115 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
115 lines
6.3 KiB
Markdown
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created: 2022-01-16
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---
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# Notes on Jeff Emmett's Rewriting the Story of Human Collaboration (Or, an Introduction to Token Bonding & Curation Markets)
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https://blog.goodaudience.com/rewriting-the-story-of-human-collaboration-c33a8a4cd5b8
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Key claim: DAOs are a new form of decentralized human collaboration
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> In the below presentation, I will discuss a new (and experimental) form of decentralized human collaboration — the curation market, how we can structure our economic incentives to more closely resemble stable networks found in nature, and how these [cryptoeconomic primitives](https://blog.coinbase.com/the-emergence-of-cryptoeconomic-primitives-14ef3300cc10) form the building blocks of a new cooperative framework for global action that can be used to solve the world’s biggest problems.
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# Summary
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### We have wicked problems which relate collective coordination problems (e.g. climate change)
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Natural systems display complex behaviour based on interaction of agents following simple rules (e.g. ants following a trail, murmurration of birds etc) [Ed: and ... markets with human beings - which he notes a few paragraphs later]
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### How can we create value signals in human networks to direct collaborative action without central authority?
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> How can we create value signals in human networks to direct collaborative action without central authority?
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* Already exists with capitalism and markets
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* How can we utilize market forces for the common good?
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[Ed: note this is a great question and a very old and hard one. Most of human institutional innovation for a few thousand years or more relate to this question. It's a hard, hard problem with a huge associated literature.]
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### For first time can decentrally fund global projects and reward individual actions towards that goal without top-down organized leadership
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> For the first time even we can decentrally fund important global projects and reward individual actions carried out to help that goal without top-down organized leadership
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>
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> * Like a charity of NGO but without the bureaucracy
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>
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![[Pasted image 20220116085601.png]]
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### 🚩 This is a confusion of fundraising and allocation problems
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This seems a basic confusion (and an "intellectual sleight of hand" - no doubt accidental): it confuses allocation and fund-raising aspects: just because we can do allocation decentrally doesn't mean we can raise the funds decentrally!
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**How is the allocation model able to solve the fund-raising?**
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As we will say this problems is basically unsolved in what follows.
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Very similar to the issues with the [claims made by Gitcoin's Kevin Owicki](https://github.com/life-itself/web3/discussions/72)
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#TODO: move to notes and link.
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### The model he describes is as follows
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![[Pasted image 20220116090043.png]]
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### Then we have an an application example that he walks us through
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![[Pasted image 20220116160233.png]]
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![[Pasted image 20220116160239.png]]
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![[Pasted image 20220116160252.png]]
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And finishes with:
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> In some future scenario, the beaches in Thailand may have been cleaned up in large part, so fewer donations are needed. As #THC tokens are sold, their value decreases according to the token bonding curve, and the donation network smoothly winds down to a smaller level of operation, commensurate with its needs. (Granted, this could go many different ways depending on your sell curve properties — thus the importance of bonding curve parameters!)
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### Let's walk this through: it's either ponzi like (some people don't get paid back) or it runs on donations
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* The only difference from classic donation is the weird possibility of speculative profit from the gradually rising payout value ...
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* But given the zero sum aspect of in and out (ETH can't get created out of thin air) and the 50% allocation to the actual project this is only possible *either* with ponzi like mechanics where either people keep joining to pay out the early investors *or* the later "investors/donors" end up out of pocket (i.e. they just donate).
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### There is also no mention of how this is verified or governed
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### Either way it doesn't seem to solve the free rider problem and the funding of public goods
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> Though the example above is very basic, it shows some interesting properties. It encourages donations to successful causes, while also providing network liquidity for goal completion, and a potential investment opportunity for donors and project participants at the same time. A project able to bootstrap funding and token value along with project success and popularity, yet also remain light on infrastructure, with the ability to wind down gradually as a problem is resolved and the project requires less funding — that’s a powerful idea.
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* How does it *encourage* donations to successful causes? (Or, at least any more than the current system?)
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* The point that money can pay out is nice though one could build that into most existing orgs relatively easily (just track who contributed). It does note seem a very powerful or important idea.
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### Claims seem large against the backing analysis
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The thing for me is how so many things are claimed with very little to back them up.
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>
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> The true benefit of a model like this, however, would be opening up the ability to create these movements to absolutely anyone in the world, with permissionless, direct, incentivized global participation.
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Wait a moment this is only true for the entity setup but includes none of the governance and distribution of funds.
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### Summary
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![[Pasted image 20220116184626.png]]
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The critique (as often) is good: yes, traditional organizations are slow and inefficient. Also solving global collective actions are politically and socially very hard ...
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But ... we haven't been shown how token bonding curves really help at all.
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## Asides
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### Market forces for fairness
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> Market forces prioritize good information, disincentivize bad actors
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🚩 But information systems aren't markets or democracies ... and if they were, then simply building good informational voting systems would have been a solved problem years ago ...
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[Ed: what's surprising is you have (what I believe) is a really progressive person making very market-fundamentalist arguments. It's like the American Enterprise Institute approach to solving the climate crisis ...]
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![[Pasted image 20220116183150.png]]
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## TODO
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TODO: insert citation link |