Incorporate post-state technocracy video

concepts/blockchain.md

@@ -3,4 +3,16 @@ A blockchain is the technical underpinnings for [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md)
 
 In computer science terms, a blockchain is a data structure that maintains a list of transactions that are authenticated using public key cryptography and linked using a hash function. A blockchain is a partial ordering of transaction event into windows of discrete time by which the transactions are programmatically committed to a shared history which is synchronized via a [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md).
 
-The term has been overloaded extensively and other data structures and topologies have been described as blockchain regardless of their use. See [permissioned-blockchain](permissioned-blockchain.md).
+The term has been overloaded extensively and other data structures and topologies have been described as blockchain regardless of their use. See [permissioned blockchain](permissioned-blockchain.md).
+
+## References
+
+1. Schneier, Bruce. 2019. ‘There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology’. Wired Magazine. https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/.
+1. Jeffries, Adrianne. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Meaningless’. The Verge 7: 2018.
+1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
+1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2017. ‘Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come Up With a Use for Blockchain’. Hackernoon. 22 December 2017. https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-blockchain-ee98c180100.
+1. ———. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
+1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
+1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
+1. White, Molly. 2022a. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/.
+1. ———. 2022b. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.

concepts/consensus-algorithm.md

@@ -19,5 +19,4 @@ An algorithm where blocks in the blockchain are validated by a closed and fixed
 
 An algorithm where blocks in the blockchain are validated by the consumption of digital resources such as random access memory or disk space. The global sortition functions weighted based on the size and availability of these digital space resources.
 
-
-
+## References

concepts/crypto-exchange.md

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 # Crypto Exchanges
-A crypto exchange is a corporate entity that acts as an intermediary between people to exchange [currency](currency.md) for [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md)
+A crypto exchange is a centralized corporate entity that acts as an intermediary between people to exchange [currency](currency.md) for [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md)
 
 Crypto exchanes are not regulated as [market makers](market-maker.md) or [brokers](broker.md), but instead as [money services business](money-services-business.md) which does regulate [order book](order-book.md) making or protect consumers against [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md).
 
 Many crypto exchanges offer their own [stablecoin](stablecoin.md) whose reserves may be comingled with customer funds.
 
-See also [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md) and [economic cartel](cartel.md).
+See also [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md),  [economic cartel](cartel.md) and [recentralization](recentralization.md).
 
 ## Jurisdictions
 
@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ Crypto exchanges are commonly set up in jurisdictions with loose or corrupt fina
 * Canning, Tonya. 2018. ‘"We Don’t Want Hippy Money”: Contradiction and Exchange in a Local Currency System’. PhD Thesis. https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/74190.
 * Johnson, Kristin N. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: Regulating Cryptocurrency Exchanges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831439.
 * Mizrach, Bruce. 2021. ‘Stablecoins: Survivorship, Transactions Costs and Exchange Microstructure’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3835219.
-* Roubini, Nouriel. 2019. ‘The Great Crypto Heist’. Project Syndicate 16. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-financial-scams-by-nouriel-roubini-2019-07.
+* Roubini, Nouriel. 2019. ‘The Great Crypto Heist’. Project Syndicate 16. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-financial-scams-by-nouriel-roubini-2019-07.

concepts/dao.md

@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ DAOs are best understood as shares in a common enterprise which is run by potent
 
 * Constitution DAO
 * Spice DAO
+* [democracy.earth](../dao/democracy.earth.md)
+* [diatom.fund](../dao/diatom.fund.md)
+* [hive.io](../dao/hive.io.md)
+* [hypha.earth](../dao/hypha.earth.md)
+* [joinseeds.earth](../dao/joinseeds.earth.md)
+* [klimadao.finance](../dao/klimadao.finance.md)
+* [Panvala](../dao/panvala.com.md)
+* [yogacoin.tech](../dao/yogacoin.tech.md)
 
