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claims/authoritarianism.md
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# Bitcoin is a means to counter authoritarian regimes
## References
* Bogost, Ian. 2017. ‘Cryptocurrency Might Be a Path to Authoritarianism’. The Atlantic 30.
* Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
* Krugman, Paul. 2022. ‘The Strange Alliance of Crypto and MAGA Believers’. The New York Times, 11 January 2022, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/opinion/crypto-cryptocurrency-money-conspiracy.html.
* Xie, Rain. 2019. ‘Why China Had to Ban Cryptocurrency but the U.S. Did Not: A Comparative Analysis of Regulations on Crypto-Markets between the U.S. and China’. Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 18 (2): 457–89. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1684&context=law_globalstudies.
* Wang, Gangjin, Yanping Tang, Chi Xie, and Shou Chen. 2019. ‘Is Bitcoin a Safe Haven or a Hedging Asset? Evidence from China’. Journal of Management Science and Engineering 4 (3): 173–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001.
* Ottenhof, Luke. 2021. ‘Crypto-Colonialists Use the Most Vulnerable People in the World as Guinea Pigs’. VICE Media.
## References
* [@bogost_cryptocurrency_2017]
* [@gerard_salvador_nodate]
* [@analytica_salvador_2021]
* [@gerard_salvadors_nodate]
* [@murray_imf_nodate]
* [@xie_why_2019]
* [@kaiser_looming_2018]
* [@wang_is_2019]
* [@wang_blockchain_2020]

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# Are crypto assets a hedge against "debasement" of the dollar?
## References

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# Are crypto assets a hedge against inflation?
## References
* Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’.
* Shaffer, Daniel S. 2010. Profiting in Economic Storms: A Historic Guide to Surviving Depression, Deflation, Hyperinflation, and Market Bubbles. John Wiley & Sons.
* Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
* Wang, Gangjin, Yanping Tang, Chi Xie, and Shou Chen. 2019. ‘Is Bitcoin a Safe Haven or a Hedging Asset? Evidence from China’. Journal of Management Science and Engineering 4 (3): 173–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001.
* Frisch, Helmut. 1983. Theories of Inflation. Cambridge University Press.
## References
* [@cembalest_maltese_2022]

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# The Aspirations and Claims of Crypto & Web3
Explore crypto and "web3" in terms of the claims made about it. These subclaims fall into six categories about different aspects of either technical, financial or political reconfiguration projects.
* What are the key high level problems, aspirations and hopes that crypto & web3 movement speaks to?
* What are the specific claims made for crypto & web3?
* What are the evaluations of those claims and evidence for them?
#### Better Economy
* [Is bitcoin a currency?](/claims/is-bitcoin-currency.md)
* [Are crypto assets a risk to the dollar?](is-threat-dollar.md)
* [What type of asset is a crypto token?](is-type-of-asset.md)
* [How do we value a crypto token?](is-valuation-model.md)
* [Are crypto assets a systemic risk to the economy?](../claims/is-systemic-risk.md)
* [Is bitcoin the basis for a new gold standard?](is-digital-gold.md)
* [Are crypto assets a bubble?](../claims/is-bubble.md)
* [Are crypto assets a form of gambling?](../claims/is-gambling.md)
* [Are crypto tokens an inflation hedge?](is-hedge-inflation.md)
* [Is private money a desirable system?](../claims/is-private-money.md)
* [Is bitcoin compataible with ESG investing?](is-bitcoin-esg.md)
#### Better Society / Financial Inclusion
* [What consumer protections exist for crypto assets?](is-consumer-protections.md)
* [Are crypto assets a form of predatory inclusion?](../claims/is-predatory.md)
* [Is crypto a solution for the unbanked?](is-crypto-unbanked.md)
* [Is crypto providing faster payment rails or better remittance services?](../claims/is-better-payments.md)
* [Are NFTs are good for artists?](is-nfts-artists.md)
* [What is the narrative economics of crypto assets?](is-narrative-economics.md)
* [Are crypto assets legal?](../claims/is-legal.md)
* [Are crypto tokens a negative-sum investment?](is-negative-sum.md)
* [Why do people invest in crypto tokens?](is-why-invest.md)
* [Why does crypto have such a weird subculture?](is-weird-culture.md)
#### Financial Liberty
* [Is an unregulated transnational payment rail even desirable?](is-transnational-payment.md)
* [Are crypto tokens a hedge against the "debasement" of the dollar?](is-hedge-debasement.md)
* [Are crypto tokens a means to counter authoritarianism?](is-authoritarianism.md)
* [Can I raise money for my non-profit using crypto tokens?](../claims/is-raise-nonprofit.md)
* [Can I do a crowdfunded equity raise for my company using crypto tokens?](../claims/is-raise-company.md)
#### Solving Public Goods Problems
* [Is crypto a means to fund public goods projects?](../claims/is-public-goods.md)
* [Is bitcoin mining harmful to the environment?](is-environmental-footprint.md)
* [Is crypto bringing about the "financialization of everything"?](../claims/is-hyperfinancialization.md)
* [Is crypto a giant misallocation of resources with an enormous opportunity cost?](../claims/is-opportunity-cost.md)
#### Financial Innovation
* [Is the underlying technology of "blockchain" useful for non-monetary purposes?](is-blockchain-tech.md)
* [Is web3 even a well-defined term?](is-well-defined.md)
* [Is web3 green?](is-web3-green.md)
* [Is web3 decentralized?](is-web3-decentralized.md)
* [Is web3 the next generation of the internet?](is-new-internet.md)
#### Creative Destruction
* [Is web3 a means to dismantle the American tech hegemony?](../claims/is-disrupt-hegemony.md)
* [Is web3 a means to rebuild the global financial system?](../claims/is-new-financial-system.md)
* [Are crypto tokens a means to accelerate the collapse of capitalism?](../claims/is-collapse.md)
## Taxonomy of Aspirations and Claims
https://coggle.it/diagram/YhTzF8ZnKihmLdpm/t/web3-taxonomy-of-aspirations-and-claims
![](https://res.cloudinary.com/ds7qslkd0/image/upload/v1647356492/Web3/Web3_Taxonomy_of_Aspirations_and_Claims_m4bmpq.png)
## TODO
#todo/writing #todo/clarify
* Aspirations and Claims: a short section explaining relationship of aspirations and claims
* Web of claims: claims depend on other claims. We use hypothesis trees to break down claims
* Claims vs questions: do we frame things as questions or statements e.g. Bitcoin is a currency vs Can Bitcoin function as a currency? Bitcoin harms the environment vs Does Bitcoin harm the environment?
## Subclaims
* How do we value a crypto token?
* Are crypto assets a risk to the state?
* What is the narrative of crypto assets?
* Can Bitcoin function as a currency?
* Are crypto tokens are securities (what type of assets are crypto token?)

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# Bitcoin is not a means to counter authoritarian regimes
Crypto assets are not a safe haven for one’s investments or a a shield against government tyranny. In his whitepaper *Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility*, Nassim Taleb writes of the "safe haven from tyranny" thesis:
> By its very nature, bitcoin is open for all to see. The belief in one’s ability to hide one’s assets from the government with a public blockchain easily triangularizable at endpoints, and not just read by the FBI but also by people in their living rooms, requires a certain lack of financial seasoning and statistical understanding — perhaps even a lack of minimal common sense. For instance a Wolfram Research specialist was able to statistically detect and triangularize "anonymous" ransom payments made by Colonial Pipeline on May 8 in 2021 — and it did not take long for the FBI to restore the funds. We can safely assume that government structures and computational power will remain stronger than those of distributed operators who, while distrusting one another, can fall prey to simple hoaxes
>
> [..] The slogan "Escape government tyranny hence bitcoin" is similar to advertisements in the 1960s extolling the health benefits of cigarettes.
The massive power asymmetries of authoritarian regimes and their control over both traditional payment rails and domestic implies that dissidents attempting to use crypto assets to circumvent repression or capital controls will find it very difficult to move assets or cash out. Without the capacity to cash out the efficacy of their actions is fundamentally limited to external geographic regions outside of the authoritarian regimes. Since no action can effected internal to the regime this fundamentally refutes the argument that crypto assets are an effective tool for dissidents.
This is best evidenced by the Canadian convoys in 2022 which attempted to take international donations in crypto assets and found themselves and their accounts frozen by both banks and Canadian [crypto exchanges](../concepts/crypto-exchange.md) which blocked transactions under [illicit financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md) laws. This made using the donations to purchase supplies impossible and undermined the [crypto assets](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) narrative.
The complete ban of [crypto asset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) by the People's Republic of China also does not lend credibility to the thesis that [crypto asset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) are outside the remit of authoritarian controls and their restriction on capital movement and controls over domestic [money services business](../concepts/money-services-business.md).
## References
1. Bogost, Ian. 2017. ‘Cryptocurrency Might Be a Path to Authoritarianism’. The Atlantic 30.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2022. ‘The Strange Alliance of Crypto and MAGA Believers’. The New York Times, 11 January 2022, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/opinion/crypto-cryptocurrency-money-conspiracy.html.
1. Xie, Rain. 2019. ‘Why China Had to Ban Cryptocurrency but the U.S. Did Not: A Comparative Analysis of Regulations on Crypto-Markets between the U.S. and China’. Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 18 (2): 457–89. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1684&context=law_globalstudies.
1. Wang, Gangjin, Yanping Tang, Chi Xie, and Shou Chen. 2019. ‘Is Bitcoin a Safe Haven or a Hedging Asset? Evidence from China’. Journal of Management Science and Engineering 4 (3): 173–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001.
1. Ottenhof, Luke. 2021. ‘Crypto-Colonialists Use the Most Vulnerable People in the World as Guinea Pigs’. VICE Media.

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# Is crypto providing faster payment rails or better remittance services?
# Crypto is not providing faster payment rails or better remittance services
Since crypto assets [cannot function as a currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md) they are not useful in building payment rails or remittance services. Crypto assets can be used as an intermediate asset in which trades can be settled in, but this does not serve a technical of financial purpose and simply introduces an unnecessary conversion step for no reason.
If a person wants to send money abroad, say from US dollars to Indian rupees they would typically use a service like MoneyGram or WesternUnion. These services charge a transaction fee and do a direct swap of dollars to rupees from the reserves the company holds in both currencies.
If one postulates using a crypto asset or stablecoin as a means to do remittances then they are stilled faced with the *last leg problem*. Their relative in India still has to convert the crypto asset into the local currency to buy domestic goods and services since supermakets and stores don't accept crypto assets. So instead of a dollar-to-ruppee conversion we would hypothetically do a dollar-to-bitcoin-to-rupee conversion. This introduces [price-risk](../concepts/price-risk.md), [counterparty-risk](../concepts/counterparty-risk.md) and unnecessary conversion fees to accommodate the extraneous third exchange. This is unnecessary complexity and likely more expensive, for no reason.
See industry analysts describe this proble in more depth: [Does Bitcoin/Blockchain make sense for international money transfers?](https://www.saveonsend.com/bitcoin-blockchain-money-transfer/)
## References
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’.
1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
1. Amato, Massimo, and Luca Fantacci. 2020. A Fistful of Bitcoins: The Risks and Opportunities of Virtual Currencies. Bocconi University Press. https://www.egeaeditore.it/ita/prodotti/economia/a-fistful-of-bitcoins.aspx.
1. Coeckelbergh, Mark. 2015. Money Machines: Electronic Financial Technologies, Distancing and Responsibility in Global Finance. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306116671949n.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Non-Innovation of Cryptocurrency’. 7 July 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/non-innovation.html.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2017. ‘Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come Up With a Use for Blockchain’. Hackernoon. 22 December 2017. https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-blockchain-ee98c180100.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
1. White, Molly. 2022a. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/.
1. ———. 2022b. ‘Anonymous Cryptocurrency Wallets Are Not So Simple’. Molly White (blog). 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/anonymous-crypto-wallets/.
1. ———. 2022c. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
1. ———. 2022d. ‘Cryptocurrency’s Robinhood Effect’. Molly White. 17 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/cryptocurrencys-robinhood-effect/.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
1. Amato, Massimo, and Luca Fantacci. 2020. A Fistful of Bitcoins: The Risks and Opportunities of Virtual Currencies. Bocconi University Press. https://www.egeaeditore.it/ita/prodotti/economia/a-fistful-of-bitcoins.aspx.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2017. ‘Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come Up With a Use for Blockchain’. Hackernoon. 22 December 2017. https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-blockchain-ee98c180100.

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# Bitcoin cannot function as a currency
Unlike the namesake of "cryptocurrency" might imply, [bitcoin](../concepts/bitcoin.md) is not a [currency](../concepts/currency.md). It does not fulfil the economic definition of [money](../concepts/money.md). Instead bitcoin is best understood as a [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) or [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) product.
Since bitcoin is not issued by a sovereign state or [central-banks](../concepts/central-banks.md) there is no central party to manage the [deflationary](../concepts/deflationary.md) spirals that occur in the [price-formation](../concepts/price-formation.md) of the asset. Therefore it is subject to wild and uncontrollable volatility that makes it unsuitable as a *means of exchange*. No amount of technology can fix the volatility problem as it is a function of the economic design of the asset and its fixed supply. This arises out of the political imaginaries of the [neo-metallism](../notes/neo-metallism.md) school and [austrian-economics](../concepts/ideologies/austrian-economics.md) that informed the design of the bitcoin to resemble the historical [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md) and the conception of heterodox ideas of [sound-money](../concepts/sound-money.md).
Since bitcoin is not issued by a sovereign state or [central-banks](../concepts/central-banks.md) there is no central party to manage the [deflationary](../concepts/deflationary.md) spirals that occur in the [price-formation](../concepts/price-formation.md) of the asset. Therefore it is subject to wild and uncontrollable volatility that makes it unsuitable as a *means of exchange*. No amount of technology can fix the volatility problem as it is a function of the economic design of the asset and its fixed supply. This arises out of the political imaginaries of the [neo-metallism](../notes/neo-metallism.md) school and [Austrian economics](../concepts/austrian-economics.md) that informed the design of the bitcoin to resemble the historical [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md) and the conception of heterodox ideas of [sound money](../concepts/sound-money.md).
As evidenced by real world context there are very few businesses that are willing to transact in bitcoin because of the price volatility. Companies that attempt to do this, such as Tesla, effectively issue an [option](../concepts/derivative.md) in which the goods or services payed are quoted at a strike price and if the transaction is reversed or goods returned the amount will be returned to the customer in a different currency at the strike price. This terms commerce into a [security](../concepts/security.md) transaction and is a taxable event.
@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Since bitcoin is [deflationary](../concepts/deflationary.md) it encourages hordi
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘The Non-Innovation of Cryptocurrency’. 7 July 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/non-innovation.html.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘The Intellectual Incoherence of Cryptoassets’. 7 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/crypto-absurd.html.
1. ———. n.d. ‘The Case Against Crypto’. Accessed 17 February 2022. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/against-crypto.html.
1. Eich, Stefan. 2018. ‘The Currency of Politics’. The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes.
1. Gerard, David. 2017. Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Ethereum & Smart Contracts. David Gerard.
1. Kolchinski, Alex. 2022. ‘Crypto Is an Unproductive Bubble’. Alex Kolchinski (blog). 18 March 2022. https://alexkolchinski.com/2022/03/18/crypto-is-an-unproductive-bubble/.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Is Basically a Ponzi Scheme’. The Seattle Times 30.
@ -26,12 +27,4 @@ Since bitcoin is [deflationary](../concepts/deflationary.md) it encourages hordi
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. White, Molly. 2022a. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
1. ———. 2022b. ‘Cryptocurrency’s Robinhood Effect’. Molly White. 17 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/cryptocurrencys-robinhood-effect/.
## References
* [@taleb_bitcoin_2021-1]
* [@corradi_disenchantment_2018]
* [@nabilou_ignorance_2019]
* [@krugman_brutal_2021]
* [@krugman_technobabble_2021]
* [@varoufakis_what_2021]
1. ———. 2022b. ‘Cryptocurrency’s Robinhood Effect’. Molly White. 17 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/cryptocurrencys-robinhood-effect/.

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**Environmental Problems**
* [Environmental footprint of mining](environmental-footprint.md)
* [Environmental footprint of mining](is-environmental-footprint.md)
**Sustainability Problems**
**Social Problems**
* [Crypto is a market bubble](is-bubble.md)
* [Predatory inclusion](is-predatory.md)
* [Consumer protections](consumer-protections.md)
* [Consumer protections](is-consumer-protections.md)
* [Bitcoin is not a currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md)
* [Private money is not sustainable](is-private-money.md)
* [Crypto is not build a new financial system](is-new-financial-system.md)
@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ Bitcoin is not compatible with ESG investing.
* [Market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md)
## References
1. Gallersdörfer, Ulrich, Lena Klaaßen, and Christian Stoll. ‘Accounting for Carbon Emissions Caused by Cryptocurrency and Token Systems’, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.06477.
1. Goodkind, Andrew L., Benjamin A. Jones, and Robert P. Berrens. ‘Cryptodamages: Monetary Value Estimates of the Air Pollution and Human Health Impacts of Cryptocurrency Mining’. Energy Research and Social Science 59, no. March 2019 (2020): 101281. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101281.
1. Gallersdörfer, Ulrich, Lena Klaaßen, and Christian Stoll. ‘Accounting for Carbon Emissions Caused by Cryptocurrency and Token Systems’, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.06477.
@ -36,4 +35,5 @@ Bitcoin is not compatible with ESG investing.
1. Schinckus, Christophe. ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: An Overview of the Sustainability of Blockchain Technology’. Energy Research and Social Science 69, no. May (2020): 101614. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101614.
1. Vries, Alex De. ‘Bitcoin’s Energy Consumption Is Underestimated : A Market Dynamics Approach’. Energy Research & Social Science 70, no. July (2020): 101721. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101721.
1. Vries, Alex de. ‘Bitcoin’s Growing Energy Problem’. Joule 2, no. 5 (2018): 801–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2018.04.016.
1. Vries, Alex de, and Christian Stoll. ‘Bitcoin’s Growing e-Waste Problem’. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 175, no. September (2021): 105901. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105901.
1. Vries, Alex de, and Christian Stoll. ‘Bitcoin’s Growing e-Waste Problem’. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 175, no. September (2021): 105901. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105901.
1. Wanat, Emanuel. 2021. ‘Are Crypto-Assets Green Enough? – An Analysis of Draft EU Regulation on Markets in Crypto Assets from the Perspective of the European Green Deal’. Osteuropa Recht 67 (2): 237–50. https://doi.org/10.5771/0030-6444-2021-2-237.

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## References
1. Schneier, Bruce. 2019. ‘There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology’. Wired Magazine. https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/.
1. Jeffries, Adrianne. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Meaningless’. The Verge 7: 2018.
1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
1. Jeffries, Adrianne. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Meaningless’. The Verge 7: 2018. https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/7/17091766/blockchain-bitcoin-ethereum-cryptocurrency-meaning.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2017. ‘Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come Up With a Use for Blockchain’. Hackernoon. 22 December 2017. https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-blockchain-ee98c180100.
1. ———. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. Orlowski, A. 2018. ‘Blockchain Study Finds 0.00% Success Rate and Vendors Don’t Call Back When Asked for Evidence’. The Register.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Blockchainism’. 11 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/blockchainism.html.
1. Pollock, Rufus. 2016. ‘Reflections on the Blockchain · Rufus Pollock Online’. 2 July 2016. https://rufuspollock.com/2016/07/02/reflections-on-the-blockchain/.
1. Orlowski, A. 2018. ‘Blockchain Study Finds 0.00% Success Rate and Vendors Don’t Call Back When Asked for Evidence’. The Register. https://www.theregister.com/2018/11/30/blockchain_study_finds_0_per_cent_success_rate/.
1. Manski, Sarah, and Michel Bauwens. 2020. ‘Reimagining New Socio-Technical Economics Through the Application of Distributed Ledger Technologies’. Frontiers in Blockchain 2 (January): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2019.00029.
1. Pardo-Guerra, Juan Pablo. 2019. Automating Finance. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108677585.
1. Rauchs, Michel, Apolline Blandin, Keith Bear, and Stephen B McKeon. 2019. ‘2nd Global Enterprise Blockchain Benchmarking Study’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3461765.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Blockchainism’. 11 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/blockchainism.html.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘The Non-Innovation of Cryptocurrency’. 7 July 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/non-innovation.html.
———. 2021b. ‘The Handwavy Technobabble Nothingburger’. 24 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/nothing-burger.html.
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
1. White, Molly. 2022a. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/.
1. ———. 2022b. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.
1. Pollock, Rufus. 2016. ‘Reflections on the Blockchain · Rufus Pollock Online’. 2 July 2016. https://rufuspollock.com/2016/07/02/reflections-on-the-blockchain/.
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220107084533/https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.

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@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ And several notable investors have also described it as a bubble:
* George Soros
## References
1. Chancellor, Edward. 1999. ‘Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation’.
1. Blanchard, Olivier J, and Mark W Watson. 1982. ‘Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets’. NBER Working Paper, no. w0945.
1. Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press.
@ -34,9 +33,5 @@ And several notable investors have also described it as a bubble:
1. Mackay, Charles. 2012. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Simon and Schuster.
1. Nabilou, Hossein, and André Prüm. 2019. ‘Ignorance, Debt, and Cryptocurrencies: The Old and the New in the Law and Economics of Concurrent Currencies’. Journal of Financial Regulation 5 (1): 29–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjz002.
1. Smales, L. A. 2022. ‘Investor Attention in Cryptocurrency Markets’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101972.
## References
* [@blanchard_bubbles_1982]
* [@caferra_bitcoin_2021]
* [@fry_negative_2016]
* [@tonelli_internet_2022]
1. Kolchinski, Alex. 2022. ‘Crypto Is an Unproductive Bubble’. Alex Kolchinski (blog). 18 March 2022. https://alexkolchinski.com/2022/03/18/crypto-is-an-unproductive-bubble/.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2021. ‘The Brutal Truth About Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.