 ## References
 
@@ -36,13 +44,4 @@ DAOs are best understood as shares in a common enterprise which is run by potent
 * Tse, Nathan. 2020. ‘Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Corporate Form’. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 51 (2): 313. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v51i2.6573.
 * Vergne, JP. 2020. ‘Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform’. Organization Theory 1 (4): 263178772097705. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720977052.
 * Wissel, Tim. 2021. ‘Fairness and Freedom for Artists: Towards a Robot Economy for the Music Industry’. https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid:72a5c834-177b-4b3c-a6f8-8e69e65cfdf4.
-* Wright, Steven A. 2021. ‘Measuring DAO Autonomy: Lessons From Other Autonomous Systems’. IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society 2 (1): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/tts.2021.3054974.
-
-
-## References
-
-* [@morrison_dao_2020]
-* [@wright_measuring_2021]
-* [@securities_sec_2017]
-* [@rikken_ins_nodate]
-* [@brennecke_-central_2022]
+* Wright, Steven A. 2021. ‘Measuring DAO Autonomy: Lessons From Other Autonomous Systems’. IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society 2 (1): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/tts.2021.3054974.

concepts/governance-token.md

@@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
 # Governance Token
 A [bearer instrument](bearer-instrument.md) token which grants holders of the token the capacity to "vote" in a [smart-contracts](smart-contracts.md) implementation of a [DAO](dao.md) or other [DeFi](defi.md) protocol.
 
-Governance tokens are imitations of voting shares [stock](stock.md) as seen in regulated [security](security.md).
+Governance tokens are imitations of voting shares [stock](stock.md) as seen in regulated [security](security.md).
+
+## References
+
+* Chen, Liang, Tony W. Tong, Shaoqin Tang, and Nianchen Han. 2022. ‘Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization’. Journal of Management 48 (1): 147–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211045023.
+* Crepaldi, M. 2020. ‘The Authority of Distributed Consensus Systems Trust, Governance, and Normative Perspectives on Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers’. PhD Thesis. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9432/.
+* El Faqir, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2020. ‘An Overview of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations on the Blockchain’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, August. https://doi.org/10.1145/3412569.3412579.
+* Rikken, Olivier, Marijn Janssen, and Zenlin Kwee. n.d. ‘The Ins and Outs of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (Daos)’. Available at SSRN 3989559. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3989559.

concepts/ideologies/anarchocapitalism.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+#  Anarcho-capitalism

concepts/recentralization.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Recentralization
+A term for [blockchain](blockchain.md) project which alleges [decentralization](decentralization.md) in either their design, yet produces an outcome in which control of the protocol remains centralized in the hands of one or several central parties. Projects may achieve this end either intentionally or unintentionally.
+
+See [DeFi](defi.md).
+
+## References
+1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
+* Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
+* White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
+* Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
+* Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
+* Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
+* Schneider, Nathan. 2019. ‘Decentralization: An Incomplete Ambition’. Journal of Cultural Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553.
+* Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
+* Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.

guide/index.md

@@ -210,6 +210,8 @@ Understand the deeper theoretical concepts behind the technical and economic cla
 * [Value](../concepts/value.md)
 * [Bubbles](../concepts/bubble.md)
 * ["Madness of crowds"](../concepts/madness-crowds.md)
+* [Decentralization](../concepts/decentralization.md)
+* [Recentralization](../concepts/recentralization.md)
 * [High control groups](../concepts/high-control-group.md)
 * [Thought terminating cliche](../concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md)
 * [Sign value](../concepts/sign-value.md)

notes/post-state-technocracy.md

@@ -2,14 +2,35 @@
 
 Rufus Pollock and Stephen Diehl do a deep dive into the Silicon Valley utopian ideas of crypto assets and explore the notion that crypto assets are a means to create a new form of network state outside of the existing international order.
 