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# Are crypto tokens a means to accelerate the collapse of capitalism?
# Crypto tokens are not a means to destroy capitalism
## References
Crypto tokens are indeed a form of [predatory investment](../concepts/predatory-inclusion.md) that may have wide-reaching consequences in the lives of people it harms. However it is not a means to accelerate the collapse of capitalism even if one subscribes to the [accelerationism](../concepts/accelerationism.md) school of thought and believed this the acceleration of capitalism and its destruction was a good thing.
The crypto ideology is an extension of neoliberal project that aims to expand the scope and reach of markets to all aspects of human life, a concept often referred to [as hyperfinancialization](is-hyperfinancialization.md). Since crypto tokens aim to expand the scope of capitalism, they cannot bring about anything but more capitalism.
## References
1. Reijers, Wessel, and Mark Coeckelbergh. 2018. ‘The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology: Investigating the Social Ontology and Normative Configurations of Cryptocurrencies’. Philosophy and Technology 31 (1): 103–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0239-x.
1. Golumbia, David. 2013a. ‘Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of “Digital Freedom.”’ Clemson University Department of English.
1. ———. 2015. ‘Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism’. MoneyLab Reader: An Intervention in Digital Economy, Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. Brody, Ann, and Stéphane Couture. 2021. ‘Ideologies and Imaginaries in Blockchain Communities: The Case of Ethereum’. Canadian Journal of Communication 46 (3). https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2021v46n3a3701.
1. DuPont, Quinn. 2016. ‘The Politics of Cryptography: Bitcoin and the Ordering Machines’. Journal of Peer Production 1 (4): 1–23. http://peerproduction.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DuPont_draft_submission.pdf.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. Jarvis, Craig. 2021. ‘Cypherpunk Ideology: Objectives, Profiles, and Influences (1992–1998)’. Internet Histories, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2021.1935547.
1. Husain, Syed Omer, Alex Franklin, and Dirk Roep. 2020. ‘The Political Imaginaries of Blockchain Projects: Discerning the Expressions of an Emerging Ecosystem’. Sustainability Science, 1–16.

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Crypto is not a solution for the unbanked
Crypto is not a solution to unbanked, because by its [deflationary](../concepts/deflationary.md) design it [cannot function as a currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md) therefore it is unusable as a scaleable means for purchasing goods and services.
Crypto is not a solution for the [unbanked](../concepts/unbanked.md), because by its [deflationary](../concepts/deflationary.md) design it [cannot function as a currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md) therefore it is unusable as a scaleable means for purchasing goods and services.
The purpose of retail banking services is to provide stable, reliable and safe means for citizens to transact with money that is safely custodied by a trusted third party with the guarantees of regulation by the government that the party will hold their accounts on their behalf. This includes practices like customer service, deposit insurance, fraud detection, transaction reversal and issuing of payment cards.
@ -16,8 +16,4 @@ The purpose of retail banking services is to provide stable, reliable and safe m
1. Kapsis, I. (2021). Should we trade market stability for more financial inclusion? The case of crypto-assets regulation in EU. FinTech, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Regulation and Crime Prevention, 85–104. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020998-9
1. Sen, A., Lindquist, J., & Kolling, M. (2020). Who’s Cashing in? Contemporary Perspectives on New Monies and Global Cashlessness (Vol. 19). Berghahn Books.
1. Swartz, L. (2020). New money: How payment became social media. Yale University Press. https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300233223/new-money
1. Vasudevan, R. (2020). Libra and Facebook’s Money Illusion. Challenge, 63(1), 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2019.1684662
## References
* [@koning_bitcoin_2020]
* [@knauer_what_2019]
1. Vasudevan, R. (2020). Libra and Facebook’s Money Illusion. Challenge, 63(1), 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2019.1684662

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# Bitcoin is the basis for a new gold standard
The neo-metallist claim is that bitcoin can operate as a new asset class which exhibits similar financial properties to [gold](../concepts/gold.md). The strong version of this claim asserts that a new [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md) can be built on top of bitcoin and that this can form the basis for a market economy.
# Bitcoin is not the basis for a new gold standard
The neo-metallist claim is that bitcoin can operate as a new asset class which exhibits similar financial properties to [gold](../concepts/gold.md). The strong version of this claim asserts that a new [gold standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md) can be built on top of bitcoin and that this can form the basis for a market economy.
These claims do not stand up to scrutiny as bitcoin has no consistent track record of being a reliable store of value, it's price movements are extremely volatile and thus is not a reliable place to store value on long time scales. Bitcoin's price behavior is uncorrelated with gold and is largely correlated with the broader stock market making it an unreliable safe haven in times of market volatility since it is directly exposed to the price action of the Nasdaq.
@ -8,19 +8,10 @@ Bitcoin has no historical track record of being a store of value and lacks the m
Even if bitcoin could function as a new gold standard. The [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md) and the notion of [sound-money](../concepts/sound-money.md) are undesirable foundations for a [currency](../concepts/currency.md) and were subject to extreme shocks and deflationary spirals, and as such were abandoned in the mid 20th century in favour of the [central-banks](../concepts/central-banks.md) and fiat monetary system.
## References
1. Cembalest, M. (2022). The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains (p. 31).
1. Allon, F. (2018). Money after Blockchain: Gold, Decentralised Politics and the New Libertarianism. Australian Feminist Studies, 33(96), 223–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2018.1517245
1. Bernanke, B. S. (2004). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press.
1. Caferra, R., Tedeschi, G., & Morone, A. (2021). Bitcoin: Bubble that bursts or Gold that glitters? Economics Letters, 205, 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942
1. Doctorow, C. (2022, February 3). Pluralistic: 03 Feb 2022 – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow. https://pluralistic.net/2022/02/03/liquidation-preference/
1. Selmi, R., Bouoiyour, J., & Wohar, M. E. (2022). “Digital Gold” and geopolitics. Research in International Business and Finance, 59, 101512. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101512
1. Wang, G., Tang, Y., Xie, C., & Chen, S. (2019). Is bitcoin a safe haven or a hedging asset? Evidence from China. Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 4(3), 173–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001
## References
* [@cembalest_maltese_2022]
* [@taleb_bitcoin_2021]
* [@caferra_bitcoin_2021]
* [@weisenthal_bitcoin_nodate]
* [@krugman_bitcoin_2018]
* [@bernanke_essays_2004]
1. Cembalest, M. (2022). The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains (p. 31).
1. Wang, G., Tang, Y., Xie, C., & Chen, S. (2019). Is bitcoin a safe haven or a hedging asset? Evidence from China. Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 4(3), 173–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001

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# Is web3 a means to dismantle the American tech hegemony?
## References
Web3 is not a means to disrupt the American tech hegemony, companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon etc. Since web3 has no coherent meaning or purpose, all projects that are currently being developed under the web3 umbrella are aimless technical Potemkin villages that mask thinly veiled [pump and dump](../concepts/pump-and-dump.md) schemes based on [securities](../concepts/security.md) [regulatory arbitrage](../concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md). This type of company structure is not set up for long term growth or product delivery outside of pumping more token schemes.
This is further evidenced by the simple fact that [blockchain](../concepts/blockchain.md) technologies have intractable scalability problems, and that the only means they do scale is by [recentralization](../concepts/recentralization.md) thereby recreating just another corporate monolith but based on inferior technology and without the ability to perform [regulatory arbitrage](../concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md)..
There is no future in web3 that poses any threat to tech monopoly because there simply is no meaningful tech to challenge any real business model.
## References
1. Marx, Paris. n.d. ‘Why Web3, the Blockchain and Crypto Internet, Is Doomed to Fail’. Accessed 29 March 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/web3-blockchain-crypto-internet-doomed-fail-doesnt-live-up-hype-2022-3?r=US&IR=T.
1. Morozov, Evgeny. 2022. ‘Web3: A Map in Search of Territory’. The Crypto Syllabus. 13 January 2022. https://the-crypto-syllabus.com/web3-a-map-in-search-of-territory/.
1. O’Reilly, Tim. 2021. ‘Why It’s Too Early to Get Excited About Web3’. O’Reilly Media. 13 December 2021. https://www.oreilly.com/radar/why-its-too-early-to-get-excited-about-web3/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2021. ‘The Web3 Fraud’. USENIX. 16 December 2021. https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/web3-fraud.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Levine, Matt. 2022. ‘Web3 Takes Trust Too’. 10 January 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/web3-takes-trust-too.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Zitron, Ed. 2022. ‘Solutions That Create Problems’. Substack newsletter. Ed Zitron’s Where’s Your Ed At (blog). 23 February 2022. https://ez.substack.com/p/solutions-that-create-problems.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Web3 Is Bullshit’. 4 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.

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@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ Bitcoin [mining](../concepts/mining.md) is enormously harmful to the environment
1. E-waste from discarded or broken ASIC mining equipment, graphics cards and servers.
2. Carbon release from fossil fuels used to power mining data centres
3. Opportunity cost of the energy used to run [consensus algorithm](../concepts/consensus-algorithm.md) compared to more efficient of efficient [real time gross settlement systems](../concepts/rtgs.md) and traditional [payment rails](transnational-payment.md) such as SWIFT, SEPA, Visa and ACH.
3. Opportunity cost of the energy used to run [consensus algorithm](../concepts/consensus-algorithm.md) compared to more efficient of efficient [real time gross settlement systems](../concepts/rtgs.md) and traditional [payment rails](is-transnational-payment.md) such as SWIFT, SEPA, Visa and ACH.
Crypto assets are not [providing access to the unbanked](crypto-unbanked.md) and cannot fulfil even a tiny fraction of the services provided by the global banking sector. Crypto assets like [bitcoin](../concepts/bitcoin.md) are simply a very inefficient and settlement to issue a speculative [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) used primarily for [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) and [illicit financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md).
Crypto assets are not [providing access to the unbanked](is-crypto-unbanked.md) and cannot fulfil even a tiny fraction of the services provided by the global banking sector. Crypto assets like [bitcoin](../concepts/bitcoin.md) are simply a very inefficient and settlement to issue a speculative [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) used primarily for [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) and [illicit financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md).
BItcoin mining has the equivalent power consumption of the state of Argentina, a country with a population of 45 million people. Bitcoin mining has an e-waste footprint comparable to that of entire population of Germany.

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@ -22,11 +22,4 @@ Crypto assets are not gambling if one participates in a [cartel](../concepts/car
1. ———. 2018b. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021. ‘The Brutal Truth About Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
## References
* [@knauer_what_2019]
* [@barrett_why_2021]
* [@powell_crypto-shills_2019]
* [@panos_financial_2019]
* [@koning_bitcoin_2020]
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.

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# Crypto assets are not a hedge against the "debasement" of the dollar
Crypto assets are not a hedge against the "debasement" of the dollar. This thesis is predicated on an [Austrian economics](../concepts/austrian-economics.md) reading of United States monetary policy and policy a conspiracy theories about the Federal Reserve.
As part of the normal functioning of the dollar system, the Federal Reserve will make
[interventionist](../concepts/keynsian-economics.md) adjustments to its quantitative easing policy and interest rates with the aims of achieving dollar price stability. The economy adjusts to these changes and factors them into the pricing of goods and services and this system results in relatively predictable inflation which encourages economic growth. The use of the pejorative term "debasement" to describe the natural and principled monetary policy rests on a fallacy which presumes fringe economic theories.
Crypto assets are not a hedge against these empty notions, because "debasement" does not exist as a phenomenon.
## References
1. Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048.
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Binder, Carola. 2021. ‘Technopopulism and Central Banks’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3823456.
1. Braun, Benjamin, and Daniela Gabor. 2019. ‘Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power’. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nf9ms.
1. Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. In 55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2022). https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
1. Malloy, Matthew, and David Lowe. 2021. ‘Global Stablecoins: Monetary Policy Implementation Considerations from the U.S. Perspective’. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021 (020): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2021.020.

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# Are crypto assets a hedge against inflation?
Since [crypto asset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) have no exposure to domestic commodities there is no evidence of anti-correlation with a basket of goods that would be inversely to the national [currency](../concepts/currency.md) in times of inflation. Instead crypto assets seem largely correlated with the broader [stock](../concepts/stock.md) market and as such are not a hedge against any macroeconomic factors of either inflation or equity markets.
[Crypto assets](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) are also not a reliable [store of value](../concepts/store-of-value.md) in times of market instability, and as such do not provide a safe haven of any form since they are largely correlated with the broader market and exposed to the same shocks.
In his whitepaper *Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility*, Nassim Taleb deconstructs the "inflation hedge" thesis:
> The experience of March 2020, during the market panic upon the onset of the pandemic, when bitcoin dropped farther than the stock market —and subsequently recovered with it upon the massive injection of liquidity is sufficient evidence that it cannot remotely be used as a tail hedge against systemic risk. Furthermore, bitcoin appears to respond to liquidity, exactly like other bubble items. It is also uncertain what could happen should the internet experience a general, or an even a regional, outage — particularly if it takes place during a financial collapse.
## References
1. Shaffer, Daniel S. 2010. Profiting in Economic Storms: A Historic Guide to Surviving Depression, Deflation, Hyperinflation, and Market Bubbles. John Wiley & Sons.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Wang, Gangjin, Yanping Tang, Chi Xie, and Shou Chen. 2019. ‘Is Bitcoin a Safe Haven or a Hedging Asset? Evidence from China’. Journal of Management Science and Engineering 4 (3): 173–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’.
1. Frisch, Helmut. 1983. Theories of Inflation. Cambridge University Press.

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# Is crypto bringing about the "financialization of everything"?
The purpose of NFTs and crypto projects generally is to further expand the scope [artificial scarcity](../concepts/artificial-scarcity.md), [enclose](../concepts/enclosure.md) and financialize greater portions of the human experience. The stated aim of the web3 and crypto project is world in which all aspects of human life (art, justice, philosophy, politics, relationships) are simply [ficticious commodities](../concepts/ficticious-commodity.md) to be traded in a market place and that human beings should subordinate all free will, individuality and rationality to the market.
The embodiment of the web3 and crypto ideology is an example of what the political theorist Macpherson denoted *possessive individualism*:
> [Possessive individualism is a philosophy] in which an individual is conceived as the sole proprietor of his or her skills and owes nothing to society for them. These skills (and those of others) are a commodity to be bought and sold on the open market, and in such a society is demonstrated a selfish and unending thirst for consumption which is considered the crucial core of human nature.
Projects like NFTs and the their increasing enclosure of culture have indicated that the intent of crypto is nothing but the complete domination of the human experience by Capital in the bleak dystopian future imagined by their acolytes.
## References
* Bellinger, Matthew. 2018. ‘The Rhetoric of Bitcoin: Money, Politics, and the Construction of Blockchain Communities’. ResearchWorks Archive. PhD Thesis. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/43342.
* Breidbach, Christoph F., and Silviana Tana. 2021. ‘Betting on Bitcoin: How Social Collectives Shape Cryptocurrency Markets’. Journal of Business Research 122: 311–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.09.017.
* Bruun, Maja Hojer, Astrid Oberborbeck Andersen, and Adrienne Mannov. 2020. ‘Infrastructures of Trust and Distrust: The Politics and Ethics of Emerging Cryptographic Technologies’. Anthropology Today 36 (2): 13–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8322.12562.
* Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘Gamestop, Bitcoin and the Commoditization of Populist Rage’. 3 February 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/gamestop.html.
* *———. n.d. ‘The Case Against Crypto’. Accessed 17 February 2022. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/against-crypto.html.
* Lee, Seung Cheol. 2020. ‘Magical Capitalism, Gambler Subjects: South Korea’s Bitcoin Investment Frenzy’. Cultural Studies 0 (0): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2020.1788620.
* Starita, G D. 2018. ‘On Bitcoin Usage, Techno-Optimism and Participation-An Anthropological Perspective on Rovereto s Bitcoin Valley Users’. Master’s Thesis. https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/374186.
* Stephenson, Will. n.d. ‘Cryptonomicon’. Harpers Review. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://harpers.org/archive/2022/03/cryptonomicon-bitcoin-maximalists-miami/.
* Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
* Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
* Warzel, Charlie. 2021. ‘The Absurdity Is the Point’. Substack newsletter. Galaxy Brain (blog). 11 May 2021. https://warzel.substack.com/p/the-absurdity-is-the-point.
* Weisenthal, Joe. n.d. ‘Bitcoin Is a Faith-Based Asset’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-21/bitcoin-is-a-faith-based-asset-joe-weisenthal.
* Xu, Yizhou. 2021. ‘Digitizing Death: Commodification of Joss Paper on Chinese Online Cemetery’. Journal of Cultural Economy 0 (0): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2021.1952099.
* Aharon, David Y., and Ender Demir. 2021. ‘NFTs and Asset Class Spillovers: Lessons from the Period around the COVID-19 Pandemic’. Finance Research Letters, 102515. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102515.
* Bodó, Balázs, Alexandra Giannopoulou, João Quintais, and Péter Mezei. 2022. ‘The Rise of NFTs: These Aren’t the Droids You’re Looking For’. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4000423.
* Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Tinkerbell Griftopia’. 19 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/tinkerbell.html.
* Dowling, Michael. 2021. ‘Fertile LAND: Pricing Non-Fungible Tokens’. Finance Research Letters, 102096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102096.
* Fairfield, Joshua. 2021. ‘Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique Digital Property’. Indiana Law Journal, 1–99. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821102.
* Frye, Brian L. 2021. ‘After Copyright: Pwning NFTs in a Clout Economy’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971240.
* *———. n.d. ‘How to Sell NFTs Without Really Trying’. Harvard Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3930430.
* Gibson, Johanna. 2021. ‘The Thousand-and-Second Tale of NFTS, as Foretold by Edgar Allan Poe’. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 11 (3): 249–69. https://doi.org/10.4337/qmjip.2021.03.00.
* Guadamuz, Andres. 2021. ‘The Treachery of Images: Non-Fungible Tokens and Copyright’. SSRN Electronic Journal 16 (12): 1367–85. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905452.
* Kim, Soyeon. 2020. ‘Fractional Ownership, Democratization, and Bubble Formation - The Impact of Blockchain Enabled Asset Tokenization’. 26th Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2020, 0–5. https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/adv_info_systems_research/adv_info_systems_research/19/.
* Kong, De-Rong, and Tse-Chun Lin. 2021. ‘Alternative Investments in the Fintech Era: The Risk and Return of Non-Fungible Token (NFT)’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914085.
* Low, Kelvin F K. 2021. ‘The Emperor’s New Art: Cryptomania, Art & Property’. Art & Property. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978241.
* Mackenzie, Simon, and Diāna Bērziņa. 2021. ‘NFTs: Digital Things and Their Criminal Lives’. Crime, Media, Culture, 17416590211039796. https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590211039797.
* Nadini, Matthieu, Laura Alessandretti, Flavio Di Giacinto, Mauro Martino, Luca Maria Aiello, and Andrea Baronchelli. 2021. ‘Mapping the NFT Revolution: Market Trends, Trade Networks, and Visual Features’. Scientific Reports 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-00053-8.
* *‘NFTs, Cryptocurrencies and Web3 Are Multilevel Marketing Schemes for a New Generation - WSJ’. n.d. Accessed 14 March 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nfts-cryptocurrencies-and-web3-are-multilevel-marketing-schemes-for-a-new-generation-11645246824.
* Olson, Dan. 2022a. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.
1. Olson, Dan. 2022a. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.
1. McKay, Ian (2014). "A Half-Century of Possessive Individualism: C.B. Macpherson and the Twenty-First-Century Prospects of Liberalism". Journal of the Canadian Historical Association. 25 (1): 307–340. doi:10.7202/1032806ar. ISSN 1712-6274.
1. Bellinger, Matthew. 2018. ‘The Rhetoric of Bitcoin: Money, Politics, and the Construction of Blockchain Communities’. ResearchWorks Archive. PhD Thesis. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/43342.
1. Breidbach, Christoph F., and Silviana Tana. 2021. ‘Betting on Bitcoin: How Social Collectives Shape Cryptocurrency Markets’. Journal of Business Research 122: 311–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.09.017.
1. Bruun, Maja Hojer, Astrid Oberborbeck Andersen, and Adrienne Mannov. 2020. ‘Infrastructures of Trust and Distrust: The Politics and Ethics of Emerging Cryptographic Technologies’. Anthropology Today 36 (2): 13–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8322.12562.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘Gamestop, Bitcoin and the Commoditization of Populist Rage’. 3 February 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/gamestop.html.
1. *———. n.d. ‘The Case Against Crypto’. Accessed 17 February 2022. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/against-crypto.html.
1. Lee, Seung Cheol. 2020. ‘Magical Capitalism, Gambler Subjects: South Korea’s Bitcoin Investment Frenzy’. Cultural Studies 0 (0): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2020.1788620.
1. Starita, G D. 2018. ‘On Bitcoin Usage, Techno-Optimism and Participation-An Anthropological Perspective on Rovereto s Bitcoin Valley Users’. Master’s Thesis. https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/374186.
1. Stephenson, Will. n.d. ‘Cryptonomicon’. Harpers Review. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://harpers.org/archive/2022/03/cryptonomicon-bitcoin-maximalists-miami/.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Warzel, Charlie. 2021. ‘The Absurdity Is the Point’. Substack newsletter. Galaxy Brain (blog). 11 May 2021. https://warzel.substack.com/p/the-absurdity-is-the-point.
1. Weisenthal, Joe. n.d. ‘Bitcoin Is a Faith-Based Asset’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-21/bitcoin-is-a-faith-based-asset-joe-weisenthal.
1. Xu, Yizhou. 2021. ‘Digitizing Death: Commodification of Joss Paper on Chinese Online Cemetery’. Journal of Cultural Economy 0 (0): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2021.1952099.
1. Aharon, David Y., and Ender Demir. 2021. ‘NFTs and Asset Class Spillovers: Lessons from the Period around the COVID-19 Pandemic’. Finance Research Letters, 102515. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102515.
1. Bodó, Balázs, Alexandra Giannopoulou, João Quintais, and Péter Mezei. 2022. ‘The Rise of NFTs: These Aren’t the Droids You’re Looking For’. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4000423.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Tinkerbell Griftopia’. 19 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/tinkerbell.html.
1. Dowling, Michael. 2021. ‘Fertile LAND: Pricing Non-Fungible Tokens’. Finance Research Letters, 102096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102096.
1. Fairfield, Joshua. 2021. ‘Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique Digital Property’. Indiana Law Journal, 1–99. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821102.
1. Frye, Brian L. 2021. ‘After Copyright: Pwning NFTs in a Clout Economy’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971240.
1. *———. n.d. ‘How to Sell NFTs Without Really Trying’. Harvard Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3930430.
1. Gibson, Johanna. 2021. ‘The Thousand-and-Second Tale of NFTS, as Foretold by Edgar Allan Poe’. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 11 (3): 249–69. https://doi.org/10.4337/qmjip.2021.03.00.
1. Guadamuz, Andres. 2021. ‘The Treachery of Images: Non-Fungible Tokens and Copyright’. SSRN Electronic Journal 16 (12): 1367–85. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905452.
1. Kim, Soyeon. 2020. ‘Fractional Ownership, Democratization, and Bubble Formation - The Impact of Blockchain Enabled Asset Tokenization’. 26th Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2020, 0–5. https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/adv_info_systems_research/adv_info_systems_research/19/.
1. Kong, De-Rong, and Tse-Chun Lin. 2021. ‘Alternative Investments in the Fintech Era: The Risk and Return of Non-Fungible Token (NFT)’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914085.
1. Low, Kelvin F K. 2021. ‘The Emperor’s New Art: Cryptomania, Art & Property’. Art & Property. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978241.
1. Mackenzie, Simon, and Diāna Bērziņa. 2021. ‘NFTs: Digital Things and Their Criminal Lives’. Crime, Media, Culture, 17416590211039796. https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590211039797.
1. Nadini, Matthieu, Laura Alessandretti, Flavio Di Giacinto, Mauro Martino, Luca Maria Aiello, and Andrea Baronchelli. 2021. ‘Mapping the NFT Revolution: Market Trends, Trade Networks, and Visual Features’. Scientific Reports 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-00053-8.

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# Legality of crypto assets
Crypto assets are unlicensed [security](../concepts/security.md) contracts for unregulated [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) investments. The legality of this depends on jurisdiction.
Crypto assets are unlicensed [security](../concepts/security.md) contracts for unregulated [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) investments. Crypto assets are effectively like buying unregulated penny stocks, except with no recourse to the courts in the case of the project being a [Ponzi scheme](../concepts/ponzi-scheme.md) or [exit scam](../concepts/exit-scam.md).
The legality of buying these risky products depends on the jurisdiction of the buyer and seller.
In the United States the sale of unregistered securities to the public is illegal. The legality of the purchase of of unregistered securities will depend on the facts and circumstances of the sale, but regardless of legality these type of extra-legal transactions expose the buyer to unnecessary [risk](../concepts/risk.md) compared to buying normal [financial assets](../concepts/financial-asset.md) within the regulatory perimeter. Buying crypto assets is thus legally inadvisable from both a risk and compliance perspective.
## References
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jü rgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘The Political Case for a Blanket Cryptocurrency Ban’. 30 March 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/banbitcoin.html.
———. 2021b. ‘How to Destroy Bitcoin’. 13 July 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/destroy-bitcoin.html.
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
1. ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets’. 2019. Financial Conduct Authority. https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf#page=11.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘The Political Case for a Blanket Cryptocurrency Ban’. 30 March 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/banbitcoin.html.
1. Hacker, Philipp, and Chris Thomale. 2018. ‘Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law’. European Company and Financial Law Review 15 (4): 645–96.
1. Huang, Sherena Sheng. 2021. ‘Crypto Assets Regulation in the UK: An Assessment of the Regulatory Effectiveness and Consistency’. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance.
1. Rae, Shaela W, and Lorraine Mastersmith. 2019. ‘Crypto Asset Trading in Canada: Entering a New Era of Regulation’. Banking & Finance Law Review 35 (1): 153–85.
1. Shri T Rabi Sankar. n.d. ‘Cryptocurrencies – An Assessment’. Reserve Bank of India. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1196.
1. Zwitter, Andrej, and Jilles Hazenberg. 2020. ‘Decentralized Network Governance: Blockchain Technology and the Future of Regulation’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012.
## References
* [@hacker_crypto-securities_2018]
* [@azgad-tromer_crypto_2018]
* [@ivaniuk_cryptocurrency_2020]
* [@rae_crypto_2019]
1. Zwitter, Andrej, and Jilles Hazenberg. 2020. ‘Decentralized Network Governance: Blockchain Technology and the Future of Regulation’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012.

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# What is the narrative economics of crypto assets?
The economist Robert J. Shiller defines [narrative economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) as:
> Epidemiology of narratives relevant to economic fluctuations. The human brain has always been highly tuned towards narratives, whether factual or not, to justify ongoing actions, even such basic actions as spending and investing. Stories motivate and connect activities to deeply felt values and needs. Narratives “go viral” and spread far, even worldwide, with economic impact.
The phenomenon of [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) and their [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md) nature is largely driven by narratives, which may differ drastically between projects. These narratives speak to different human needs and beliefs that touch upon ideas as vast as culture, [value](../concepts/value.md), money, art, law, identity and politics.
Bitcoin has a [narrative economics](is-narrative-economics.md) based on [libertarianism](../concepts/libertarianism.md), [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) and aspirations of [private money](private-money.md).
Ethereum has a [narrative economics](is-narrative-economics.md) based on [technosolutionism](../concepts/technosolutionism.md), [libertarianism](../concepts/libertarianism.md), [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) and aspirations of [private money](private-money.md).
Dogecoin is an example of a crypto asset with no political imaginaries, no [currency](currency.md) narrative, no pretense of [use value](use-value.md), no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md), and no narrative economics whatsoever. it is a pure manifestation of the [greater fool theory](greater-fool-theory.md) with an investment thesis rooted purely in [financial nihilism](../concepts/financial-nihilism.md).
## Narrative Claims
* Cypherpunk
* Anarchism
* [Libertarianism](../concepts/libertarianism.md)
* [Cryptoanarchism](../concepts/cryptoanarchism.md)
* [Financial Nihilism](../concepts/financial-nihilism.md)
* [Post State Technocracy](../concepts/post-state-technocracy.md)
* [Technolibertarianism](../concepts/idelogies/technolibertarianism.md)
* [Technosolutionism](../concepts/technosolutionism.md)
* [Technocollectivism](../concepts/techno-collectivism.md)
* [Accelerationism](../concepts/accelerationism.md)
## References
1. Shiller, Robert J. 2017. ‘Narrative Economics’. American Economic Review 107 (4): 967–1004.
1. Reijers, Wessel, and Mark Coeckelbergh. 2018. ‘The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology: Investigating the Social Ontology and Normative Configurations of Cryptocurrencies’. Philosophy and Technology 31 (1): 103–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0239-x.
1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
1. Ailon, Galit. 2022. ‘The Double Meaning of Money’. Sociological Theory, 073527512110711. https://doi.org/10.1177/07352751211071121.
1. Becker, Katrin. 2022. ‘Blockchain Matters—Lex Cryptographia and the Displacement of Legal Symbolics and Imaginaries’. Law and Critique. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-021-09317-8.
1. Faustino, Sandra, Inês Faria, and Rafael Marques. 2021. ‘The Myths and Legends of King Satoshi and the Knights of Blockchain’. Journal of Cultural Economy 0 (0): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2021.1921830.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. Maddox, Alexia, and Luke J Heemsbergen. 2021. ‘Digging in Crypto-Communities’ Future-Making: From Dark to Doge’. M/C Journal 24 (2 SE-). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2755.
1. Narayanan, Arvind. 2013. ‘What Happened to the Crypto Dream?, Part 1’. IEEE Security & Privacy 11 (2): 75–76.
1. Olson, Dan. 2022. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.
1. Gerard, David. 2017. Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Ethereum & Smart Contracts. David Gerard.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2021a. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘The Brutal Truth About Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2022. ‘The Strange Alliance of Crypto and MAGA Believers’. The New York Times, 11 January 2022, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/opinion/crypto-cryptocurrency-money-conspiracy.html.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/.
1. Brody, Ann, and Stéphane Couture. 2021. ‘Ideologies and Imaginaries in Blockchain Communities: The Case of Ethereum’. Canadian Journal of Communication 46 (3). https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2021v46n3a3701.
1. Doody, Sean. 2020. ‘Reactionary Technopolitics: A Critical Sociohistorical Review’. Fast Capitalism 17 (1): 143–64. https://doi.org/10.32855/fcapital.202001.009.
1. Golumbia, David. 2013a. ‘Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of “Digital Freedom.”’ Clemson University Department of English.
1. ———. 2013b. ‘Cyberlibertarians’ Digital Deletion of the Left: Technological Innovation Does Not Inherently Promote the Left’s Goals’. Retrieved 2 (10): 2014.
1. ———. 2015. ‘Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism’. MoneyLab Reader: An Intervention in Digital Economy, Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
1. ———. 2016. The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism. U of Minnesota Press.
1. *———. 2018. ‘Zealots of the Blockchain: The True Believers of the Bitcoin Cult’. The Baffler, no. 38: 102–11.
1. Groos, Jan. 2021. ‘Crypto Politics: Notes on Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Governance in Blockchain Based Technologies’. In Data Loam, 1:148–70. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110697841-009.
1. Hayden, Micahel, and Megan Squire. n.d. ‘How Cryptocurrency Revolutionized the White Supremacist Movement’. Souther Poverty Law Center. Accessed 3 March 2022. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2021/12/09/how-cryptocurrency-revolutionized-white-supremacist-movement.
1. Husain, Syed Omer, Alex Franklin, and Dirk Roep. 2020. ‘The Political Imaginaries of Blockchain Projects: Discerning the Expressions of an Emerging Ecosystem’. Sustainability Science, 1–16.
1. Hussain, Syed Omer. 2020. ‘Prefigurative Post-Politics as Strategy: The Case of Government-Led Blockchain Projects’. The Journal of The British Blockchain Association 3 (1): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.31585/jbba-3-1-(2)2020.
1. The Economist. 2022. ‘The Charm of Cryptocurrencies for White Supremacists’, 5 February 2022. https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/02/05/the-charm-of-cryptocurrencies-for-white-supremacists.
1. Anderson, Patrick D. 2021. ‘Privacy for the Weak, Transparency for the Powerful: The Cypherpunk Ethics of Julian Assange’. Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3): 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09571-x.
1. Beltramini, Enrico. 2020. ‘Trust, Finance and Cryptocurrencies’. In Anarchism, Organization and Management, 184–95. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315172606-19.
1. *———. 2021. ‘Against Technocratic Authoritarianism. A Short Intellectual History of the Cypherpunk Movement’. Internet Histories 5 (2): 101–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2020.1731249.
1. Beyer, Jessica L., and Fenwick Mckelvey. 2015. ‘You Are Not Welcome among US: Pirates and the State’. International Journal of Communication 9 (1): 890–908.
1. Curran, Giorel, and Morgan Gibson. 2013. ‘WikiLeaks, Anarchism and Technologies of Dissent’. Antipode 45 (2): 294–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01009.x.
1. DuPont, Isaac Quinn. 2017. ‘An Archeology of Cryptography: Rewriting Plaintext, Encryption, and Ciphertext’. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. PhD Thesis, University of Toronto (Canada). https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/78958.
1. DuPont, Quinn. 2016. ‘The Politics of Cryptography: Bitcoin and the Ordering Machines’. Journal of Peer Production 1 (4): 1–23. http://peerproduction.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DuPont_draft_submission.pdf.
1. Gehl, Robert W. 2016. ‘Power/Freedom on the Dark Web: A Digital Ethnography of the Dark Web Social Network’. New Media and Society 18 (7): 1219–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814554900.
1. Gürses, Seda, Arun Kundnani, and Joris Van Hoboken. 2016. ‘Crypto and Empire: The Contradictions of Counter-Surveillance Advocacy’. Media, Culture and Society 38 (4): 576–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716643006.
1. Hellegren, Isadora. 2020. ‘Crypto-Discourse, Internet Freedom, and the State’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication. https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-887.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. Jarvis, Craig. 2021. ‘Cypherpunk Ideology: Objectives, Profiles, and Influences (1992–1998)’. Internet Histories, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2021.1935547.
1. May, Tim. 1994. ‘Cyphernomicon’.
1. May, Timothy. 1992. ‘The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace.
1. Moore, Daniel, and Thomas Rid. 2016. ‘Cryptopolitik and the Darknet’. Survival 58 (1): 7–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1142085.
1. Phillips, David J. 1998. Digital Cash and the Surveillance Society: Negotiating Identification in New Consumer Payment Systems. University of Pennsylvania. https://search.proquest.com/openview/7ca922683fe4b5a94427e0ba59af4def/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y.
1. West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
1. ———. 2020. ‘Survival of the Cryptic: Tracing Technological Imaginaries across Ideologies, Infrastructures, and Community Practices’. New Media and Society, 1461444820983017. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820983017.
TODO: group by narrative

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# Is web3 a means to rebuild the global financial system?
# Web3 is not a means to rebuild the global financial system.
Crypto assets do [not have the capacity](is-bitcoin-currency.md) to function as [money](../concepts/money.md) which serves as the foundation for a financial system. Without money which can mediate transactions, serve as a medium exchange, be used to denominate contracts and issue debt products in, all of modern finance could not exist.
Crypto has no theoretical basis as a foundation for a financial system because it is not fit for purpose and is not a [currency](../concepts/currency.md).
## References
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
1. Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
1. Dini, Paolo, and Alexandros Kioupkiolis. 2019. ‘The Alter-Politics of Complementary Currencies: The Case of Sardex’. Cogent Social Sciences 5 (1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2019.1646625.
1. Petz, Marcus. 2020. ‘When Is Money Not a Currency? Developments from Finland of Proto-Community Currencies’. International Journal of Community Currency Research 24 (2): 30–53.
1. Gorton, Gary B, and Jeffery Zhang. 2021. ‘Taming Wildcat Stablecoins’. Available at SSRN 3888752.

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# Crypto is not building a new internet
The meme of a "new internet" is a consistent and persistent marketing term that has always existed in technology, to the point where the term itself is widely considered a joke. Many technologies are described as being a new iteration of the internet as a way of generating hype or marketing themselves to the public or regulators as important "innovation". [Crypto assets](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) continue on in this marketing trend, yet the underlying reality of the tech is completely removed from any level of paradigm shift that the early internet ushered in.
The early internet was a collaboration between the United States defense sector and private academic institutions to build early networking solutions, originally for defence applications to connect different national laboratories. The evolution of the internet expanded with the development of the world wide web in 1989, whose initial development at CERN in Switzerland allowed the dissemination of scientific research in a new form called *hypertext* which would form the foundation for the now ubiquitous HTML.
At each step along the evolution early of the internet, its design was informed and shaped by real applications and the solutions which developed rapidly were fit-for-purpose. Crypto does not resemble this kind of technical formation in any way, because crypto is a solution in search of a problem whose existence is predicated on the political imaginaries of its acolytes who advance the solution allegedly as a means to do reconfiguration projects or enrich themselves through [regulatory arbitrage](../concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md). Thus there is no resemblance to the early internet in either form or function.
The notion that crypto is building new internet is pernicious form of myth-making that wrapped in phoney populism as an excuse for the already wealthy to enrich themselves on the back of securities fraud and phoney aimless innovation detached from any real world problems.
## References
1. Blank, Steve. "A Secret History of Silicon Valley." Computer History Museum (2008).
1. O’Reilly, Tim. 2021. ‘Why It’s Too Early to Get Excited About Web3’. O’Reilly Media. 13 December 2021. https://www.oreilly.com/radar/why-its-too-early-to-get-excited-about-web3/.
1. Morozov, Evgeny. 2022. ‘Web3: A Map in Search of Territory’. The Crypto Syllabus. 13 January 2022. https://the-crypto-syllabus.com/web3-a-map-in-search-of-territory/.
1. Marx, Paris. n.d. ‘Why Web3, the Blockchain and Crypto Internet, Is Doomed to Fail’. Accessed 29 March 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/web3-blockchain-crypto-internet-doomed-fail-doesnt-live-up-hype-2022-3?r=US&IR=T.
1. Patterson, Dan. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly on Web3: “Get Ready for the Crash”’. CBS News. 10 February 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/web3-cryptocurrency-nft-tim-oreilly/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2021. ‘The Web3 Fraud’. USENIX. 16 December 2021. https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/web3-fraud.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Levine, Matt. 2022. ‘Web3 Takes Trust Too’. 10 January 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/web3-takes-trust-too.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Tonelli, Emily. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly: Crypto and NFTs Are “Pretty Serious Speculative Bubble”’. Decrypt. 10 February 2022. https://decrypt.co/92676/internet-guru-tim-oreilly-crypto-nfts-serious-speculative-bubble.
1. Yaffe-Bellany, David. 2022. ‘Millions for Crypto Start-Ups, No Real Names Necessary’. The New York Times, 2 March 2022, sec. Technology. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/technology/cryptocurrency-anonymity-alarm.html.
1. Zitron, Ed. 2022. ‘Solutions That Create Problems’. Substack newsletter. Ed Zitron’s Where’s Your Ed At (blog). 23 February 2022. https://ez.substack.com/p/solutions-that-create-problems.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Web3 Is Bullshit’. 4 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.

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# NFTs are not a net good for artists
The economic structure of [NFTs](../concepts/nft.md) is almost identical to that of [multilevel marketing schemes](../concepts/mlm.md). Both MLMs and NFTs share the same set of psychological tricks to create fear of missing out and false promises of financial windfalls to entice more victims into the scheme. Just like with MLM schemes, NFTs require an upfront buy-in cost in order to mint the NFT projects. These minting fees must be paid in a specific [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) which creates [artificial demand](../concepts/artificial-demand.md) for the token since artists are forced to buy the token at any price to buy into the scheme.
Since the NFT market depends highly on [sign-value](../concepts/sign-value.md), hype, and promotion generation the returns on any one NFT projects are only a factor of their visibility and [market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md). Thus artist who will see higher returns are ones who outside of their NFT projects already have high visibility and are thus able to leverage their influence to create exit liquidity in their NFT scheme.
Because digital tokens have no inherent value and are not backed by any other asset, hype is crypto's product and those with the most to lose are in the worst positions. NFTs are a form of [predatory inclusion](../concepts/predatory-inclusion.md) that on average does not liberate artists. Instead most artiists will engage in the token sales at a loss, making almost nothing in return. The return and payout structure is similar to that of MLMs which depend on [asymmetric information](../concepts/asymmetric-information.md) to incentiveize a small pool of individuals at the expensive a vast number of others who are victims of the scheme.
On the whole, NFTs create more harm to than good like most [is-negative-sum](is-negative-sum.md) investment schemes.
## References
1. Olson, Dan. 2022a. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.
1. *‘NFTs, Cryptocurrencies and Web3 Are Multilevel Marketing Schemes for a New Generation - WSJ’. n.d. Accessed 14 March 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nfts-cryptocurrencies-and-web3-are-multilevel-marketing-schemes-for-a-new-generation-11645246824.
1. Low, Kelvin F K. 2021. ‘The Emperor’s New Art: Cryptomania, Art & Property’. Art & Property. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978241.
1. Aharon, David Y., and Ender Demir. 2021. ‘NFTs and Asset Class Spillovers: Lessons from the Period around the COVID-19 Pandemic’. Finance Research Letters, 102515. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102515.
1. Ante, Lennart. 2021. ‘Non-Fungible Token (NFT) Markets on the Ethereum Blockchain: Temporal Development, Cointegration and Interrelations’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904683.
1. Bodó, Balázs, Alexandra Giannopoulou, João Quintais, and Péter Mezei. 2022. ‘The Rise of NFTs: These Aren’t the Droids You’re Looking For’. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4000423.
1. Çağlayan Aksoy, Pınar, and Zehra Özkan Üner. 2021. ‘NFTs and Copyright: Challenges and Opportunities’. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 16 (10): 1115–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab104.
1. Casale-Brunet, S., P. Ribeca, P. Doyle, and M. Mattavelli. 2021. ‘Networks of Ethereum Non-Fungible Tokens: A Graph-Based Analysis of the ERC-721 Ecosystem’. ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:2110.12545. http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.12545.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Tinkerbell Griftopia’. 19 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/tinkerbell.html.
1. Dowling, Michael. 2021. ‘Fertile LAND: Pricing Non-Fungible Tokens’. Finance Research Letters, 102096. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2021.102096.
1. Fairfield, Joshua. 2021. ‘Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique Digital Property’. Indiana Law Journal, 1–99. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821102.
1. Frye, Brian L. 2021. ‘After Copyright: Pwning NFTs in a Clout Economy’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971240.
1. *———. n.d. ‘How to Sell NFTs Without Really Trying’. Harvard Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, Forthcoming. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3930430.
1. Gibson, Johanna. 2021. ‘The Thousand-and-Second Tale of NFTS, as Foretold by Edgar Allan Poe’. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 11 (3): 249–69. https://doi.org/10.4337/qmjip.2021.03.00.
1. Guadamuz, Andres. 2021. ‘The Treachery of Images: Non-Fungible Tokens and Copyright’. SSRN Electronic Journal 16 (12): 1367–85. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905452.
1. Kim, Soyeon. 2020. ‘Fractional Ownership, Democratization, and Bubble Formation - The Impact of Blockchain Enabled Asset Tokenization’. 26th Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2020, 0–5. https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/adv_info_systems_research/adv_info_systems_research/19/.
1. Kong, De-Rong, and Tse-Chun Lin. 2021. ‘Alternative Investments in the Fintech Era: The Risk and Return of Non-Fungible Token (NFT)’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914085.
1. Mackenzie, Simon, and Diāna Bērziņa. 2021. ‘NFTs: Digital Things and Their Criminal Lives’. Crime, Media, Culture, 17416590211039796. https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590211039797.
1. Mazur, Mieszko. 2021. Non-Fungible Tokens (NFT). The Analysis of Risk and Return. SSRN Electronic Journal. October. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3953535.
1. Nadini, Matthieu, Laura Alessandretti, Flavio Di Giacinto, Mauro Martino, Luca Maria Aiello, and Andrea Baronchelli. 2021. ‘Mapping the NFT Revolution: Market Trends, Trade Networks, and Visual Features’. Scientific Reports 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-00053-8.
1. Solimano, Andrés. 2021. ‘The Evolution of Contemporary Arts Markets’. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003215127.
1. Tonelli, Emily. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly: Crypto and NFTs Are “Pretty Serious Speculative Bubble”’. Decrypt. 10 February 2022. https://decrypt.co/92676/internet-guru-tim-oreilly-crypto-nfts-serious-speculative-bubble.
1. Whitaker, Amy. 2021. Economics of Visual Art: Market Practice and Market Resistance. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108649919.
## External References
* [Web3 is Going Great](https://web3isgoinggreat.com)
* [Line Goes Up - The Problem with NFTs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g)
* [The NFTBay](https://thenftbay.org)

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# Is crypto providing faster payment rails or better remittance services?
# There is an enormous opportunity cost to building crypto
Crypto companies and projects are draining resources and capital that could be better invested in [productive assets](../concepts/productive-asset.md). Since these assets are [non-economic](../concepts/non-economic.md) they do not produce any net wealth or value for society as a whole, much like buying and holding physical commodities but without the commodities having [any use case or purpose](../concepts/ficticious-commodity.md).
The crypto project on a whole is therefore a drain on both capital markets and the technology industry since it is consuming time, resources, and talent that could be put towards more productive enterprises. It is a form a civilizational brain-drain towards projects which result in no net good and massive negative exteranlities on the world.
## References
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
1. Amato, Massimo, and Luca Fantacci. 2020. A Fistful of Bitcoins: The Risks and Opportunities of Virtual Currencies. Bocconi University Press. https://www.egeaeditore.it/ita/prodotti/economia/a-fistful-of-bitcoins.aspx.
1. Coeckelbergh, Mark. 2015. Money Machines: Electronic Financial Technologies, Distancing and Responsibility in Global Finance. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094306116671949n.