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZ0iCJkM3PU
+
 ## Topic
 [post-state-technocracy](../concepts/ideologies/post-state-technocracy.md)
 
 ## Concepts Covered
 
-#todo
+* [post-state-technocracy](post-state-technocracy.md)
+* [cryptoanarchism](../concepts/ideologies/cryptoanarchism.md)
+* [technosolutionism](../concepts/ideologies/technosolutionism.md)
+* [public-goods-problem](../concepts/public-goods-problem.md)
+* [narrative-economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md)
+* [public-goods-problem](../concepts/public-goods-problem.md)
+* [free-rider-problem](../concepts/free-rider-problem.md)
+* [private-money](../concepts/private-money.md)
 
 ## Summary
 #todo 
 
-## References
+## References
+1. May, Tim. 1994. ‘Cyphernomicon’.
+1. May, Timothy. 1992. ‘The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace.
+1. ‘1729 - The Network State’. n.d. 1729. Accessed 4 March 2022. https://1729.com/.
+1. Brody, Ann, and Stéphane Couture. 2021. ‘Ideologies and Imaginaries in Blockchain Communities: The Case of Ethereum’. Canadian Journal of Communication 46 (3). https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2021v46n3a3701.
+1. Coase, Ronald Harry. 1937. ‘The Nature of the Firm’. Economica 4 (16): 386–405.
+1. Faria, Inês. 2019. ‘Trust, Reputation and Ambiguous Freedoms: Financial Institutions and Subversive Libertarians Navigating Blockchain, Markets, and Regulation’. Journal of Cultural Economy 12 (2): 119–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2018.1547986.
+1. Groos, Jan. 2021. ‘Crypto Politics: Notes on Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Governance in Blockchain Based Technologies’. In Data Loam, 1:148–70. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110697841-009.
+1. Husain, Syed Omer, Alex Franklin, and Dirk Roep. 2020. ‘The Political Imaginaries of Blockchain Projects: Discerning the Expressions of an Emerging Ecosystem’. Sustainability Science 15 (2): 379–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00786-x.
+1. Hussain, Syed Omer. 2020. ‘Prefigurative Post-Politics as Strategy: The Case of Government-Led Blockchain Projects’. The Journal of The British Blockchain Association 3 (1): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.31585/jbba-3-1-(2)2020.
+1. Srinivasan, Parag Khanna, Balaji S. n.d. ‘Great Protocol Politics’. Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed 22 February 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/11/bitcoin-ethereum-cryptocurrency-web3-great-protocol-politics/.
+1. West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
+1. Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.

site/pages/about.md

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Third, we provide a high quality “conceptual underlay” with definitions and
 
 ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/life-itself/web3/main/excalidraw/sensemaking-3-layers-2022-03-04.excalidraw.svg)
 
-First, it provides a basic introduction for those coming to the topic with simple, neutral summaries of the key ideas and terms. Second, it provides a base “layer” that underpins the evaluative work and the overall sensemaking effort. For example, suppose you want to evaluate the claim that DAOs can help address the climate crisis. To do that you are going to need contextual material about public goods, free rider problems – as well as information on what a DAO is! In addition, this is an area where meanings of key terms are crucial and often ill-defined, for example what exactly do we mean by “collaboration” or “freedom” (and is our meaning shared)? By providing reference material and common definitions we can ground and inform the debate and avoid “talking past each other”.
+First, it provides a basic introduction for those coming to the topic with simple, neutral summaries of the key ideas and terms. Second, it provides a base “layer” that underpins the evaluative work and the overall sensemaking effort. For example, suppose you want to evaluate the claim that DAOs can help address the climate crisis. To do that you are going to need contextual material about public goods, [free rider problems](../../concepts/free-rider-problem.md)  – as well as information on what a DAO is! In addition, this is an area where meanings of key terms are crucial and often ill-defined, for example what exactly do we mean by “collaboration” or “freedom” (and is our meaning shared)? By providing reference material and common definitions we can ground and inform the debate and avoid “talking past each other”.
 
 ![](https://res.cloudinary.com/ds7qslkd0/image/upload/v1647432615/Web3/crypto_for_good_iedlhs.png)