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# Crypto assets are predatory investments
Crypto assets are a form of predatory financial product. Crypto asset [market making](../concepts/market-maker.md) is subject to extreme forms of [market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md) not found in other regulated markets. The [price-formation](../concepts/price-formation.md) of crypto assets is untethered to any [fundamental-value](../concepts/fundamental-value.md) and instead depends purely on the [greater-fool-theory](../concepts/greater-fool-theory.md).
Crypto assets are a form of predatory financial product. Crypto asset [market making](../concepts/market-maker.md) is subject to extreme forms of [market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md) not found in other regulated markets. The [price formation](../concepts/price-formation.md) of crypto assets is untethered to any [fundamental value](../concepts/fundamental-value.md) and instead depends purely on the [greater fool theory](../concepts/greater-fool-theory.md).
The price setting by crypto excahnges and [order-book](../concepts/order-book.md) design admits extreme forms of [asymmetric-information](../concepts/asymmetric-information.md) which privileges an [economic cartel](../concepts/cartel.md) who can manipulate crypto assets to extract wealth from public from unfair market making.
The price setting by crypto exchanges and [order book](../concepts/order-book.md) design admits extreme forms of [asymmetric information](../concepts/asymmetric-information.md) which privileges an [economic cartel](../concepts/cartel.md) who can manipulate crypto assets to extract wealth from public from unfair market making.
The base economics of crypto assets make them [negative sum](negative-sum.md) which guarantees the amount of loses in the asset class exceed the gains.
The base economics of crypto assets make them [negative sum](is-negative-sum.md) which guarantees the amount of loses in the asset class exceed the gains.
Crypto assets are thus a form of predatory finance with negative [expected-return](../concepts/expected-return.md) much like [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) in a rigged casino.
@ -28,14 +28,4 @@ Crypto assets are thus a form of predatory finance with negative [expected-retur
———. 2018b. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021a. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘The Brutal Truth About Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
## References
* [@bindseil_encrypted_2022]
* [@momtaz_entrepreneurial_2020]
* [@kapsis_should_2021]
* [@iansiti_truth_2017]
* [@krugman_bitcoin_2018]
* [@krugman_bitcoin_2013]
* [@glongloff_bitcoin_nodate]
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.

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# Is private money a desirable system?
# Private money is not desirable
The aspirations of some [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) is to reinvent historical ideas of private money issuance, effectively shifting the control of an alleged currency from the democratically elected officials to the unaccountable individuals in the private sector. Unless one subscribes to extreme forms of [libertarianism](../concepts/libertarianism.md) or [anarchocapitalism](../concepts/anarchocapitalism.md) this is not a desirable state and the historical precedence on private money is one of repeated disasters compared to the normal issuance of money.
The so-called *Wildcat Banking Era* in the United States is the best example of widespread use of private money. There was no single issuer of the dollar and most banks would issue their own bank notes which would circulate in a local economy as a form of [money](../concepts/money.md). However these notes had no stable value and would not trade at par with each other, this introduced massive arbitrage opportunities for people to trade more valuable bank notes for less valuable ones. However none of this market for secondary currency exchange was beneficial for the end users or conducive for commerce. Shopkeepers would be forced to do unnecessary currency conversions for their customers, denominate their goods in multiple currencies and incur both [price-risk](../concepts/price-risk.md) and exchange risk.
Money exists as a platform to enable commerce and disparate competing currencies within one economic region undermine the project and introduce unnecessary friction to commerce. Thus private money is not desirable from a pure [capitalist](../concepts/capitalism.md) perspective.
## References
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
@ -16,7 +22,4 @@
1. North, Peter. 2007. Money and Liberation: The Micropolitics of Alternative Currency Movements. University of Minnesota Press. https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/money-and-liberation.
1. Pacione, Michael. 1997. ‘Local Exchange Trading Systems as a Response to the Globalisation of Capitalism’. Urban Studies 34 (8): 1179–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/0042098975583.
1. Petz, Marcus. 2020. ‘When Is Money Not a Currency? Developments from Finland of Proto-Community Currencies’. International Journal of Community Currency Research 24 (2): 30–53.
1. Schroeder, Rolf F. H. 2020. ‘Beyond the Veil of Money: Boundaries as Constitutive Elements of Complementary Currencies’. The Japanese Political Economy 46 (1): 17–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/2329194x.2020.1762499.
## References
* [@larue_case_nodate]
1. Schroeder, Rolf F. H. 2020. ‘Beyond the Veil of Money: Boundaries as Constitutive Elements of Complementary Currencies’. The Japanese Political Economy 46 (1): 17–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/2329194x.2020.1762499.

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# Is crypto a means to fund public goods projects?
# Crypto is not a sustainable way to fund public goods
## References

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# Can I do a crowdfunded equity raise for my company?
Raising money for a common venture is a [regulated](../concepts/regulation.md) as a [security](../concepts/security.md) sale in the United States. Raising money under a SAFT or selling tokens as a proxy for equity may run afoul of the Securities Act.
## References
This was evidenced by the [ICO](../concepts/ico.md) bubble of 2017 which resulted in a net ban on initial coin offerings for illegal fundraising activities.
See also [ICO](../concepts/ico.md), [regulatory arbitrage](../concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md), [pre-mine](../concepts/pre-mine.md) and [security](../concepts/security.md).
## References
1. Kharif, Olga. 2018. ‘Half of ICOs Die Within Four Months After Token Sales Finalized’. Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/half-of-icos-die-within-four-months-after-token-sales-finalized.
1. Livni, Ephrat, and Andrew Ross Sorkin. 2021. ‘The Dramatic Crash of a Buzzy Cryptocurrency Raises Eyebrows’. The New York Times, 28 June 2021, sec. Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/business/dealbook/icp-cryptocurrency-crash.html.
1. Andrés, Pablo de, David Arroyo, Ricardo Correia, and Alvaro Rezola. 2022. ‘Challenges of the Market for Initial Coin Offerings’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101966. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101966.
1. Burilov, Vlad. 2019. ‘Regulation of Crypto Tokens and Initial Coin Offerings in the EU: De Lege Lata and de Lege Ferenda’. European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 6 (2): 146–86. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00602003.
1. Hofman, Darra, Quinn DuPont, Angela Walch, and Ivan Beschastnikh. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance: De Facto (x)or Designed?’ In Building Decentralized Trust, 21–33. x. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54414-0_2.
1. Walch, Angela. 2019a. ‘In Code (Rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains’.
1. ———. 2019b. ‘Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains’. Regulating Blockchain. Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, Ed. by Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich, Oxford University Press, 2019. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3203198.
1. Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126.
1. Davis, Mark and DavisBruce. 2021. Crowdfunding and the Democratization of Finance. Policy Press. https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/crowdfunding-and-the-democratization-of-finance.

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# Can I raise money for my non-profit using crypto tokens?
# Can I raise money for my non-profit using crypto tokens?
## References

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# Crypto assets pose a risk to the state
Crypto assets exist for a single purpose: [regulatory arbitrage](../concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md). Effectively to undermine the rule of law and circumvent controls that nation states have put in place to safeguard the public and protect their economic interests. These include controls like [sanctions enforcement](../concepts/sanctions-enforcement.md), [know your customer](../concepts/kyc.md), [anti-money laundering](../concepts/aml.md) and [counter-terrorism financing](../concepts/ctf.md).
Dark flows of crypto assets outside of the regulatory perimeter undermines these controls by allowing criminals to circumvent the law and engage in [illicit financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md) and avoid law enforcement controls. This undermines the rule of law and the capacity of the state to protect its national interests.
While crypto assets don't pose an *existential* threat to the state per se, they do enable crime and undermine policy which weakens trust in democratic institutions and threatens the way of life for law-abiding citizens.
## References
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jü rgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘The Political Case for a Blanket Cryptocurrency Ban’. 30 March 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/banbitcoin.html.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘How to Destroy Bitcoin’. 13 July 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/destroy-bitcoin.html.
1. ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets’. 2019. Financial Conduct Authority. https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf#page=11.
1. Hacker, Philipp, and Chris Thomale. 2018. ‘Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law’. European Company and Financial Law Review 15 (4): 645–96.
1. Huang, Sherena Sheng. 2021. ‘Crypto Assets Regulation in the UK: An Assessment of the Regulatory Effectiveness and Consistency’. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance.
1. Rae, Shaela W, and Lorraine Mastersmith. 2019. ‘Crypto Asset Trading in Canada: Entering a New Era of Regulation’. Banking & Finance Law Review 35 (1): 153–85.
1. Shri T Rabi Sankar. n.d. ‘Cryptocurrencies – An Assessment’. Reserve Bank of India. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1196.
1. Zwitter, Andrej, and Jilles Hazenberg. 2020. ‘Decentralized Network Governance: Blockchain Technology and the Future of Regulation’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012.

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# Crypto assets may pose systemic risk to the larger economy
Crypto assets do not currently pose a [systemic risk](../concepts/systemic-risk.md) to the United States economy, but may in the future if their growth is left unchecked. Allegedly the [paper wealth](paper-wealth.md) locked up into crypto tokens is allegedly only on the order of the $1 trillion which is inconsequential next to the amount of capital allocated in both the US equities and bond markets. Crypto is still a relatively tiny asset class and a sudden crash in the market, while devastating to individual retail investors, would likely not bring amount much damage to financial institutions or markets as a whole.
Because of regulation and [risk](risk.md) aversion most banks and companies have very little exposure to the crypto market and will not put crypto assets directly on their balance sheet. This fundamentally limits the amount of damage a sudden crash in crypto assets could actually cause as most companies would simply not be within the financial "blast radius" were the market to go to zero overnight.
In the event of a sudden crash retail investors and the public who have chosen to gamble on crypto assets would see all of their wealth disappear instantly, likely with no recourse or chance of a bailout. This would be a very socially socially corrosive event which would be financially devastating to the public and erode trust in institutions. This is real problem that crypto assets and their insane risk properties introduce.
## References
1. Nolan, Hamilton. n.d. ‘The Ticking Bomb of Crypto Fascism’. Accessed 21 March 2022. https://inthesetimes.com/article/the-ticking-bomb-of-crypto-fascism.
1. Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048.

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# Bitcoin does not threaten the US dollar as reserve currency
Crypto assets, such as bitcoin, do not threaten the US dollar as an international [reserve currency](../concepts/reserve-currency.md) currency because they [cannot function as a currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md). To quote financial historian Adam Tooze:
> [The dollar] is backed by "nothing" other than the trifling matter of tens of trillions of dollars in private credit, the rule of law and the power of the state, itself inserted into a state system. In other words, the entire structure of global macrofinance.
Since bitcoin cannot be used to issue debt products, denominate contracts or scale to act as a medium of exchange for commerce it lacks *any* of the properties of [money](../concepts/money.md) that a reserve currency would have to fulfil. Bitcoin cannot upend the entire structure of global macrofinance any more than beanie babies or tulip bulbs could.
## References
1. Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Corradi, Fiammetta, and Philipp Höfner. 2018. ‘The Disenchantment of Bitcoin: Unveiling the Myth of a Digital Currency’. International Review of Sociology 28 (1): 193–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1430067.
1. Bratspies, Rebecca M. 2018. ‘Cryptocurrency and the Myth of the Trustless Transaction’. Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev 1. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3141605.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021a. ‘The Non-Innovation of Cryptocurrency’. 7 July 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/non-innovation.html.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘The Intellectual Incoherence of Cryptoassets’. 7 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/crypto-absurd.html.
1. ———. n.d. ‘The Case Against Crypto’. Accessed 17 February 2022. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/against-crypto.html.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Is Basically a Ponzi Scheme’. The Seattle Times 30.
1. ———. 2021a. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘The Brutal Truth About Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. Olson, Dan. 2022. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.

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# An unregulated transnational payment is not desirable
The stated aspirations of some crypto projects is to build a global supranational payment system which is [censorship resistant](../concepts/censorship-resistence.md) against nation state actors, effectively allowing parties from any jurisdiction to move value anonymously and with no controls. However from the perspective of civil society this is not desirable since the world already struggles with an excess of offshore tax evasion and dark money flows, as evidenced by the recent Panama Paper leaks.
Today there already exists and enormous [shadow banking](../concepts/shadow-bank.md) space which facilitates the creation of credit and movement of money through jurisdictions with questionable money controls and loose enforcement of policy. Many wealthy individuals avail themselves of this transnational network of trusts and shell companies to avoid paying taxes in their country of residence, opting to instead hide their money abroad in opaque financial structures set up in island nations like the Bahamas or Cayman Islands.
The incorporation of crypto into the shadow banking system, which is already happening, is providing even easier access for disreputable individuals to avoid taxes and to expand their holdings abroad. Instead of offshore shell companies, these individuals will use [stablecoin](../concepts/stablecoin.md) and [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) to hide their money from tax authorities.
From the public interest perspective none of this setup is desirable, since it allows the already wealth to avoid paying taxes and supporting [public goods](../concepts/public-goods-problem.md) and the welfare state which supports people with less resources than wealthy individuals. Crypto thus exasperates wealth inequality and allows individuals to circumvent the rule of law and undermine the entire social contract of democracy.
## References
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
1. Gorton, Gary B., and Jeffery Zhang. 2021. ‘Taming Wildcat Stablecoins’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888752.
1. Malloy, Matthew, and David Lowe. 2021. ‘Global Stablecoins: Monetary Policy Implementation Considerations from the U.S. Perspective’. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021 (020): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2021.020.
1. Pupolizio, Ivan. 2021. ‘From Libra to Diem. The Pursuit of a Global Private Currency’. Global Jurist. https://doi.org/10.1515/gj-2021-0055.
1. Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/.
1. Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January.

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# What type of assets are crypto token?
Crypto assets are [securities](../concepts/security.md) contracts for [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) investments.
# What type of assets are crypto tokens?
Crypto assets are [securities](../concepts/security.md) contracts for [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) investments. This definition excludes [stablecoins](../concepts/stablecoin.md) which are a form of debt product or [deposit](../concepts/deposit.md) product.
See the [assets](../concepts/assets.md) comparison chart for an overview of how crypto asset compare to traditional investments and currencies.
Crypto assets are [not currencies](is-bitcoin-currency.md) because they cannot fulfil the definition of [money](../concepts/money.md).
Crypto assets are [not currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md) because they cannot fulfil the definition of [money](../concepts/money.md).
Crypto assets are not [financial assets](../concepts/financial-asset.md) because they have no claims on [income cashflows](income-cashflows.md), underlying [currency](currency.md) or [commodity](commodity.md), or risk transfer between counterparties.
Crypto assets are not [commodities](../concepts/commodity.md) because they have no intrinsic value needed to fulfil any productive economic activity or human need. A hypothetical definition of their [use value](../concepts/use-value.md) depends on a circular logic.
Crypto assets are not [commodities](../concepts/commodity.md) because they have no [intrinsic value](../concepts/use-value.md) needed to fulfil any productive economic activity or human need. Any hypothetical definition of their [use value](../concepts/use-value.md) as a commodity depends on circular logic and is thus absurd.
Crypto assets may also be a form of [art](../concepts/art.md) under the fuzzy definition of "artistic intent".
See the [assets](../concepts/assets.md) comparison chart for an overview of how crypto asset compare to traditional investments and currencies.
## Comparables
While crypto assets are securities contracts, they are a pathological form of a zero-income security because they have no underlying asset or cashflows. Thus crypto assets have no direct correspondence in traditional markets, but have several pathological equivalences of traditional assets with absurd premises or terms.
Crypto assets have no direct correspondence in traditional markets, but have several pathological equivalences of traditional assets with absurd premises or terms.
* Tulip [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md)
* Zero-coupon perpetual [bond](bond.md)
* Unspendable [currency](currency.md)
* [Equity](security.md) with no cash flows or dividends
* [Commodity](commodity.md) with no [use value](../concepts/use-value.md)
* Exchange traded [pyramid-scheme](pyramid-scheme.md)
* [Equity](security.md) with no cashflows or dividends
* Exchange traded [pyramid scheme](pyramid-scheme.md)
* [Derivative](derivative.md) contract with no underlying
* [Libertarian](ideologies/libertarianism.md) performance [art](art.md)
* [Libertarian](../concepts/libertarianism.md) performance [art](art.md)
* Self-organizing [Ponzi scheme](ponzi-scheme.md)
* Tulip [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md)
* [Indulgences](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indulgence)
## References
@ -32,10 +31,10 @@ Crypto assets have no direct correspondence in traditional markets, but have sev
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Shri T Rabi Sankar. n.d. ‘Cryptocurrencies – An Assessment’. Reserve Bank of India. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1196.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220107084533/https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
1. Corradi, Fiammetta, and Philipp Höfner. 2018. ‘The Disenchantment of Bitcoin: Unveiling the Myth of a Digital Currency’. International Review of Sociology 28 (1): 193–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1430067.
1. Computerphile. 2018. Why Bitcoin Is Not Cash - Computerphile. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9HH_dFcoLc.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Intellectual Incoherence of Cryptoassets’. 7 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/crypto-absurd.html.
1. ———. n.d. ‘The Case Against Crypto’. Accessed 17 February 2022. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/against-crypto.html.
1. Weisenthal, Joe. n.d. ‘Bitcoin Is a Faith-Based Asset’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-21/bitcoin-is-a-faith-based-asset-joe-weisenthal.
1. Silverman, Gary. 2021. ‘Crypto Has “No Inherent Worth” But Is Good to Trade, Says Man Group Chief’. Financial Times, 26 July 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/9275baf4-0422-43a1-b8c9-9317882ca874.
1. Silverman, Gary. 2021. ‘Crypto Has “No Inherent Worth” But Is Good to Trade, Says Man Group Chief’. Financial Times, 26 July 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/9275baf4-0422-43a1-b8c9-9317882ca874.

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# Crypto assets do not have a verifiable valuation model
Crypto tokens have no reliable [valuation method](../concepts/valuation-model.md). It is not possible to develop a theoretical [value](../concepts/value.md) for a crypto token because there is no demand curve generated by a [use case](../concepts/use-value.md) or any [income or cashflows](../concepts/income-cashflows.md) associated with the [security](../concepts/security.md). Crypto tokens have a strictly zero [fundamental value](../concepts/fundamental-value.md) and a [present-value](../concepts/present-value.md) of zero.
Crypto tokens have no reliable [valuation method](../concepts/valuation-model.md). It is not possible to develop a theoretical [value](../concepts/value.md) for a crypto token because there is no demand curve generated by a [use case](../concepts/use-value.md) or any [income or cashflows](../concepts/income-cashflows.md) associated with the [security](../concepts/security.md). Crypto tokens have a strictly zero [fundamental value](../concepts/fundamental-value.md) and a [present value](../concepts/present-value.md) of zero because they have zero income.
Instead the price of a crypto asset swings about wildly depending on the whims of fluctuating demand, random sentiment and market mania of the larger crypto [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md). Crypto assets are a manifestation of the [greater fool theory](../concepts/greater-fool-theory.md) and the price of a crypto asset is defined simply by what people believe the next "fool" will pay for it.
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Other products in [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md) such as tulips or beanie babie
## References
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
1. Silverman, Gary. 2021. ‘Crypto Has “No Inherent Worth” But Is Good to Trade, Says Man Group Chief’. Financial Times, 26 July 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/9275baf4-0422-43a1-b8c9-9317882ca874.
1. Stolfi, Jorge. n.d. ‘Bitcoin Is a Ponzi’. Accessed 19 March 2022. https://ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/bitcoin/2020-12-31-bitcoin-ponzi.html.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Intellectual Incoherence of Cryptoassets’. 7 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/crypto-absurd.html.

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# Crypto is not decentralized
# Web3 is not decentralized
In all scenarios web3 still requires central parties for its technical operation and simply involves [recentralization](../concepts/recentralization.md) of services that already exist. Since web3 is centralized then it has neither the [censorship resistance](../concepts/censorship-resistence.md) properties or [decentralization](../concepts/decentralization.md) claims its myth-making and marketing claims.
Web3 is either a completely nonsensical buzzword, or a term about reinventing existing business models either poorly or as a thinly veiled scheme for securities fraud for transferring wealth from the public to a few (centralized) operators of the scheme.
## References
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Marx, Paris. n.d. ‘Why Web3, the Blockchain and Crypto Internet, Is Doomed to Fail’. Accessed 29 March 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/web3-blockchain-crypto-internet-doomed-fail-doesnt-live-up-hype-2022-3?r=US&IR=T.
1. Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2021. ‘The Web3 Fraud’. USENIX. 16 December 2021. https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/web3-fraud.
1. Marlinspike, Moxie. 2022. ‘My First Impressions of Web3’. Moxie Marlinspike. 7 January 2022. https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Web3 Is Bullshit’. 4 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html.
1. Levine, Matt. 2022. ‘Web3 Takes Trust Too’. 10 January 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/web3-takes-trust-too.
1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
1. Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
1. Azouvi, Sarah. 2021. ‘Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications’. PhD Thesis, University College London. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139069/.
1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
1. Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
1. Bodó, Balázs, Jaya Klara Brekke, and Jaap Henk Hoepman. 2021. ‘Decentralisation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 0–21. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1563.
1. Cong, Lin William, Zhiguo He, and Jiasun Li. 2021. ‘Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools’. Review of Financial Studies 34 (3): 1191–1235. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa040.
1. Garrod, J. Z. 2016. ‘The Real World of the Decentralized Autonomous Society’. TripleC 14 (1): 62–77. https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v14i1.692.
1. Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
1. Humayun, Syeda Mariam. 2019. ‘Creation and Resilience of Decentralized Brands: Bitcoin & the Blockchain’. PhD Thesis. http://hdl.handle.net/10315/37662.

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# Is Web3 green?
Web3 is allegedly based on crypto assets which have a known [environmental footprint](is-environmental-footprint.md) problem. Therefore web3 is not green.
See also [ESG investing and crypto](is-bitcoin-esg.md), [is-environmental-footprint](is-environmental-footprint.md) and [mining](../concepts/mining.md).
## References
1. Wanat, Emanuel. 2021. ‘Are Crypto-Assets Green Enough? – An Analysis of Draft EU Regulation on Markets in Crypto Assets from the Perspective of the European Green Deal’. Osteuropa Recht 67 (2): 237–50. https://doi.org/10.5771/0030-6444-2021-2-237.
1. Dindar, B., and Ö. Gül. ‘The Detection of Illicit Cryptocurrency Mining Farms with Innovative Approaches for the Prevention of Electricity Theft’. Energy & Environment, no. April (2021): 0958305X211045066. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958305x211045066.
1. Vries, Alex De. ‘Bitcoin’s Energy Consumption Is Underestimated : A Market Dynamics Approach’. Energy Research & Social Science 70, no. July (2020): 101721. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101721.
1. Vries, Alex de. ‘Bitcoin’s Growing Energy Problem’. Joule 2, no. 5 (2018): 801–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2018.04.016.
1. Vries, Alex de, and Christian Stoll. ‘Bitcoin’s Growing e-Waste Problem’. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 175, no. September (2021): 105901. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2021.105901.

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# Crypto has a weird subculture
The crypto subculture is an example of a self-organizing [high control group](../concepts/high-control-group.md) whose existence organically creates a market mania, [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md) and [narrative economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) that entices the public to invest in the asset class or join the group and its subculture.
Since the asset class is [non-productive](../concepts/productive-asset.md) and [negative-sum](negative-sum.md) the crypto scheme entirely depends on attracting new investor inflows based on narratives of "money for nothing" and "easy wealth" that clash with traditional readings of [economics](../concepts/ideologies/keynsian-economics.md). These schemes may also depend on [technosolutionism](../concepts/ideologies/technosolutionism.md) or [libertarianism](../concepts/ideologies/libertarianism.md) to justify bringing more [greater fools](../concepts/greater-fool-theory.md) into the scheme.
Since the asset class is [non-productive](../concepts/productive-asset.md) and [is-negative-sum](is-negative-sum.md) the crypto scheme entirely depends on attracting new investor inflows based on narratives of "money for nothing" and "easy wealth" that clash with traditional readings of [economics](../concepts/keynsian-economics.md). These schemes may also depend on [technosolutionism](../concepts/technosolutionism.md) or [libertarianism](../concepts/libertarianism.md) to justify bringing more [greater fools](../concepts/greater-fool-theory.md) into the scheme.
Crypto culture depends heavily on a distortion of language to signify belonging to an ingroup and leans heavily on [thought terminating cliches](../concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md) to quell dissent and rational discourse. Within the crypto [subculture](../claims/weird-culture.md) there are several thought-terminating cliches.
Crypto culture depends heavily on a distortion of language to signify belonging to an ingroup and leans heavily on [thought terminating cliches](../concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md) to quell dissent and rational discourse. Within the crypto [subculture](is-weird-culture.md) there are several thought-terminating cliches.
* "have fun staying poor" / "hfsp"
* "If you don't believe it or don't get it, I don't have the time to try to convince you"
@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Crypto culture depends heavily on a distortion of language to signify belonging
1. Faria, I. (2021). The market, the regulator, and the government: Making a blockchain ecosystem in the Netherlands. Finance and Society, 7(1), 40–56. https://doi.org/10.2218/finsoc.v7i1.5590
1. Faustino, S. (2019). How metaphors matter: An ethnography of blockchain-based re-descriptions of the world. Journal of Cultural Economy, 12(6), 478–490. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1629330
1. Fletcher, J. (2013). Currency in Transition: An Ethnographic Inquiry of Bitcoin Adherents. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/2748/
1. Gerard, David. 2017. Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Ethereum & Smart Contracts. David Gerard.
1. Gerard, D. (n.d.). Neo-Nazis Bet Big on Bitcoin (And Lost). Retrieved 3 March 2022, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/neo-nazis-banked-on-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-farright-christchurch/
1. Glongloff, M. (n.d.). Bitcoin, GameStop Are More Cults Than Investments. Bloomberg. Retrieved 2 March 2022, from https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-02/bitcoin-btc-gamestop-gme-are-more-cults-than-investments
1. Golumbia, D. (2016). The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-wing Extremism. University of Minnesota Press.
@ -58,9 +59,4 @@ Crypto culture depends heavily on a distortion of language to signify belonging
1. Golumbia, David. 2018. ‘Zealots of the Blockchain: The True Believers of the Bitcoin Cult’. The Baffler, no. 38: 102–11.
1. Lee, Seung Cheol. 2020. ‘Magical Capitalism, Gambler Subjects: South Korea’s Bitcoin Investment Frenzy’. Cultural Studies 0 (0): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2020.1788620.
1. Mackay, Charles. 2012. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Simon and Schuster.
1. Samman, Amin, and Stefano Sgambati. n.d. ‘Financial Eschatology and the Libidinal Economy of Leverage’. Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1177/02632764211070805.
## References
* [@olson_line_2022]
* [@golumbia_bitcoin_2015]
1. Samman, Amin, and Stefano Sgambati. n.d. ‘Financial Eschatology and the Libidinal Economy of Leverage’. Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1177/02632764211070805.

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# Is web3 a well-defined term?
# Web3 is not well-defined
Web3 does not have any universally agreed upon definition.
Web3 has been accused of becoming an intellectual nexus for many internet "thought leaders" to pontificate about grand visions of technical and financial reconfiguration largely detached from any concrete plans or implementations of these ideas. This may give rise to a [bubble](bubble.md) in the sale of [security](../concepts/security.md) tokens detached from any progress on building real companies or technologies and may even disincentive productivity in favour of pure [speculation](../concepts/speculation.md).
Web3 has also been described as a means of doing [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) on [securites](security.md) offerings to enrich venture capital firms using the broader public as exit [liquidity](../concepts/liquidity.md).
Web3 has been [criticised](https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html) as being an intentionally ambiguous buzzword.
## References
Web3 has also been accused of becoming an intellectual nexus for many internet "thought leaders" to pontificate about grand visions of technical and financial reconfiguration largely detached from any concrete plans or implementations of these ideas. This may give rise to a [bubble](bubble.md) in the sale of [security](../concepts/security.md) tokens detached from any progress on building real companies or technologies and may even disincentivize productivity in favour of pure [speculation](../concepts/speculation.md) on [ficticious commodites](../concepts/ficticious-commodity.md).
Web3 has also been described as a means of doing [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) on [securites](security.md) offerings to enrich venture capital firms using the broader public as exit [liquidity](../concepts/liquidity.md).
## References
1. Morozov, Evgeny. 2022. ‘Web3: A Map in Search of Territory’. The Crypto Syllabus. 13 January 2022. https://the-crypto-syllabus.com/web3-a-map-in-search-of-territory/.
1. O’Reilly, Tim. 2021. ‘Why It’s Too Early to Get Excited About Web3’. O’Reilly Media. 13 December 2021. https://www.oreilly.com/radar/why-its-too-early-to-get-excited-about-web3/.
1. Patterson, Dan. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly on Web3: “Get Ready for the Crash”’. CBS News. 10 February 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/web3-cryptocurrency-nft-tim-oreilly/.
@ -16,19 +16,10 @@ Web3 has been [criticised](https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html)
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Marlinspike, Moxie. 2022. ‘My First Impressions of Web3’. Moxie Marlinspike. 7 January 2022. https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html.
1. Levine, Matt. 2022. ‘Web3 Takes Trust Too’. 10 January 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/web3-takes-trust-too.
1. Marx, Paris. n.d. ‘Why Web3, the Blockchain and Crypto Internet, Is Doomed to Fail’. Accessed 29 March 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/web3-blockchain-crypto-internet-doomed-fail-doesnt-live-up-hype-2022-3?r=US&IR=T.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Tonelli, Emily. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly: Crypto and NFTs Are “Pretty Serious Speculative Bubble”’. Decrypt. 10 February 2022. https://decrypt.co/92676/internet-guru-tim-oreilly-crypto-nfts-serious-speculative-bubble.
1. Yaffe-Bellany, David. 2022. ‘Millions for Crypto Start-Ups, No Real Names Necessary’. The New York Times, 2 March 2022, sec. Technology. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/technology/cryptocurrency-anonymity-alarm.html.
1. Zitron, Ed. 2022. ‘Solutions That Create Problems’. Substack newsletter. Ed Zitron’s Where’s Your Ed At (blog). 23 February 2022. https://ez.substack.com/p/solutions-that-create-problems.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Web3 Is Bullshit’. 4 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.
## References
* [https://web3isgoinggreat.com](https://web3isgoinggreat.com)
* [@diehl_web3_2021]
* [@weaver_web3_2021]
* [@white_its_2022]
* [@morozov_web3_2022]
* [@patterson_internet_2022]
* [@oreilly_why_2021]
* [@tante_third_2021]
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.

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@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ As has been consistently noted [2,3,8] throughout historical [market manias](../
> A [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md) starts when any group of stocks, in this case those associated with the excitement of the Internet, begin to rise. The updraft encourages [more people](../concepts/bandwagon-bias.md) to buy the stocks, which causes more TV and print coverage, which causes even more people to buy, which creates big profits for early Internet stockholders. The successful investors tell you at cocktail parties how easy it is to get rich, which causes the stocks to rise further, which pulls in larger and larger groups of investors. But the whole mechanism is a kind of [Ponzi scheme](../concepts/ponzi-scheme.md) where more and more credulous investors must be found to buy the stock from the earlier investors. Eventually, one runs out of [greater fools](../concepts/greater-fool-theory.md)
This coupled with the [weird subculture](weird-culture.md) of crypto assets and a [narrative economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) of belonging to a [high control group](../concepts/high-control-group.md) with the promises of [easy money](../concepts/ponzi-scheme.md) is a psychologically enticing proposition for a large demographic. The synthesis of the market mania and the narrative appeal of the culture and its political [imaginarires](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) appears to be the main driver of the crypto bubble.
This coupled with the [weird subculture](is-weird-culture.md) of crypto assets and a [narrative economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) of belonging to a [high control group](../concepts/high-control-group.md) with the promises of [easy money](../concepts/ponzi-scheme.md) is a psychologically enticing proposition for a large demographic. The synthesis of the market mania and the narrative appeal of the culture and its political [imaginaries](is-narrative-economics.md) appears to be the main driver of the crypto bubble.
There is also a strong sample bias in self-reported winnings of crypto assets. With partipants who make outsized returns [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) on the [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md) are more likely to report this returns compared to the vast majority of those who lost money as guaranteed by the [negative-sum](../concepts/zero-sum-game.md) dynamics of gambling on [crypto assets](../concepts/cryptoasset.md).
See [madness of crowds](../concepts/madness-crowds.md), [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md), [market mania](../concepts/market-mania.md), [speculation](../concepts/speculation.md) and [bandwagon bias](../concepts/bandwagon-bias.md).
@ -21,4 +23,4 @@ See [madness of crowds](../concepts/madness-crowds.md), [bubble](../concepts/bub
1. Knauer, Florian, and Andreas Mann. 2019. ‘What Is in It for Me? Identifying Drivers of Blockchain Acceptance among German Consumers’. The Journal of the British Blockchain Association, 10484.
1. Koning, J.P. 2020. ‘Bitcoin Financial Literacy and Crypto-Twitter’. American Institute for Economic Research. https://www.aier.org/article/bitcoin-financial-literacy-and-crypto-twitter/.
1. Panos, Georgios A, and Tatja Karkkainen. 2019. ‘Financial Literacy and Attitudes to Cryptocurrencies’. Available at SSRN 3482083.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.

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# What is the narrative economics of crypto assets?
The economist Robert J. Shiller defines [narrative economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) as:
> Epidemiology of narratives relevant to economic fluctuations. The human brain has always been highly tuned towards narratives, whether factual or not, to justify ongoing actions, even such basic actions as spending and investing. Stories motivate and connect activities to deeply felt values and needs. Narratives “go viral” and spread far, even worldwide, with economic impact.
The phenomenon of [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md) and their [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md) nature is largely driven by narratives, which may differ drastically between projects. These narratives speak to different human needs and beliefs that touch upon ideas as vast as culture, [value](../concepts/value.md), money, art, law, identity and politics.
Bitcoin has a [narrative economics](../claims/narrative-economics.md) based on [libertarianism](ideologies/libertarianism.md), [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) and aspirations of [private money](private-money.md).
Ethereum has a [narrative economics](../claims/narrative-economics.md) based on [technosolutionism](ideologies/technosolutionism.md), [libertarianism](ideologies/libertarianism.md), [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) and aspirations of [private money](private-money.md).
Dogecoin is an example of a crypto asset with no political imaginaries, no [currency](currency.md) narrative, no pretense of [use value](use-value.md), no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md), and no narrative economics whatsoever. it is a pure manifestation of the [greater fool theory](greater-fool-theory.md) with an investment thesis rooted purely in [financial nihilism](ideologies/financial-nihilism.md).
## Narrative Claims
* Cypherpunk
* Anarchism
* [Libertarianism](../concepts/ideologies/libertarianism.md)
* [Cryptoanarchism](../concepts/ideologies/cryptoanarchism.md)
* [Financial Nihilism](../concepts/ideologies/financial-nihilism.md)
* [Post State Technocracy](../concepts/ideologies/post-state-technocracy.md)
* [Technolibertarianism](../concepts/idelogies/technolibertarianism.md)
* [Technosolutionism](../concepts/ideologies/technosolutionism.md)
* [Technocollectivism](../concepts/ideologies/techno-collectivism.md)
* [Accelerationism](../concepts/ideologies/accelerationism.md)
## References
1. Shiller, Robert J. 2017. ‘Narrative Economics’. American Economic Review 107 (4): 967–1004.
1. Reijers, Wessel, and Mark Coeckelbergh. 2018. ‘The Blockchain as a Narrative Technology: Investigating the Social Ontology and Normative Configurations of Cryptocurrencies’. Philosophy and Technology 31 (1): 103–30. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0239-x.
* Golumbia, David. 2013a. ‘Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of “Digital Freedom.”’ Clemson University Department of English.
1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
1. Ailon, Galit. 2022. ‘The Double Meaning of Money’. Sociological Theory, 073527512110711. https://doi.org/10.1177/07352751211071121.
1. Becker, Katrin. 2022. ‘Blockchain Matters—Lex Cryptographia and the Displacement of Legal Symbolics and Imaginaries’. Law and Critique. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-021-09317-8.
1. Faustino, Sandra, Inês Faria, and Rafael Marques. 2021. ‘The Myths and Legends of King Satoshi and the Knights of Blockchain’. Journal of Cultural Economy 0 (0): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2021.1921830.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. Maddox, Alexia, and Luke J Heemsbergen. 2021. ‘Digging in Crypto-Communities’ Future-Making: From Dark to Doge’. M/C Journal 24 (2 SE-). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2755.
1. Narayanan, Arvind. 2013. ‘What Happened to the Crypto Dream?, Part 1’. IEEE Security & Privacy 11 (2): 75–76.
1. Olson, Dan. 2022. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.
1. Gerard, David. 2017. Attack of the 50 Foot Blockchain: Bitcoin, Blockchain, Ethereum & Smart Contracts. David Gerard.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2021a. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2021b. ‘The Brutal Truth About Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21.
1. ———. 2022. ‘The Strange Alliance of Crypto and MAGA Believers’. The New York Times, 11 January 2022, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/opinion/crypto-cryptocurrency-money-conspiracy.html.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/.
* Brody, Ann, and Stéphane Couture. 2021. ‘Ideologies and Imaginaries in Blockchain Communities: The Case of Ethereum’. Canadian Journal of Communication 46 (3). https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2021v46n3a3701.
* Doody, Sean. 2020. ‘Reactionary Technopolitics: A Critical Sociohistorical Review’. Fast Capitalism 17 (1): 143–64. https://doi.org/10.32855/fcapital.202001.009.
* *———. 2013b. ‘Cyberlibertarians’ Digital Deletion of the Left: Technological Innovation Does Not Inherently Promote the Left’s Goals’. Retrieved 2 (10): 2014.
* *———. 2015. ‘Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism’. MoneyLab Reader: An Intervention in Digital Economy, Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
* *———. 2016. The Politics of Bitcoin: Software as Right-Wing Extremism. U of Minnesota Press.
* *———. 2018. ‘Zealots of the Blockchain: The True Believers of the Bitcoin Cult’. The Baffler, no. 38: 102–11.
* Groos, Jan. 2021. ‘Crypto Politics: Notes on Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Governance in Blockchain Based Technologies’. In Data Loam, 1:148–70. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110697841-009.
* Hayden, Micahel, and Megan Squire. n.d. ‘How Cryptocurrency Revolutionized the White Supremacist Movement’. Souther Poverty Law Center. Accessed 3 March 2022. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2021/12/09/how-cryptocurrency-revolutionized-white-supremacist-movement.
* Husain, Syed Omer, Alex Franklin, and Dirk Roep. 2020. ‘The Political Imaginaries of Blockchain Projects: Discerning the Expressions of an Emerging Ecosystem’. Sustainability Science, 1–16.
* Hussain, Syed Omer. 2020. ‘Prefigurative Post-Politics as Strategy: The Case of Government-Led Blockchain Projects’. The Journal of The British Blockchain Association 3 (1): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.31585/jbba-3-1-(2)2020.
* The Economist. 2022. ‘The Charm of Cryptocurrencies for White Supremacists’, 5 February 2022. https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/02/05/the-charm-of-cryptocurrencies-for-white-supremacists.
* Anderson, Patrick D. 2021. ‘Privacy for the Weak, Transparency for the Powerful: The Cypherpunk Ethics of Julian Assange’. Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3): 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09571-x.
* Beltramini, Enrico. 2020. ‘Trust, Finance and Cryptocurrencies’. In Anarchism, Organization and Management, 184–95. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315172606-19.
* *———. 2021. ‘Against Technocratic Authoritarianism. A Short Intellectual History of the Cypherpunk Movement’. Internet Histories 5 (2): 101–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2020.1731249.
* Beyer, Jessica L., and Fenwick Mckelvey. 2015. ‘You Are Not Welcome among US: Pirates and the State’. International Journal of Communication 9 (1): 890–908.
* Curran, Giorel, and Morgan Gibson. 2013. ‘WikiLeaks, Anarchism and Technologies of Dissent’. Antipode 45 (2): 294–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01009.x.
* DuPont, Isaac Quinn. 2017. ‘An Archeology of Cryptography: Rewriting Plaintext, Encryption, and Ciphertext’. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. PhD Thesis, University of Toronto (Canada). https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/78958.
* DuPont, Quinn. 2016. ‘The Politics of Cryptography: Bitcoin and the Ordering Machines’. Journal of Peer Production 1 (4): 1–23. http://peerproduction.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DuPont_draft_submission.pdf.
* Gehl, Robert W. 2016. ‘Power/Freedom on the Dark Web: A Digital Ethnography of the Dark Web Social Network’. New Media and Society 18 (7): 1219–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814554900.
* Gürses, Seda, Arun Kundnani, and Joris Van Hoboken. 2016. ‘Crypto and Empire: The Contradictions of Counter-Surveillance Advocacy’. Media, Culture and Society 38 (4): 576–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716643006.
* Hellegren, Isadora. 2020. ‘Crypto-Discourse, Internet Freedom, and the State’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication. https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-887.
* Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
* Jarvis, Craig. 2021. ‘Cypherpunk Ideology: Objectives, Profiles, and Influences (1992–1998)’. Internet Histories, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2021.1935547.
* May, Tim. 1994. ‘Cyphernomicon’.
* May, Timothy. 1992. ‘The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace.
* Moore, Daniel, and Thomas Rid. 2016. ‘Cryptopolitik and the Darknet’. Survival 58 (1): 7–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1142085.
* Phillips, David J. 1998. Digital Cash and the Surveillance Society: Negotiating Identification in New Consumer Payment Systems. University of Pennsylvania. https://search.proquest.com/openview/7ca922683fe4b5a94427e0ba59af4def/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y.
* West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
* *———. 2020. ‘Survival of the Cryptic: Tracing Technological Imaginaries across Ideologies, Infrastructures, and Community Practices’. New Media and Society, 1461444820983017. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820983017.
TODO: group by narrative
## References
* [@golumbia_bitcoin_2015]
* [@reijers_blockchain_2018]
* [@beltramini_cryptoanarchist_2021]
* [@shiller_narrative_2017]
* [@may_crypto_1992]
* [@curran_wikileaks_2013]
* [@krugman_technobabble_2021]
* [@krugman_strange_2022]

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# Cryptoassets are being used to build a new internet
## References
1. Morozov, Evgeny. 2022. ‘Web3: A Map in Search of Territory’. The Crypto Syllabus. 13 January 2022. https://the-crypto-syllabus.com/web3-a-map-in-search-of-territory/.
1. O’Reilly, Tim. 2021. ‘Why It’s Too Early to Get Excited About Web3’. O’Reilly Media. 13 December 2021. https://www.oreilly.com/radar/why-its-too-early-to-get-excited-about-web3/.
1. Patterson, Dan. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly on Web3: “Get Ready for the Crash”’. CBS News. 10 February 2022. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/web3-cryptocurrency-nft-tim-oreilly/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2021. ‘The Web3 Fraud’. USENIX. 16 December 2021. https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/web3-fraud.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Marlinspike, Moxie. 2022. ‘My First Impressions of Web3’. Moxie Marlinspike. 7 January 2022. https://moxie.org/2022/01/07/web3-first-impressions.html.
1. Levine, Matt. 2022. ‘Web3 Takes Trust Too’. 10 January 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/web3-takes-trust-too.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Tonelli, Emily. 2022. ‘Internet Guru Tim O’Reilly: Crypto and NFTs Are “Pretty Serious Speculative Bubble”’. Decrypt. 10 February 2022. https://decrypt.co/92676/internet-guru-tim-oreilly-crypto-nfts-serious-speculative-bubble.
1. Yaffe-Bellany, David. 2022. ‘Millions for Crypto Start-Ups, No Real Names Necessary’. The New York Times, 2 March 2022, sec. Technology. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/technology/cryptocurrency-anonymity-alarm.html.
1. Zitron, Ed. 2022. ‘Solutions That Create Problems’. Substack newsletter. Ed Zitron’s Where’s Your Ed At (blog). 23 February 2022. https://ez.substack.com/p/solutions-that-create-problems.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Web3 Is Bullshit’. 4 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.
## References
* [@levine_web3_2022]
* [@morozov_web3_2022]
* [@weaver_web3_2021]
* [@soatok_against_2021]
* [@tante_third_2021]
* [@oreilly_why_2021]

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# Crypto assets pose a risk to the state
## References
* [@jeong_bitcoin_2013]
* [@orcutt_this_2020]
* [@popper_bitcoin_2020]
* [@corbet_destabilising_2020]
* [@ludlow_crypto_2001]
* [@wolf_libertarian_2019]

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# Crypto assets pose systemic risk to the larger economy
## References
* [@momtaz_entrepreneurial_2020]
* [@zetzsche_ico_2017]

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# Does bitcoin threaten the US dollar as reserve currency
## References
*

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# Is a unregulated transnational payment rail even desirable?
Panama Papers
See [shadow banking](../concepts/shadow-bank.md).
## References
* [@pilkington_can_2017]
* [@allen_defi_2022]
* [@braun_central_2019]
* [@steele_miner_2021]
* [@li_money_2021]

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# Is Web3 green?
Web3 is allegedly based on crypto assets which have a known [environmental footprint](environmental-footprint.md) problem. Therefore web3 is not green.
## References

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# Accelerationism
Accelerationism is reactionary belief system that proposes that processes like capitalist growth and technological change should be drastically intensified or "accelerated" as a mechanism to effect radical social change.
The notion coincides with crypto advocacy as some believe that an acceleration to a variant of [capitalism](capitalism.md) with no regulation, caveat emptor investments, and extreme financialization of all aspects of human life as a means to accelerate the collapse of capitalism itself or to build a new financial system like a phoenix from the ashes of the old one.
## References
1. Husain, Syed Omer, Alex Franklin, and Dirk Roep. 2020. ‘The Political Imaginaries of Blockchain Projects: Discerning the Expressions of an Emerging Ecosystem’. Sustainability Science 15 (2): 379–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00786-x.
1. Hussain, Syed Omer. 2020. ‘Prefigurative Post-Politics as Strategy: The Case of Government-Led Blockchain Projects’. The Journal of The British Blockchain Association 3 (1): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.31585/jbba-3-1-(2)2020.

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# Anti Money Laundering
[Money laundering](money-laundering.md) is a criminal activity in which the provenance of money associated with a crime are obscured by passing the funds through legitimate businesses to obscure their origin.
Crypto assets are used as a vehicle for money laundering.
Crypto assets are used as a vehicle for money laundering.
See also [illicit financing](illicit-financing.md), [KYC](kyc.md) and [sanctions enforcement](sanctions-enforcement.md).
## References
1. Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/.
1. Buttigieg, Christopher P., Christos Efthymiopoulos, Abigail Attard, and Samantha Cuyle. 2019. ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulation of Crypto Assets in Europe’s Smallest Member State’. Law and Financial Markets Review 13 (4): 211–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2019.1663996.
1. Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January.
1. Feinstein, Brian D., and Kevin Werbach. 2020. ‘The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets’. SSRN Electronic Journal 7 (1): 48–99. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3649475.
1. Ferreira, Agata. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Stablecoins—Balancing Risks and Rewards?’ Journal of International Economic Law 24 (4): 755–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgab036.
1. Fletcher, Emily, Charles Larkin, and Shaen Corbet. 2021. ‘Countering Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Case for Bitcoin Regulation’. Research in International Business and Finance 56 (January): 101387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101387.
1. Miscione, Gianluca, and Donncha Kavanagh. 2015. ‘Bitcoin and the Blockchain: A Coup d’Etat in Digital Heterotopia?’ SSRN Electronic Journal, no. 2006: 1–27. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624922.
1. Rae, Shaela W, and Lorraine Mastersmith. 2019. ‘Crypto Asset Trading in Canada: Entering a New Era of Regulation’. Banking & Finance Law Review 35 (1): 153–85.
1. Renwick, Robin, and Rob Gleasure. 2021. ‘Those Who Control the Code Control the Rules: How Different Perspectives of Privacy Are Being Written into the Code of Blockchain Systems’. Journal of Information Technology 36 (1): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396220944406.

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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ From https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-is-an-automated-market-maker-a
>
> AMMs have really carved out their niche in the DeFi space due to how simple and easy they are to use. Decentralizing market making this way is intrinsic to the vision of crypto.
## Examples
Examples of AMM crypto projects:
* Uniswap
* SushiSwap
@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ Uniswap is iterating to favor "professional players":
> However, with this additional layer of complexity, “lazy” LPs are going to earn much less in trading fees than professional players who can constantly keep optimizing their strategy.
## References
* https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-is-an-automated-market-maker-amm
* https://twitter.com/HideNotSlide/status/1386358389240958977 - someone getting excited about not having transparent market makers as if this is something innovative but what about e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEX
* https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2112v.htm - good brief overview from BIS. Note interesting footnote (no 2):
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Anker-Sørensen, Linn, and Dirk A Zetzsche. 2021. ‘From Centralized to Decentralized Finance: The Issue Of’. Available at SSRN 3978815. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978815.
1. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2112v.htm - good brief overview from BIS. Note interesting footnote (no 2):
§
> The AMM trading mechanism shares similarities with the framework of Shapley and Shubik (1977), which ensures market-clearing. See L Shapley and M Shubik, "Trade using one commodity as a means of payment", Journal of Political Economy, vol 85, no 5, pp. 937–68, and H S Shin, "Comparing the robustness of trading systems to higher-order uncertainty", Review of Economic Studies, vol 63, no 1, pp. 39–59.
1. https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-is-an-automated-market-maker-amm
1. https://twitter.com/HideNotSlide/status/1386358389240958977 - someone getting excited about not having transparent market makers as if this is something innovative but what about e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IEX

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# Anarcho-capitalism
Anarcho-capitalism is a political ideology that synthesises beliefs from [capitalism](capitalism.md) and anarchy. It's adherents believe in the the elimination of centralized nation states in favour of of a system of pure private property enforced by private agencies, free markets and self-ownership without the need for laws or the state.
In the absence of the nation state, anarcho-capitalists suppose that society will inevitably contractually self-regulate and participation in the free market will sustain or replace the need for [public goods](public-goods-problem.md).
See [cryptoanarchism](cryptoanarchism.md), [post-state technocracy](../../notes/post-state-technocracy.md) and [technolibertarianism](technolibertarianism.md).
## References
1. Ludlow, Peter. 2001. Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias. MIT Press.
1. Brunton, Finn. 2019. Digital Cash: The Unknown History of the Anarchists, Utopians, and Technologists Who Created Cryptocurrency. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691179490/digital-cash.
1. Malabou, Catherine. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrencies: Anarchist Turn or Strengthening of Surveillance Capitalism? From Bitcoin to Libra’. Australian Humanities Review 66 (May 2020). http://australianhumanitiesreview.org/2020/05/31/cryptocurrencies-anarchist-turn-or-strengthening-of-surveillance-capitalism-from-bitcoin-to-libra/.
1. Sanz Bas, David. 2020. ‘Hayek and the Cryptocurrency Revolution’. Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought 7 (1): 15–28. https://doi.org/10.5209/ijhe.69403.
1. Golumbia, David. 2013. ‘Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of “Digital Freedom.”’ Clemson University Department of English.
1. Beltramini, Enrico. 2020. ‘Trust, Finance and Cryptocurrencies’. In Anarchism, Organization and Management, 184–95. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315172606-19.
1. Beyer, Jessica L., and Fenwick Mckelvey. 2015. ‘You Are Not Welcome among US: Pirates and the State’. International Journal of Communication 9 (1): 890–908.
1. Curran, Giorel, and Morgan Gibson. 2013. ‘WikiLeaks, Anarchism and Technologies of Dissent’. Antipode 45 (2): 294–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01009.x.
1. DuPont, Quinn. 2016. ‘The Politics of Cryptography: Bitcoin and the Ordering Machines’. Journal of Peer Production 1 (4): 1–23. http://peerproduction.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DuPont_draft_submission.pdf.
1. Hellegren, Isadora. 2020. ‘Crypto-Discourse, Internet Freedom, and the State’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication. https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-887.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. May, Timothy. 1992. ‘The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace.
1. Beltramini, Enrico. 2021. ‘Against Technocratic Authoritarianism. A Short Intellectual History of the Cypherpunk Movement’. Internet Histories 5 (2): 101–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2020.1731249.
1. Inwood, Olivia, and Michele Zappavigna. 2021. ‘Ideology, Attitudinal Positioning, and the Blockchain: A Social Semiotic Approach to Understanding the Values Construed in the Whitepapers of Blockchain Start-Ups’. Social Semiotics, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2021.1877995.
1. Korhonen, Outi, and Juho Rantala. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance Challenges: Beyond Libertarianism’. AJIL Unbound 115: 408–12. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2021.65.

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Art has no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) under the economic definition of the term.
Art's [intrinsic value](use-value.md) is a debated in philosophy. There is no generally agreed definition of what constitutes art.
Art's [intrinsic value](use-value.md) is a debated in philosophy. Some models suggest that art's value is derived from a human desire for beauty or a physiological compulsion to conceptualize abstract representations of the minds others human beings. There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes art.
Art's value is often tied to its provenance and [sign value](sign-value.md).
Art's [market value](market-value.md) is often tied to its provenance, [sign value](sign-value.md) and [narrative](narrative-economics.md). The precise nature of this a relationship is an open problem in the philosophy of art.
Art may be [artificial scarce](artificial-scarcity.md) if created as part of a collection.
The art market has a great amount of [asymmetric-information](asymmetric-information.md) and [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md).
The art market has a great amount of [asymmetric information](asymmetric-information.md) and [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md) and is often used a vehicle for [money laundering](money-laundering.md).
## References
## References
1. Solimano, Andrés. 2021. ‘The Evolution of Contemporary Arts Markets’. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003215127.

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# Artificial Demand
# Artificial Demand
The property of a [asset](asset) whereby the demand curve for the asset is not generated by market forces but instead by an artificial source external which requires the purchase of the asset as a proxy for another good or services, or as part of an [enclosure](enclosure.md).
See [enclosure](enclosure.md) and [artificial scarcity](artificial-scarcity.md).
## References

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@ -5,4 +5,20 @@ Products like [crypto asset](cryptoasset.md), [NFTs](nft.md) and sometimes [art]
Financial instruments like bonds, stocks and derivatives are not artificially scarce because of their underlying cashflows. Commodities are not artificially scarce because of their physicality and intrinsic value.
There is an infinite number of non-physical artificially scare assets that can be created, thus leading to a paradox where unless demand is also infinite their [market value](market-value.md) should trend towards zero.
There is an infinite number of non-physical artificially scare assets that can be created, thus leading to a paradox where unless demand is also infinite their [market value](market-value.md) should trend towards zero.
## References
1. Mims, Christopher. n.d. ‘NFTs, Cryptocurrencies and Web3 Are Multilevel Marketing Schemes for a New Generation - WSJ’. Accessed 14 March 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nfts-cryptocurrencies-and-web3-are-multilevel-marketing-schemes-for-a-new-generation-11645246824.
1. Anonymous. n.d. ‘Why NFTs Are Bad: The Long Version’. Accessed 21 March 2022. https://antsstyle.medium.com/why-nfts-are-bad-the-long-version-2c16dae145e2.
1. Bodó, Balázs, Alexandra Giannopoulou, João Quintais, and Péter Mezei. 2022. ‘The Rise of NFTs: These Aren’t the Droids You’re Looking For’. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4000423.
1. Çağlayan Aksoy, Pınar, and Zehra Özkan Üner. 2021. ‘NFTs and Copyright: Challenges and Opportunities’. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 16 (10): 1115–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpab104.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Tinkerbell Griftopia’. 19 November 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/tinkerbell.html.
1. Fairfield, Joshua. 2021. ‘Tokenized: The Law of Non-Fungible Tokens and Unique Digital Property’. Indiana Law Journal, 1–99. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3821102.
1. Gibson, Johanna. 2021. ‘The Thousand-and-Second Tale of NFTS, as Foretold by Edgar Allan Poe’. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 11 (3): 249–69. https://doi.org/10.4337/qmjip.2021.03.00.
1. Guadamuz, Andres. 2021. ‘The Treachery of Images: Non-Fungible Tokens and Copyright’. SSRN Electronic Journal 16 (12): 1367–85. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905452.
1. Kim, Soyeon. 2020. ‘Fractional Ownership, Democratization, and Bubble Formation - The Impact of Blockchain Enabled Asset Tokenization’. 26th Americas Conference on Information Systems, AMCIS 2020, 0–5. https://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2020/adv_info_systems_research/adv_info_systems_research/19/.
1. Kong, De-Rong, and Tse-Chun Lin. 2021. ‘Alternative Investments in the Fintech Era: The Risk and Return of Non-Fungible Token (NFT)’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914085.
1. Low, Kelvin F K. 2021. ‘The Emperor’s New Art: Cryptomania, Art & Property’. Art & Property. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978241.
1. Mackenzie, Simon, and Diāna Bērziņa. 2021. ‘NFTs: Digital Things and Their Criminal Lives’. Crime, Media, Culture, 17416590211039796. https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590211039797.
1. Nadini, Matthieu, Laura Alessandretti, Flavio Di Giacinto, Mauro Martino, Luca Maria Aiello, and Andrea Baronchelli. 2021. ‘Mapping the NFT Revolution: Market Trends, Trade Networks, and Visual Features’. Scientific Reports 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-00053-8.
1. Olson, Dan. 2022a. Line Goes Up – The Problem With NFTs. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQ_xWvX1n9g.

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# Asymmetric Information
Information asymmetry is a condition in [price-formation](price-formation.md) and economics transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in transactions. This can lead to [moral-hazard](moral-hazard.md) or entire [markets](market.md) to be inefficient.
Information asymmetry is a condition in [price formation](price-formation.md) and economics transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in transactions. This can lead to [moral hazard](moral-hazard.md) or entire [markets](market.md) to be inefficient.
See also [broker](broker.md), [front running](front-running.md) and [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md).
## References
1. Akerlof, George A. "The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." In Uncertainty in economics, pp. 235-251. Academic Press, 1978.

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# Atomic Swap

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# Austrian Economics
A heterodox school of economics that attempts to reason about human behaviour from first principles and deductive reasoning instead of quantitative analysis. Popular in the early 20th century but largely rejected by the modern academy.
This school of thought has seen a resurgence in relation to [crypto assets](../cryptoasset.md). These ideas often resonates with advocacy for the [gold standard](../gold-standard.md) and [libertarianism](libertarianism.md).
Prominent Thinkers in the Austrian tradition are:
* Murry Rothbards
* Ludwig von Mises
* Friedrich Hayek
* Saifedean Ammous
Austrian economics is now widely regarded as a heterodox or crank school of economics in light of recent scholarship. See [Criticism of Austrian Economics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_School#Criticism).
## References
1. Krugman, Paul. "The hangover theory." Slate. December 3 (1998).
1. Krugman, Paul (7 April 2010). "The Conscience of a Liberal: Martin And The Austrians". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 September 2011.
1. Friedrich, Carl J. "The Road to Serfdom." (1945): 575-579.

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# Bandwagon Bias
The bandwagon bias refers to the tendency people have to adopt a certain trend-following behaviour or investment based on the perception that others are involved.
See [madness of crowds](madness-crowds.md), [bubble](bubble.md) and [market mania](market-mania.md).
See [madness of crowds](madness-crowds.md), [bubble](bubble.md) and [market mania](market-mania.md).
## References

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# Bank Run
In financial regulation, a bank run is the sudden withdrawal of [deposits](deposit.md) from a [bank](bank.md), which may result in the bank becoming insolvent.
Bank runs where a common occurrence in United States in the market crash of 1929 and during the 1930s. Regulation and federal policy [deposit insurance](deposit-insurance.md) entirely eliminated this phenomenon in subsequent decades.
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.

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@ -3,4 +3,9 @@ A bank is a financial institution which is chartered and regulated to hold custo
A bank has [deposit insurance](deposit-insurance.md) backed by a [central bank](central-banks.md).
Banks are required to perform [KYC](kyc.md), [CTF](ctf.md), [AML](aml.md) checks on financial transactions and account holders.
Banks are required to perform [KYC](kyc.md), [CTF](ctf.md), [AML](aml.md) checks on financial transactions and account holders.
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Binder, Carola. 2021. ‘Technopopulism and Central Banks’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3823456.
1. Braun, Benjamin, and Daniela Gabor. 2019. ‘Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power’. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nf9ms.

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Physical [currency](currency.md) is a bearer instrument.
Unhosted crypto [wallets](wallet.md) are bearer instruments for whoever holds their associated [private key](private-key.md).
Unhosted crypto [wallets](wallet.md) are bearer instruments for whoever holds their associated [private key](private-key.md).
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.

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Bitcoin is a [security](security.md).
Bitcoin is allegedly a [sound money](sound-money.md) in the [Austrian economics](ideologies/austrian-economics.md) school of thought.
Bitcoin is [artificial scarce](artificial-scarcity.md).
Bitcoin is allegedly a [sound money](sound-money.md) in the [Austrian economics](austrian-economics.md) school of thought.
Bitcoin is based on [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md) known as Proof of Work [mining](mining.md).
## References
* Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048.
* Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
* Krugman, Paul. 2021. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/opinion/cryptocurrency-bitcoin.html.
* Bellinger, Matthew. 2018. ‘The Rhetoric of Bitcoin: Money, Politics, and the Construction of Blockchain Communities’. ResearchWorks Archive. PhD Thesis. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/43342.
* Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
* Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
1. Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2021. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/opinion/cryptocurrency-bitcoin.html.
1. Bellinger, Matthew. 2018. ‘The Rhetoric of Bitcoin: Money, Politics, and the Construction of Blockchain Communities’. ResearchWorks Archive. PhD Thesis. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/43342.
1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
1. Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.

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# Blockchain
A blockchain is the technical underpinnings for [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md) such as [bitcoin](bitcoin.md) and [ethereum](ethereum.md).
In computer science terms, a blockchain is a data structure that maintains a list of transactions that are authenticated using public key cryptography and linked using a hash function. A blockchain is a partial ordering of transaction event into windows of discrete time by which the transactions are programmatically committed to a shared history which is synchronized via a [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md).
In computer science terms, a blockchain is an [immutable](immutability.md) data structure that maintains a list of transactions that are authenticated using public key cryptography and linked using a hash function. A blockchain is a partial ordering of transaction event into windows of discrete time by which the transactions are programmatically committed to a shared history which is synchronized via a [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md).
The term has been overloaded extensively and other data structures and topologies have been described as blockchain regardless of their use. See [permissioned-blockchain](permissioned-blockchain.md).
The term has been overloaded extensively and other data structures and topologies have been described as blockchain regardless of their use. See [permissioned blockchain](permissioned-blockchain.md).
## References
1. Schneier, Bruce. 2019. ‘There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology’. Wired Magazine. https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/.
1. Jeffries, Adrianne. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Meaningless’. The Verge 7: 2018.
1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2017. ‘Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come Up With a Use for Blockchain’. Hackernoon. 22 December 2017. https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-blockchain-ee98c180100.
1. ———. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec.
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
1. White, Molly. 2022a. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/.
1. ———. 2022b. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/.

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# Bond
A bond is a [security](security.md) financial product that represents a promise by a borrower to pay a lender their principal and periodic interest (called a *coupon*) on a loan.
A bond is a [security](security.md) financial product that represents a promise by a borrower to pay a lender their principal and periodic interest (called a coupon) on a loan.
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Varoufakis, Yanis. Foundations of economics: A beginner's companion. Routledge, 2002.
1. Grinold, Richard C., and Ronald N. Kahn. Active portfolio management: Quantitative theory and applications. Probus, 1995.
1. Wilmott, Paul. Paul Wilmott introduces quantitative finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

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# Bretton Woods
The *Bretton Woods system* is the international monetary convention by the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. The Bretton Woods system was the first example an an international and negotiated order intended to establish a means of doing international monetary relations among independent states. The Bretton wood system was based on the [gold standard](gold-standard.md) and establish the [dollar](dollar.md) as a the international [reserve-currency](reserve-currency.md).
In 1971 the United States terminated convertibility of the US dollar to [gold](gold.md), removing the United States from the gold standard and transitioned to a pure *fiat money* system. This ended the Bretton Woods system.
In 1971 the United States terminated convertibility of the US dollar to [gold](gold.md), removing the United States from the gold standard and transitioned to a pure *fiat money* system. This ended the Bretton Woods system.
## References
1. Steil, Benn. The Battle of Bretton Woods. Princeton University Press, 2013.
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.

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# Broker
In financial regulation, a broker is a company that acts as an intermediary between individual investors and a [securities](security.md) exchange or [market maker](market-maker.md).
Crypto exchanges are not regulated as brokers, but instead as [money services businesses](money-services-business.md).
See also [market maker](market-maker.md) and [regulation](regulation.md).
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Hofman, Darra, Quinn DuPont, Angela Walch, and Ivan Beschastnikh. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance: De Facto (x)or Designed?’ In Building Decentralized Trust, 21–33. x. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54414-0_2.
1. Inozemtsev, Maxim I. 2021. ‘Legal Regulation of Crypto-Asset Markets in the EU in the Post-COVID Period’. In Post-COVID Economic Revival, Volume I, 315–26. Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-83561-3_22.
1. Lee, Joseph. 2022. Crypto-Finance, Law and Regulation: Governing an Emerging Ecosystem. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/Crypto-Finance-Law-and-Regulation-Governing-an-Emerging-Ecosystem/Lee/p/book/9780367086619.
1. Walch, Angela. 2015. ‘The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk’. NYUJ Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 18: 837.
1. Zetzsche, Dirk A., Filippo Annunziata, Douglas W. Arner, and Ross P. Buckley. 2021. ‘The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) and the EU Digital Finance Strategy’. Capital Markets Law Journal 16 (2): 203–25. https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmab005.
1. Zwitter, Andrej, and Jilles Hazenberg. 2020. ‘Decentralized Network Governance: Blockchain Technology and the Future of Regulation’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3. https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00012.

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@ -3,9 +3,7 @@ An economic bubble is a phenomenon in [markets](market.md) created by herd menta
Attempting to time the market on bubbles is a [zero-sum game](zero-sum-game.md) and has a negative [expected return](expected-return.md).
See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md).
## Examples
Historical bubbles:
* South Sea Bubble
* Beanie Baby Bubble
@ -15,19 +13,21 @@ See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) an
* Japanese Real Estate Bubble
* [Crypto asset](cryptoasset.md) Bubble
See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md).
## References
* Mackay, Charles. 2012. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Simon and Schuster.
* Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press.
* Blanchard, Olivier J, and Mark W Watson. 1982. ‘Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets’. NBER Working Paper, no. w0945.
1. Mackay, Charles. 2012. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Simon and Schuster.
1. Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press.
1. Blanchard, Olivier J, and Mark W Watson. 1982. ‘Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets’. NBER Working Paper, no. w0945.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
* Caferra, Rocco, Gabriele Tedeschi, and Andrea Morone. 2021. ‘Bitcoin: Bubble That Bursts or Gold That Glitters?’ Economics Letters 205: 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942.
* Andrés, Pablo de, David Arroyo, Ricardo Correia, and Alvaro Rezola. 2022. ‘Challenges of the Market for Initial Coin Offerings’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101966. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101966.
1. Caferra, Rocco, Gabriele Tedeschi, and Andrea Morone. 2021. ‘Bitcoin: Bubble That Bursts or Gold That Glitters?’ Economics Letters 205: 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942.
1. Andrés, Pablo de, David Arroyo, Ricardo Correia, and Alvaro Rezola. 2022. ‘Challenges of the Market for Initial Coin Offerings’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101966. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101966.
1. Corradi, Fiammetta, and Philipp Höfner. 2018. ‘The Disenchantment of Bitcoin: Unveiling the Myth of a Digital Currency’. International Review of Sociology 28 (1): 193–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1430067.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
1. Shri T Rabi Sankar. n.d. ‘Cryptocurrencies – An Assessment’. Reserve Bank of India. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1196.
* Chancellor, Edward. 1999. ‘Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation’.
* Demmler, Michael, and Amilcar Orlian Fernández Domínguez. 2021. ‘Bitcoin and the South Sea Company: A Comparative Analysis’. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica 13 (1): 197–224.
* Kolchinski, Alex. 2022. ‘Crypto Is an Unproductive Bubble’. Alex Kolchinski (blog). 18 March 2022. https://alexkolchinski.com/2022/03/18/crypto-is-an-unproductive-bubble/.
* Smales, L. A. 2022. ‘Investor Attention in Cryptocurrency Markets’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101972.
* Zetzsche, Dirk A, Ross P Buckley, Douglas W Arner, and Linus Föhr. 2017. ‘The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators’. University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper, no. 11: 17–83.
1. Chancellor, Edward. 1999. ‘Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation’.
1. Demmler, Michael, and Amilcar Orlian Fernández Domínguez. 2021. ‘Bitcoin and the South Sea Company: A Comparative Analysis’. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica 13 (1): 197–224.
1. Kolchinski, Alex. 2022. ‘Crypto Is an Unproductive Bubble’. Alex Kolchinski (blog). 18 March 2022. https://alexkolchinski.com/2022/03/18/crypto-is-an-unproductive-bubble/.
1. Smales, L. A. 2022. ‘Investor Attention in Cryptocurrency Markets’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101972.
1. Zetzsche, Dirk A, Ross P Buckley, Douglas W Arner, and Linus Föhr. 2017. ‘The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators’. University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper, no. 11: 17–83.

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# Bucket Shop
A *bucket shop* is a type of fraudulent unregulated business which offers a [broker-like](broker.md) service for speculating on purely fictional positions in an [asset](asset) or currency using the funds of unwitting investors. The defining features of this type of fraud is there is no actual transfer or delivery of the underlying [assets](assets.md) allegedly being dealt in.
Bucket shops were made in illegal in the United States in 1922. Bucket shops are often cited as a major contributing factor to the market crash of 1929 leading the Great Depression.
See also [crypto exchange](crypto-exchange.md).
## References
1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.

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# Capital Formation
A term in macroeconomics to refer to the transfer of savings to [productive](productive-asset.md) endeavours of setting up of financial institutions, private enterprises, fiscal measures, lending activites, development of capital markets, and the development of secondary markets for [financial assets](financial-asset.md). Efficient capital formation is the end goal of [capitalism](capitalism.md) and is a property that developed economies have.
## References
1. Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
1. Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417.
1. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. "Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns." Journal of financial economics 105, no. 3 (2012): 457-472.

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# Capitalism
A broad category of economic systems in which [price formation](price-formation.md), [markets](market.md), trade, and industry are controlled by private owners rather than by the state.
See also [Marxism](marxism.md), [anarchocapitalism](anarchocapitalism.md) and [market fundamentalism](market-fundamentalism.md).
## References
1. Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
1. Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström. "The theory of contracts." In Advances in economic theory: Fifth world congress, vol. 1. 1987.
1. Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417.
1. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. "Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns." Journal of financial economics 105, no. 3 (2012): 457-472.

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# Cartel
An economic cartel use a non-public agreement to restrict the supply or fix the price of an asset. A cartel is a formal type of [market-manipulation](market-manipulation.md). Cartels are considered to be against the public interest because of the potential [asymmetric-information](asymmetric-information.md) to reduce trust in [markets](market.md).
Crypto exchanges operators act as economic cartel which can distort [price formation](price-formation.md). See [stablecoin](stablecoin.md).
Crypto exchanges operators act as economic cartel which can distort [price formation](price-formation.md). See [stablecoin](stablecoin.md).
## References
1. Akerlof, George A. "The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." In Uncertainty in economics, pp. 235-251. Academic Press, 1978.
1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
1. Dhawan, Anirudh, and Talis J. Putnins. 2020. ‘A New Wolf in Town? Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3670714.
1. Hamrick, JT, Farhang Rouhi, Arghya Mukherjee, Amir Feder, Neil Gandal, Tyler Moore, and Marie Vasek. 2018a. ‘An Examination of the Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Ecosystem’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3303365.
1. *———. 2018b. ‘The Economics of Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Schemes’.
1. Kamps, Josh, and Bennett Kleinberg. 2018. ‘To the Moon: Defining and Detecting Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dumps’. Crime Science 7 (1): 18.
1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
1. Li, Tao, Donghwa Shin, and Baolian Wang. 2019. ‘Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dump Schemes’. Available at SSRN 3267041.
1. Xu, Jiahua, and Benjamin Livshits. 2019. ‘The Anatomy of a Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dump Scheme’. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 1609–25.

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CBDCs have been critized as being an extension of the surveillance state that conflicts with financial privacy norms.
## Examples
Examples of pending or live CBDC projects by nation states:
* Chinese Digital Yuan
* Bahama Sand Dollar
* Project Hamilton
## References
* [@kiff_survey_2020]
* [@bilotta_cbdcs_nodate]
* [@nabilou_central_2019]
1. Hockett, Robert C. 2019. ‘Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking’.
1. Bilotta, Nicola. n.d. CBDCs and Stablecoins: The Scramble for (Controllable) Anonymity. Instituto AffariInternazionali.
1. Kiff, John, Jihad Alwazir, Sonja Davidovic, Aquiles Farias, Ashraf Khan, Tanai Khiaonarong, Majid Malaika, et al. 2020. ‘A Survey of Research on Retail Central Bank Digital Currency’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3639760.
1. Korhonen, Outi, and Juho Rantala. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance Challenges: Beyond Libertarianism’. AJIL Unbound 115: 408–12. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2021.65.
1. Nabilou, Hossein. 2019. ‘Central Bank Digital Currencies: Preliminary Legal Observations’. Journal of Banking Regulation.
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.

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# Certificate Deposit
A certificate of deposit or CD is a type of [financial asset](financial-asset.md) known as a time deposit. CDs are a type of debt instrument over a fixed term (often specified in years) and usually priced at a fixed interest rate. The issuer of a CD to be held until maturity, at which time they can be withdrawn and interest paid.
See also [deposit](deposit.md), [assets](assets.md), and [financial asset](financial-asset.md).
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Grinold, Richard C., and Ronald N. Kahn. Active portfolio management: Quantitative theory and applications. Probus, 1995.
1. Wilmott, Paul. Paul Wilmott introduces quantitative finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

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# Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps are a type of [derivative](derivative.md) contract with underlying of debt on [real estate](real-estate.md) [securities](security.md). Credit default swaps are a type of advanced financial engineering that is widely attributed to the 2008 financial subprime crisis.
See also [regulatory-capture](regulatory-capture.md) and [derivative](derivative.md).
## References
1. Ball, Laurence M. The Fed and Lehman Brothers: setting the record straight on a financial disaster. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

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# Censorship Resistance
The claim or aspiration that a [decentralization](decentralization.md) network is resistant to the removal of content or transactions by an outside party or law enforcement. Censorship resistance is often touted as a feature of [blockchain](blockchain.md) and [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md).
See also [recentralization](recentralization.md).
## References
* Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
* Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
* Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
* White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
* Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
* Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
* Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
* Azouvi, Sarah. 2021. ‘Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications’. PhD Thesis, University College London. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139069/.
* Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
* Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
* Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
* Schneider, Nathan. 2019. ‘Decentralization: An Incomplete Ambition’. Journal of Cultural Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553.
* Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
* Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
* Bailey, Andrew M., Bradley Rettler, and Craig Warmke. 2021. ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency II: The Moral Landscape of Monetary Design’. Philosophy Compass 16 (11): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12784.
* Renwick, Robin, and Rob Gleasure. 2021. ‘Those Who Control the Code Control the Rules: How Different Perspectives of Privacy Are Being Written into the Code of Blockchain Systems’. Journal of Information Technology 36 (1): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396220944406.
* West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
1. Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
1. Azouvi, Sarah. 2021. ‘Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications’. PhD Thesis, University College London. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139069/.
1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
1. Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
1. Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
1. Schneider, Nathan. 2019. ‘Decentralization: An Incomplete Ambition’. Journal of Cultural Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
1. Bailey, Andrew M., Bradley Rettler, and Craig Warmke. 2021. ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency II: The Moral Landscape of Monetary Design’. Philosophy Compass 16 (11): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12784.
1. Renwick, Robin, and Rob Gleasure. 2021. ‘Those Who Control the Code Control the Rules: How Different Perspectives of Privacy Are Being Written into the Code of Blockchain Systems’. Journal of Information Technology 36 (1): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396220944406.
1. West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.

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The mandate of central banks is often to control domestic employment and maintain price stability of a national currency.
## Examples
Examples of central banks include:
* Federal Reserve
* United States Federal Reserve
* European Central Bank
* Bank of England
## References
* [@braun_central_2019]
1. Braun, Benjamin, and Daniela Gabor. 2019. ‘Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power’. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nf9ms.

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# Collateralization
In finance, collateral is a borrower's commitment of property to a lender as a means to secure against [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md) and ensure repayment of a loan.
*Overcollateralization* is used to define types of [loan products](financial-asset.md) where an asset value used as collateral on a loan exceeds the loan value. This is sometimes used by borrowers to reduce credit risk for the creditor and enhance the loan's credit rating.
See also [DeFi](defi.md).
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Ball, Laurence M. The Fed and Lehman Brothers: setting the record straight on a financial disaster. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

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# Commercial Paper
Short term debt issued between companies.
See [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md).
## References
1. Venkataramakrishnan, Siddharth, and Joe Rennison. 2021. ‘Tether’s Commercial Paper Disclosure Places It among Global Giants’. Financial Times, 10 June 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/342966af-98dc-4b48-b997-38c00804270a.
1. Faux, Zeke. n.d. ‘Crypto Mystery: Where’s the $69 Billion Backing the Stablecoin Tether?’ Bloomberg. Accessed 22 March 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-07/crypto-mystery-where-s-the-69-billion-backing-the-stablecoin-tether.
1. Peebles, Gustav. 2020. ‘Banking on Digital Money: Swedish Cashlessness and the Fraying Currency Tether’. Cultural Anthropology 36 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.1.01.
1. Bennet, Tomlin. n.d. ‘Tether and Bitfinex Introduction’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://bennettftomlin.com/2021/08/08/tether-and-bitfinex-introduction/.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. Castor, Amy. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Tether: A Complete Timeline of Events’. https://amycastor.com/2019/01/17/the-curious-case-of-tether-a-complete-timeline-of-events/.
1. Griffin, John M, and Amin Shams. 2020. ‘Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?’ The Journal of Finance 75 (4): 1913–64.

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# Commodity
An asset that is used for its [use value](use-value.md) as an input to an economic process.
## Examples
Examples of commodities include:
* Petroleum
* Wheat
* Pork
* Aluminium
* Aluminium
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Binder, Carola. 2021. ‘Technopopulism and Central Banks’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3823456.
1. Braun, Benjamin, and Daniela Gabor. 2019. ‘Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power’. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nf9ms.

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# Consensus Algorithm
A mechanism by which data is synchronised across computer and kept in a consistent state. An integral part of a [blockchain](blockchain.md) network.
Many consensus algorithms use tokens rewards as an economic incentive for partipants to maintain servers which [mine](mining.md), [stake](staking.md) or participate in the consensus algorithm..
Many consensus algorithms use tokens rewards as an economic incentive for partipants to maintain servers which [mine](mining.md), [stake](staking.md) or participate in the consensus algorithm.
## Proof of Work
@ -19,5 +19,8 @@ An algorithm where blocks in the blockchain are validated by a closed and fixed
An algorithm where blocks in the blockchain are validated by the consumption of digital resources such as random access memory or disk space. The global sortition functions weighted based on the size and availability of these digital space resources.
## References
1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2018. Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies: Burn It With Fire. Berkeley School of Information. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCHab0dNnj4.
1. Schneier, Bruce. 2019. ‘There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology’. Wired Magazine. https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/.

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# Counterparty Risk
In financial risk analysis, *counterparty risk* is the probability that the one party to an a legal contract, investment, transaction, or credit agreement will not fulfil the terms of the deal and may default on the contractual obligations.
## References
1. Petro, Louis W., James P. Martin, Adam A. Wadecki, and Harry Cendrowski. The handbook of fraud deterrence. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

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# Cross Bridges
In crypto technology a *cross bridge* is a combination of [smart-contracts](smart-contracts.md) across multiple [blockchain](blockchain.md) networks that facilitate interoperability and transactions across different [cryptoassets](cryptoasset.md).
Cross bridges are commonly used for [money laundering](money-laundering.md) transactions in which multiple [cryptoassets](cryptoasset.md) are swapped in a method called *chain-hopping* which is used to obscure the provenance of funds associated with [illicit financing](illicit-financing.md).
See also [defi](defi.md) and [money-laundering](money-laundering.md).
## References
1. Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/.
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.

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# Crypto Exchanges
A crypto exchange is a corporate entity that acts as an intermediary between people to exchange [currency](currency.md) for [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md)
A crypto exchange is a centralized corporate entity that acts as an intermediary between people to exchange [currency](currency.md) for [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md)
Crypto exchanes are not regulated as [market makers](market-maker.md) or [brokers](broker.md), but instead as [money services business](money-services-business.md) which does regulate [order book](order-book.md) making or protect consumers against [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md).
Many crypto exchanges offer their own [stablecoin](stablecoin.md) whose reserves may be comingled with customer funds.
See also [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md) and [economic cartel](cartel.md).
## Jurisdictions
Crypto exchanges are commonly set up in jurisdictions with loose or corrupt financial regulatory authorities.
Crypto exchanges are commonly set up in jurisdictions with loose or corrupt financial regulatory regimes. These include, but are not limited to:
* Antigua
* Barbuda
* Seychelles
* Malta
* Jersey
* Isle of Man
* The Bahamas
* Cayman Islands
* Singapore
## References
See also [bucket shop](bucket-shop.md), [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md), [economic cartel](cartel.md), [recentralization](recentralization.md) and [platform risk](platform-risk.md).
* Ivaniuk, Viktoria. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrency Exchange Regulation – An International Review’. Magda Dziembowska, Robert Dziembowski, Apelacja w Postępowaniu, 67.
* White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
* Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126.
* Canning, Tonya. 2018. ‘"We Don’t Want Hippy Money”: Contradiction and Exchange in a Local Currency System’. PhD Thesis. https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/74190.
* Johnson, Kristin N. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: Regulating Cryptocurrency Exchanges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831439.
* Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
* Mizrach, Bruce. 2021. ‘Stablecoins: Survivorship, Transactions Costs and Exchange Microstructure’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3835219.
* Roubini, Nouriel. 2019. ‘The Great Crypto Heist’. Project Syndicate 16. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-financial-scams-by-nouriel-roubini-2019-07.
## References
1. Doctorow, C. (2022, February 3). Pluralistic: 03 Feb 2022 – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow. https://pluralistic.net/2022/02/03/liquidation-preference/
1. Ivaniuk, Viktoria. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrency Exchange Regulation – An International Review’. Magda Dziembowska, Robert Dziembowski, Apelacja w Postępowaniu, 67.
1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
1. Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126.
1. Canning, Tonya. 2018. ‘"We Don’t Want Hippy Money”: Contradiction and Exchange in a Local Currency System’. PhD Thesis. https://dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/74190.
1. Johnson, Kristin N. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: Regulating Cryptocurrency Exchanges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831439.
1. Mizrach, Bruce. 2021. ‘Stablecoins: Survivorship, Transactions Costs and Exchange Microstructure’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3835219.
1. Roubini, Nouriel. 2019. ‘The Great Crypto Heist’. Project Syndicate 16. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-financial-scams-by-nouriel-roubini-2019-07.

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# Cryptoanarchism
Cryptoanarchism or cyberanarchism is a political ideology whose aim is to achieve the protection of privacy, political freedom and economic freedom through the use the use of cryptography and [crypto assets](../cryptoasset.md). Cryptoanarchism sees itself as reaction to the overreach of governments and the state into the private and financial lives of citizens and asserts the need for so-called *total freedom*.
* Total anonymity of individuals in the digital spaces.
* Total freedom of speech without censorship or moderation
* Total freedom to trade without regulation or protections
The idea revolves around the politics that individuals are self-sovereign and that the internet or cyberspace as a whole is an independent territory outside the remit and regulation of governments. This is outlined in the seminal writing by cryptoanarchist leader John Barlow in his writing *A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace*.
The ideas behind [bitcoin](../bitcoin.md) can be traced to another seminal work *The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto*.
See also [anarchocapitalism](../anarchocapitalism.md), [libertarianism](libertarianism.md) and [post-state technocracy](../../notes/post-state-technocracy.md).
## References
1. May, Tim. 1994. ‘Cyphernomicon’.
1. May, Timothy. 1992. ‘The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace.
1. Barlow, John Perry. 2019. ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’. Duke Law & Technology Review 18 (1): 5–7.
1. Greenberg, Andy. 2012. This Machine Kills Secrets: Julian Assange, the Cypherpunks, and Their Fight to Empower Whistleblowers. Penguin Randon House. https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/309904/this-machine-kills-secrets-by-andy-greenberg/.
1. Jarvis, Craig. 2021. ‘Cypherpunk Ideology: Objectives, Profiles, and Influences (1992–1998)’. Internet Histories, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2021.1935547.
1. Moore, Daniel, and Thomas Rid. 2016. ‘Cryptopolitik and the Darknet’. Survival 58 (1): 7–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1142085.
1. Allon, Fiona. 2018. ‘Money after Blockchain: Gold, Decentralised Politics and the New Libertarianism’. Australian Feminist Studies 33 (96): 223–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2018.1517245.
1. Beltramini, Enrico. 2021. ‘Against Technocratic Authoritarianism. A Short Intellectual History of the Cypherpunk Movement’. Internet Histories 5 (2): 101–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2020.1731249.
1. Brody, Ann, and Stéphane Couture. 2021. ‘Ideologies and Imaginaries in Blockchain Communities: The Case of Ethereum’. Canadian Journal of Communication 46 (3). https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2021v46n3a3701.
1. Golumbia, David. 2013. ‘Cyberlibertarianism: The Extremist Foundations of “Digital Freedom.”’ Clemson University Department of English.
1. Inwood, Olivia, and Michele Zappavigna. 2021. ‘Ideology, Attitudinal Positioning, and the Blockchain: A Social Semiotic Approach to Understanding the Values Construed in the Whitepapers of Blockchain Start-Ups’. Social Semiotics, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2021.1877995.
1. Wolf, Martin. 2019. ‘The Libertarian Fantasies of Cryptocurrencies’. Financial Times, February. https://www.ft.com/content/eeeacd7c-2e0e-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8.
1. Anderson, Patrick D. 2021. ‘Privacy for the Weak, Transparency for the Powerful: The Cypherpunk Ethics of Julian Assange’. Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3): 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09571-x.
1. Beltramini, Enrico. 2020. ‘Trust, Finance and Cryptocurrencies’. In Anarchism, Organization and Management, 184–95. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315172606-19.
1. ———. 2021. ‘Against Technocratic Authoritarianism. A Short Intellectual History of the Cypherpunk Movement’. Internet Histories 5 (2): 101–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2020.1731249.
1. Beyer, Jessica L., and Fenwick Mckelvey. 2015. ‘You Are Not Welcome among US: Pirates and the State’. International Journal of Communication 9 (1): 890–908.
1. Curran, Giorel, and Morgan Gibson. 2013. ‘WikiLeaks, Anarchism and Technologies of Dissent’. Antipode 45 (2): 294–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01009.x.
1. DuPont, Isaac Quinn. 2017. ‘An Archeology of Cryptography: Rewriting Plaintext, Encryption, and Ciphertext’. ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. PhD Thesis, University of Toronto (Canada). https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/78958.
1. DuPont, Quinn. 2016. ‘The Politics of Cryptography: Bitcoin and the Ordering Machines’. Journal of Peer Production 1 (4): 1–23. http://peerproduction.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DuPont_draft_submission.pdf.
1. Gehl, Robert W. 2016. ‘Power/Freedom on the Dark Web: A Digital Ethnography of the Dark Web Social Network’. New Media and Society 18 (7): 1219–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814554900.
1. Gürses, Seda, Arun Kundnani, and Joris Van Hoboken. 2016. ‘Crypto and Empire: The Contradictions of Counter-Surveillance Advocacy’. Media, Culture and Society 38 (4): 576–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716643006.
1. Hellegren, Isadora. 2020. ‘Crypto-Discourse, Internet Freedom, and the State’. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication. https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-887.
1. Hellegren, Z. Isadora. 2017. ‘A History of Crypto-Discourse: Encryption as a Site of Struggles to Define Internet Freedom’. Internet Histories 1 (4): 285–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2017.1387466.
1. Jarvis, Craig. 2021. ‘Cypherpunk Ideology: Objectives, Profiles, and Influences (1992–1998)’. Internet Histories, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2021.1935547.
1. Phillips, David J. 1998. Digital Cash and the Surveillance Society: Negotiating Identification in New Consumer Payment Systems. University of Pennsylvania. https://search.proquest.com/openview/7ca922683fe4b5a94427e0ba59af4def/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y.
1. West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
1. ———. 2020. ‘Survival of the Cryptic: Tracing Technological Imaginaries across Ideologies, Infrastructures, and Community Practices’. New Media and Society, 1461444820983017. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820983017.

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# Crypto Asset
A digital [asset](assets.md) that is traded on a [blockchain](blockchain.md) network. Sometimes also referred to by "cryptocurrency" although this namesake has semantic issues due to confusion around differing [currency](currency.md) definitions.
## Examples
Examples of crypto assets include, but are not limited to:
* [Bitcoin](bitcoin.md)
* [Ethereum](ethereum.md)
* [Dogecoin](dogecoin.md)
* [Stablecoins](stablecoin.md)
* [Governance tokens](governance-token.md)
* [NFTs](nft.md)
## References
* Bank of International Settlements. 2018. ‘Cryptocurrencies: Looking beyond the Hype’. In . Bank for International Settlements Basel. https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e5.htm.
* Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
* Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
* Larue, Louis. 2020. ‘“A Conceptual Framework for Classifying Currencies”.’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 24 (1): 45–60.
* Pele, Daniel Traian, Niels Wesselhöfft, Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Michalis Kolossiatis, and Yannis G. Yatracos. 2021. ‘Are Cryptos Becoming Alternative Assets?’ European Journal of Finance, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2021.1960403.
* Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.
1. Bank of International Settlements. 2018. ‘Cryptocurrencies: Looking beyond the Hype’. In . Bank for International Settlements Basel. https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e5.htm.
1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf.
1. Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
1. Larue, Louis. 2020. ‘“A Conceptual Framework for Classifying Currencies”.’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 24 (1): 45–60.
1. Pele, Daniel Traian, Niels Wesselhöfft, Wolfgang Karl Härdle, Michalis Kolossiatis, and Yannis G. Yatracos. 2021. ‘Are Cryptos Becoming Alternative Assets?’ European Journal of Finance, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2021.1960403.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.

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# Counter-terrorism financing
Counter-terrorism financing (CFT or CTF) is a regulatory requirement that financial service providers and [money services business](money-services-business.md) may not trade or offer services with entities who are sanctioned or on terrorist watch lists.
Counter-terrorism financing (CFT or CTF) is a regulatory requirement that financial service providers and [money services business](money-services-business.md) may not trade or offer services with entities who are sanctioned or on terrorist watch lists.
## References
1. Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/.
1. Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January.

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# Currency Peg
A [currency](currency.md) peg is a policy in which an asset is set to a specific fixed exchange rate for its currency with a foreign currency or basket of currencies.
A [currency](currency.md) peg is a policy in which an asset is set to a specific fixed exchange rate for its currency with a foreign currency or basket of currencies.
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Braun, Benjamin, and Daniela Gabor. 2019. ‘Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power’. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nf9ms.

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# Currency
A physical or digital representation of [money](money.md).
A physical or digital representation of [money](money.md).
## References
1. Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
1. Corradi, Fiammetta, and Philipp Höfner. 2018. ‘The Disenchantment of Bitcoin: Unveiling the Myth of a Digital Currency’. International Review of Sociology 28 (1): 193–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1430067.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.

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* Constitution DAO
* Spice DAO
* [democracy.earth](../dao/democracy.earth.md)
* [diatom.fund](../dao/diatom.fund.md)
* [hive.io](../dao/hive.io.md)
* [hypha.earth](../dao/hypha.earth.md)
* [joinseeds.earth](../dao/joinseeds.earth.md)
* [klimadao.finance](../dao/klimadao.finance.md)
* [Panvala](../dao/panvala.com.md)
* [yogacoin.tech](../dao/yogacoin.tech.md)
## References
* Bayern, Shawn. 2021. Autonomous Organizations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108878203.
* Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
* Chen, Liang, Tony W. Tong, Shaoqin Tang, and Nianchen Han. 2022. ‘Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization’. Journal of Management 48 (1): 147–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211045023.
* Crepaldi, M. 2020. ‘The Authority of Distributed Consensus Systems Trust, Governance, and Normative Perspectives on Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers’. PhD Thesis. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9432/.
* El Faqir, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2020. ‘An Overview of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations on the Blockchain’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, August. https://doi.org/10.1145/3412569.3412579.
* Faqir-Rhazoui, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2021. ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Platforms for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations in the Ethereum Blockchain’. Journal of Internet Services and Applications 12 (1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13174-021-00139-6.
* Frey, Seth, P. M. Krafft, and Brian C. Keegan. 2019. ‘“This Place Does What It Was Built for”: Designing Digital Institutions for Participatory Change’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359134.
* Hassan, Samer, and Primavera De Filippi. 2021. ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1556.
* Hsieh, Ying Ying, Jean Philippe Vergne, Philip Anderson, Karim Lakhani, and Markus Reitzig. 2018. ‘Bitcoin and the Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations’. Journal of Organization Design 7 (1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41469-018-0038-1.
* Lovett, Matthew, and Lee Thomas. 2021. ‘A Fork in the Road: Perspectives on Sustainability and Decentralised Governance in Digital Institutions’. First Monday 26 (11). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v26i11.12357.
* Lumineau, Fabrice, Wenqian Wang, and Oliver Schilke. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance-A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?’ Organization Science 32 (2): 500–521. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1379.
* Lustig, Caitlin. 2019. ‘Intersecting Imaginaries: Visions of Decentralized Autonomous Systems’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW). https://doi.org/10.1145/3359312.
* Morrison, Robbie, Natasha C. H. L. Mazey, and Stephen C. Wingreen. 2020. ‘The DAO Controversy: The Case for a New Species of Corporate Governance?’ Frontiers in Blockchain 3 (May). https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00025.
* Murray, Alex, Jen Rhymer, and David G. Sirmon. 2021. ‘Humans and Technology: Forms of Conjoined Agency in Organizations’. Academy of Management Review 46 (3): 552–71. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2019.0186.
* Poblet, Marta, Darcy W. E. Allen, Oleksii Konashevych, Aaron M. Lane, and Carlos Andres Diaz Valdivia. 2020. ‘From Athens to the Blockchain: Oracles for Digital Democracy’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3: 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.575662.
* Rikken, Olivier, Marijn Janssen, and Zenlin Kwee. n.d. ‘The Ins and Outs of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (Daos)’. Available at SSRN 3989559. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3989559.
* Schirrmacher, Nina-Birte, Johannes Rude Jensen, and Michel Avital. 2021. ‘Token-Centric Work Practices in Fluid Organizations: The Cases of Yearn and MakerDAO’. In The 42nd International Conference on Information Systems: ICIS 2021: Building Sustainability and Resilience With Is: A Call for Action. https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2021/is_future_work/is_future_work/17/.
* Schneider, Nathan. 2021. ‘Broad-Based Stakeholder Ownership in Journalism: Co-Ops, ESOPs, Blockchains’. Media Industries Journal 7 (2). https://doi.org/10.3998/mij.15031809.0007.203.
* Sun, Xiaotong. 2021. ‘Centralized Governance in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): A Case Study of MakerDAO’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971791.
* Tse, Nathan. 2020. ‘Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Corporate Form’. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 51 (2): 313. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v51i2.6573.
* Vergne, JP. 2020. ‘Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform’. Organization Theory 1 (4): 263178772097705. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720977052.
* Wissel, Tim. 2021. ‘Fairness and Freedom for Artists: Towards a Robot Economy for the Music Industry’. https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid:72a5c834-177b-4b3c-a6f8-8e69e65cfdf4.
* Wright, Steven A. 2021. ‘Measuring DAO Autonomy: Lessons From Other Autonomous Systems’. IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society 2 (1): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/tts.2021.3054974.
## References
* [@morrison_dao_2020]
* [@wright_measuring_2021]
* [@securities_sec_2017]
* [@rikken_ins_nodate]
* [@brennecke_-central_2022]
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Bayern, Shawn. 2021. Autonomous Organizations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108878203.
1. Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
1. Chen, Liang, Tony W. Tong, Shaoqin Tang, and Nianchen Han. 2022. ‘Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization’. Journal of Management 48 (1): 147–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211045023.
1. Crepaldi, M. 2020. ‘The Authority of Distributed Consensus Systems Trust, Governance, and Normative Perspectives on Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers’. PhD Thesis. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9432/.
1. El Faqir, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2020. ‘An Overview of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations on the Blockchain’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, August. https://doi.org/10.1145/3412569.3412579.
1. Faqir-Rhazoui, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2021. ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Platforms for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations in the Ethereum Blockchain’. Journal of Internet Services and Applications 12 (1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13174-021-00139-6.
1. Frey, Seth, P. M. Krafft, and Brian C. Keegan. 2019. ‘“This Place Does What It Was Built for”: Designing Digital Institutions for Participatory Change’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359134.
1. Hassan, Samer, and Primavera De Filippi. 2021. ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1556.
1. Hsieh, Ying Ying, Jean Philippe Vergne, Philip Anderson, Karim Lakhani, and Markus Reitzig. 2018. ‘Bitcoin and the Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations’. Journal of Organization Design 7 (1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41469-018-0038-1.
1. Lovett, Matthew, and Lee Thomas. 2021. ‘A Fork in the Road: Perspectives on Sustainability and Decentralised Governance in Digital Institutions’. First Monday 26 (11). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v26i11.12357.
1. Lumineau, Fabrice, Wenqian Wang, and Oliver Schilke. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance-A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?’ Organization Science 32 (2): 500–521. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1379.
1. Lustig, Caitlin. 2019. ‘Intersecting Imaginaries: Visions of Decentralized Autonomous Systems’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW). https://doi.org/10.1145/3359312.
1. Morrison, Robbie, Natasha C. H. L. Mazey, and Stephen C. Wingreen. 2020. ‘The DAO Controversy: The Case for a New Species of Corporate Governance?’ Frontiers in Blockchain 3 (May). https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00025.
1. Murray, Alex, Jen Rhymer, and David G. Sirmon. 2021. ‘Humans and Technology: Forms of Conjoined Agency in Organizations’. Academy of Management Review 46 (3): 552–71. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2019.0186.
1. Poblet, Marta, Darcy W. E. Allen, Oleksii Konashevych, Aaron M. Lane, and Carlos Andres Diaz Valdivia. 2020. ‘From Athens to the Blockchain: Oracles for Digital Democracy’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3: 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.575662.
1. Rikken, Olivier, Marijn Janssen, and Zenlin Kwee. n.d. ‘The Ins and Outs of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (Daos)’. Available at SSRN 3989559. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3989559.
1. Schirrmacher, Nina-Birte, Johannes Rude Jensen, and Michel Avital. 2021. ‘Token-Centric Work Practices in Fluid Organizations: The Cases of Yearn and MakerDAO’. In The 42nd International Conference on Information Systems: ICIS 2021: Building Sustainability and Resilience With Is: A Call for Action. https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2021/is_future_work/is_future_work/17/.
1. Schneider, Nathan. 2021. ‘Broad-Based Stakeholder Ownership in Journalism: Co-Ops, ESOPs, Blockchains’. Media Industries Journal 7 (2). https://doi.org/10.3998/mij.15031809.0007.203.
1. Sun, Xiaotong. 2021. ‘Centralized Governance in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): A Case Study of MakerDAO’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971791.
1. Tse, Nathan. 2020. ‘Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Corporate Form’. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 51 (2): 313. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v51i2.6573.
1. Vergne, JP. 2020. ‘Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform’. Organization Theory 1 (4): 263178772097705. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720977052.
1. Wissel, Tim. 2021. ‘Fairness and Freedom for Artists: Towards a Robot Economy for the Music Industry’. https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid:72a5c834-177b-4b3c-a6f8-8e69e65cfdf4.
1. Wright, Steven A. 2021. ‘Measuring DAO Autonomy: Lessons From Other Autonomous Systems’. IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society 2 (1): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/tts.2021.3054974.

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# Decentralization
A technical and marketing buzzword use amorphously to refer to an unclear set of aspirations about a technology or community.
A technical and marketing buzzword use amorphously to refer to an unclear set of aspirations about a technology or community. Appeals to decentralization will often involve co-mingling with other loaded or misinterpreted words such as:
In information technology it refers to a type of network topology in which a system has no single point of failure and whose workload or actions are performed in parallel by multiple computers which provide a shared service.
* Immutable
* Decentralized
* Trustless
* Secure
* Tamper-proof
* Disintermediated
* Open/Transparent
* Neutral
* Direct transfers of value
The internet is the canonical example of a decentralized network.
Use of term decentralization is often falsely used interchangeably with "democratization", which has an orthogonal meaning.
This term is often falsely used interchangeably with "democratization", which has an orthogonal meaning.
In information technology it refers to a type of network topology in which a system has no single point of failure and whose workload or actions are performed in parallel by multiple computers which provide a shared service. The internet is the canonical example of a decentralized network.
## References
* [@diehl_decentralized_2021]
* [@schneider_decentralization_2019]
* [@bodo_decentralisation_2021]
* [@zhang_aesthetics_2019]
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2021. ‘The Web3 Fraud’. USENIX. 16 December 2021. https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/web3-fraud.
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘Web3 Is Bullshit’. 4 December 2021. https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/web3-bullshit.html.
1. Levine, Matt. 2022. ‘Web3 Takes Trust Too’. 10 January 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-10/web3-takes-trust-too.
1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
1. Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
1. Azouvi, Sarah. 2021. ‘Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications’. PhD Thesis, University College London. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139069/.
1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
1. Bodó, Balázs, Jaya Klara Brekke, and Jaap Henk Hoepman. 2021. ‘Decentralisation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 0–21. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1563.
1. Garrod, J. Z. 2016. ‘The Real World of the Decentralized Autonomous Society’. TripleC 14 (1): 62–77. https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v14i1.692.
1. Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
1. Humayun, Syeda Mariam. 2019. ‘Creation and Resilience of Decentralized Brands: Bitcoin & the Blockchain’. PhD Thesis. http://hdl.handle.net/10315/37662.
1. Mannan, M. & Schneider, N. 2020. ‘Exit to Community: Strategies for Multi-Stakeholder Ownership in the Platform Economy’. Georgetown Law Technology Review 4 (1): 2017–19. https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/exit-to-community-strategies-for-multi-stakeholder-ownership-in-the-platform-economy/GLTR-05-2021/.
1. Manski, Sarah, and Michel Bauwens. 2020. ‘Reimagining New Socio-Technical Economics Through the Application of Distributed Ledger Technologies’. Frontiers in Blockchain 2 (January): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2019.00029.
1. Rocas-Royo, Marc. 2021. ‘The Blockchain That Was Not: The Case of Four Cooperative Agroecological Supermarkets’. Frontiers in Blockchain 4 (April): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2021.624810.
1. Sai, Ashish Rajendra. 2021. ‘Towards a Holistic Assessment of Centralization in Distributed Ledgers’. https://ulir.ul.ie/handle/10344/10766.
1. Sai, Ashish Rajendra, Jim Buckley, Brian Fitzgerald, and Andrew Le Gear. 2021. ‘Taxonomy of Centralization in Public Blockchain Systems: A Systematic Literature Review’. Information Processing and Management 58 (4): 102584. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipm.2021.102584.
1. Schneider, Nathan. 2019. ‘Decentralization: An Incomplete Ambition’. Journal of Cultural Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553.

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# Decentralized Finance (DeFi)
Defi is a broad category of [smart-contracts](smart-contracts.md) which loosely correspond to digital contracts running on a [blockchain](blockchain.md) which allow users to create collateralized loans out of [stablecoin](stablecoin.md) and which have side payouts in so-called "[governance tokens](governance-token.md)".
Defi is a broad category of [smart contracts](smart-contracts.md) which loosely correspond to digital investment schemes running on a [blockchain](blockchain.md) which allow users to create [overcollateralized](collateralization.md) loans out of [stablecoin](stablecoin.md) and which have side payouts in so-called "[governance tokens](governance-token.md)".
DeFi generally refers to a collection of services which offer lending products offered by non-banks and which exist outside the regulatory perimeter as a form [regulatory-arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) and to fund margin trading activities to [speculaate](speculation.md) on [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md).
DeFi generally refers to a collection of services which offer lending products offered by non-banks and which exist outside the regulatory perimeter as a form [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md) and to fund margin trading activities to [speculaate](speculation.md) on [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md).
See also [yield farming](yield-farming.md), [AMM](amm.md), [DEX](dex.md).
See also [yield farming](yield-farming.md), [AMM](amm.md), [DEX](dex.md) and [shadow bank](shadow-bank.md).
## References
* [@allen_defi_2022]
* [@carter_defi_2021]
* [@aramonte_defi_2021]
* [@saengchote_defi_2021]
* [@barbereau_defi_2022]
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Anker-Sørensen, Linn, and Dirk A Zetzsche. 2021. ‘From Centralized to Decentralized Finance: The Issue Of’. Available at SSRN 3978815. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978815.
1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
1. Barbereau, Tom, Reilly Smethurst, Orestis Papageorgiou, Alexander Rieger, and Gilbert Fridgen. 2022. ‘DeFi, Not So Decentralized: The Measured Distribution of Voting Rights’. In Proceedings of the 55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/80074.
1. Barbereau, Tom, Reilly Smethurst, Orestis Papageorgiou, Johannes Sedlmeir, and Gilbert Fridgen. 2022. ‘Decentralised Finance’s Unregulated Governance: Minority Rule in the Digital Wild West’. Available at SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4001891.
1. Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. In 55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2022). https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
1. Chen, Yan, and Cristiano Bellavitis. 2020. ‘Blockchain Disruption and Decentralized Finance: The Rise of Decentralized Business Models’. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbvi.2019.e00151.
1. Ciriello, Raffaele Fabio. 2021. ‘Tokenized Index Funds: A Blockchain-Based Concept and a Multidisciplinary Research Framework’. International Journal of Information Management 61: 102400. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2021.102400.
1. Eikmanns, Benedikt C., Pascal Mehrwald, Isabell M. Welpe, and Philipp G. Sandner. n.d. ‘Is Ethereum the New IOS? Exploring the Platform Economy of Decentralized Finance’. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3992625.
1. Harwick, Cameron, and James Caton. 2020. ‘What’s Holding Back Blockchain Finance? On the Possibility of Decentralized Autonomous Finance’. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, October. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2020.09.006.
1. Johnson, Kristin N. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: Regulating Cryptocurrency Exchanges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831439.
1. Maia, Guilherme, and João Vieira dos Santos. 2021. ‘MiCA and DeFi (“Proposal for a Regulation on Market in Crypto-Assets” and ’Decentralised Finance’)’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875355.
1. Nedashkovskiy, Alexander. 2021. ‘Understanding DeFi Ecosystem and How Can It Change or Transform Existing Financial System’. https://lutpub.lut.fi/handle/10024/162989.
1. Qin, Kaihua, Liyi Zhou, Yaroslav Afonin, Ludovico Lazzaretti, and Arthur Gervais. 2021. ‘CeFi vs. DeFi – Comparing Centralized to Decentralized Finance’. ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:2106.08157. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.08157.
1. Saengchote, Kanis. 2021. ‘A DeFi Bank Run: Iron Finance, IRON Stablecoin, and the Fall of TITAN’. IRON Stablecoin, and the Fall of TITAN (July 16, 2021).
1. Schär, Fabian. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: On Blockchain-and Smart Contract-Based Financial Markets’. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 103 (2): 153–74. https://doi.org/10.20955/r.103.153-74.
1. Sun, Xiaotong. 2021. ‘Centralized Governance in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): A Case Study of MakerDAO’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971791.
1. Zetzsche, Dirk A., Douglas W. Arner, and Ross P. Buckley. 2020. ‘Decentralized Finance’. Journal of Financial Regulation 6 (2): 172–203. https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjaa010.

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See also [inflationary asset](inflationary.md).
## References
1. Frisch, Helmut. 1983. Theories of Inflation. Cambridge University Press.
1. Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048.
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204.

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# Deposit Insurance
Insurance a bank holds against its [deposit](deposit.md) to protect depositors from losses by insolvent banks. Instead of being mutualized deposits are backed by a [central banks](central-banks.md).
See also [bank run](bank-run.md).
See also [bank run](bank-run.md) and [mutualization](mutualization.md).
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.

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# Deposit
Money that held on behalf of a client of a [bank](bank.md).
Money that held on behalf of a client of a [bank](bank.md).
## References
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.

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# Derivative
A derivative is a type of financial contract whose value is dependent on an underlying asset, group of assets, or benchmark.
A derivative is a type of financial contract whose value is dependent on an *underlying* asset, basket of assets, or a benchmark of other assets.
Underlying assets for derivatives are most often stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, and market indexes. The value of the contract itself depend on changes in the prices of the underlying asset.
Underlying for derivatives are most often [stocks](stock.md), [bonds](bond.md), [commodites](commodity.md), [currencies](currency.md), debt and market indexes. The value of the contract itself depend on changes in the prices of the underlying asset.
A derivative is a type of [financial asset](financial-asset.md). Derivatives have no [use value](use-value.md). Their [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) and demand is generated from their the demand of the underlying.
Examples of derivatives products:
## Examples
* Futures
* Forwards
* Swaps
* Options
* Interest Rate Swaps
* [Credit Default Swaps](cds.md)
* [Credit Default Swaps](cds.md)
## References
1. Wilmott, Paul. Paul Wilmott introduces quantitative finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.
1. Grinold, Richard C., and Ronald N. Kahn. Active portfolio management: Quantitative theory and applications. Probus, 1995.
1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625.
1. Braun, Benjamin, and Daniela Gabor. 2019. ‘Central Banking, Shadow Banking, and Infrastructural Power’. https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nf9ms.

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# Decentralized Exchange
Order-book based but peer-to-peer transactions (i.e. without market makers). This contrasts with [AMM](AMM.md) (automated market makers) who don't have an order book.
A form of [market making](market-maker.md) done via a [smart-contracts](smart-contracts.md). In this setup the [order-book](order-book.md) is based on peer-to-peer transactions instead of through a central party like a [crypto exchange](crypto-exchange.md). This contrasts with [AMM](AMM.md) (automated market makers) who don't have an [order book](order-book.md) and instead use [liquidity pools](liquidity-pool.md).
## Limitations
Decentralized exchanges lack the ability to withdraw currencies like [dollar](dollar.md) and Euros because they have no access to the [banking](bank.md) system to issue payments.
From https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/what-is-uniswap-and-how-does-it-work
See also [crypto exchange](crypto-exchange.md), [bucket shop](bucket-shop.md), [mixer](mixer.md) and [money laundering](money-laundering.md).
> Due to the inherent limitations of [blockchain](blockchain.md) technology, it has been a challenge to build DEXes that meaningfully compete with their centralized counterparts. Most DEXes could improve both in terms of performance and user experience.
## References
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Anker-Sørensen, Linn, and Dirk A Zetzsche. 2021. ‘From Centralized to Decentralized Finance: The Issue Of’. Available at SSRN 3978815. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978815.
1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
1. Barbereau, Tom, Reilly Smethurst, Orestis Papageorgiou, Johannes Sedlmeir, and Gilbert Fridgen. 2022. ‘Decentralised Finance’s Unregulated Governance: Minority Rule in the Digital Wild West’. Available at SSRN. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4001891.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.

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# Distribution Problem
The *distribution problem* refers to a set of hypothetical solutions to achieve a equitable (or other property) of distribution in the bootstrapping of a [private-money](private-money.md). Effectively how to distribute the [currency](currency.md) to early adopters to achieve some end.
An alleged solution to this problem comes attached to a presuppositional claim about what *equity* would be defined as, which is a political rather than economic claim.
An alleged solution to this problem comes attached to a presuppositional claim about what *equity* would be defined as, which is a political rather than economic claim.
See also [decentralization](decentralization.md) and [recentralization](recentralization.md).
## References
1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
1. Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
1. Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
1. Tante. 2021. ‘The Third Web’. Nodes in a Social Network (blog). 17 December 2021. https://tante.cc/2021/12/17/the-third-web/.
1. Weaver, Nicholas. 2021. ‘The Web3 Fraud’. USENIX. 16 December 2021. https://www.usenix.org/publications/loginonline/web3-fraud.
1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
1. Bodó, Balázs, Jaya Klara Brekke, and Jaap Henk Hoepman. 2021. ‘Decentralisation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 0–21. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1563.
1. Garrod, J. Z. 2016. ‘The Real World of the Decentralized Autonomous Society’. TripleC 14 (1): 62–77. https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v14i1.692.
1. Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.

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