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# Asymmetric Information
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Information asymmetry is a condition in [price-formation](price-formation.md) and economics transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in transactions. This can lead to [moral-hazard](moral-hazard.md) or entire [markets](market.md) to be inefficient.
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Information asymmetry is a condition in [price formation](price-formation.md) and economics transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. This asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in transactions. This can lead to [moral hazard](moral-hazard.md) or entire [markets](market.md) to be inefficient.
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## References
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1. Akerlof, George A. "The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." In Uncertainty in economics, pp. 235-251. Academic Press, 1978.
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# Atomic Swap
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@ -3,4 +3,6 @@ A bank is a financial institution which is chartered and regulated to hold custo
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A bank has [deposit insurance](deposit-insurance.md) backed by a [central bank](central-banks.md).
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Banks are required to perform [KYC](kyc.md), [CTF](ctf.md), [AML](aml.md) checks on financial transactions and account holders.
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Banks are required to perform [KYC](kyc.md), [CTF](ctf.md), [AML](aml.md) checks on financial transactions and account holders.
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## References
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@ -41,4 +41,4 @@ Bitcoin is based on [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md) known as Proof
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* Krugman, Paul. 2021. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/opinion/cryptocurrency-bitcoin.html.
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* Bellinger, Matthew. 2018. ‘The Rhetoric of Bitcoin: Money, Politics, and the Construction of Blockchain Communities’. ResearchWorks Archive. PhD Thesis. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/43342.
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* Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf.
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* Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
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* Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/.
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@ -4,20 +4,20 @@ The claim or aspiration that a [decentralization](decentralization.md) network i
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See also [recentralization](recentralization.md).
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## References
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* Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
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* Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
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* Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
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* White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
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* Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
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* Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
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* Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
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* Azouvi, Sarah. 2021. ‘Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications’. PhD Thesis, University College London. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139069/.
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* Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
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* Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
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* Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
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* Schneider, Nathan. 2019. ‘Decentralization: An Incomplete Ambition’. Journal of Cultural Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553.
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* Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
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* Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
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* Bailey, Andrew M., Bradley Rettler, and Craig Warmke. 2021. ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency II: The Moral Landscape of Monetary Design’. Philosophy Compass 16 (11): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12784.
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* Renwick, Robin, and Rob Gleasure. 2021. ‘Those Who Control the Code Control the Rules: How Different Perspectives of Privacy Are Being Written into the Code of Blockchain Systems’. Journal of Information Technology 36 (1): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396220944406.
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* West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
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1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
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1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
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1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
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1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/.
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1. Plant, Luke. 2022. ‘The Technological Case against Bitcoin and Blockchain’. Luke Plant’s Home Page. 5 March 2022. https://lukeplant.me.uk/blog/posts/the-technological-case-against-bitcoin-and-blockchain/.
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1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html.
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1. Arnosti, Nick, and S Matthew Weinberg. 2022. ‘Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly’. Management Science.
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1. Azouvi, Sarah. 2021. ‘Levels of Decentralization and Trust in Cryptocurrencies: Consensus, Governance and Applications’. PhD Thesis, University College London. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10139069/.
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1. Babu, Asvatha. 2020. ‘Behind the Veil of Decentralization: Analyzing Blockchain Frames and Sponsors in US News’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749482.
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1. Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02.
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1. Halpin, Harry. 2020. ‘Deconstructing the Decentralization Trilemma’. ICETE 2020 - Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications 3: 505–12. https://doi.org/10.5220/0009892405050512.
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1. Schneider, Nathan. 2019. ‘Decentralization: An Incomplete Ambition’. Journal of Cultural Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2019.1589553.
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1. Soatok. 2021. ‘Against Web3 and Faux-Decentralization’. Dhole Moments. 19 October 2021. https://soatok.blog/2021/10/19/against-web3-and-faux-decentralization/.
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1. Zhang, Zhexi. 2019. ‘The Aesthetics of Decentralization’. PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123614.
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1. Bailey, Andrew M., Bradley Rettler, and Craig Warmke. 2021. ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economics of Cryptocurrency II: The Moral Landscape of Monetary Design’. Philosophy Compass 16 (11): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12784.
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1. Renwick, Robin, and Rob Gleasure. 2021. ‘Those Who Control the Code Control the Rules: How Different Perspectives of Privacy Are Being Written into the Code of Blockchain Systems’. Journal of Information Technology 36 (1): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396220944406.
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1. West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792.
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@ -21,27 +21,27 @@ DAOs are best understood as shares in a common enterprise which is run by potent
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* [yogacoin.tech](../dao/yogacoin.tech.md)
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## References
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* Bayern, Shawn. 2021. Autonomous Organizations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108878203.
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* Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
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* Chen, Liang, Tony W. Tong, Shaoqin Tang, and Nianchen Han. 2022. ‘Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization’. Journal of Management 48 (1): 147–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211045023.
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* Crepaldi, M. 2020. ‘The Authority of Distributed Consensus Systems Trust, Governance, and Normative Perspectives on Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers’. PhD Thesis. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9432/.
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* El Faqir, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2020. ‘An Overview of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations on the Blockchain’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, August. https://doi.org/10.1145/3412569.3412579.
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* Faqir-Rhazoui, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2021. ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Platforms for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations in the Ethereum Blockchain’. Journal of Internet Services and Applications 12 (1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13174-021-00139-6.
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* Frey, Seth, P. M. Krafft, and Brian C. Keegan. 2019. ‘“This Place Does What It Was Built for”: Designing Digital Institutions for Participatory Change’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359134.
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* Hassan, Samer, and Primavera De Filippi. 2021. ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1556.
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* Hsieh, Ying Ying, Jean Philippe Vergne, Philip Anderson, Karim Lakhani, and Markus Reitzig. 2018. ‘Bitcoin and the Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations’. Journal of Organization Design 7 (1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41469-018-0038-1.
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* Lovett, Matthew, and Lee Thomas. 2021. ‘A Fork in the Road: Perspectives on Sustainability and Decentralised Governance in Digital Institutions’. First Monday 26 (11). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v26i11.12357.
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* Lumineau, Fabrice, Wenqian Wang, and Oliver Schilke. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance-A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?’ Organization Science 32 (2): 500–521. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1379.
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* Lustig, Caitlin. 2019. ‘Intersecting Imaginaries: Visions of Decentralized Autonomous Systems’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW). https://doi.org/10.1145/3359312.
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* Morrison, Robbie, Natasha C. H. L. Mazey, and Stephen C. Wingreen. 2020. ‘The DAO Controversy: The Case for a New Species of Corporate Governance?’ Frontiers in Blockchain 3 (May). https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00025.
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* Murray, Alex, Jen Rhymer, and David G. Sirmon. 2021. ‘Humans and Technology: Forms of Conjoined Agency in Organizations’. Academy of Management Review 46 (3): 552–71. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2019.0186.
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* Poblet, Marta, Darcy W. E. Allen, Oleksii Konashevych, Aaron M. Lane, and Carlos Andres Diaz Valdivia. 2020. ‘From Athens to the Blockchain: Oracles for Digital Democracy’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3: 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.575662.
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* Rikken, Olivier, Marijn Janssen, and Zenlin Kwee. n.d. ‘The Ins and Outs of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (Daos)’. Available at SSRN 3989559. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3989559.
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* Schirrmacher, Nina-Birte, Johannes Rude Jensen, and Michel Avital. 2021. ‘Token-Centric Work Practices in Fluid Organizations: The Cases of Yearn and MakerDAO’. In The 42nd International Conference on Information Systems: ICIS 2021: Building Sustainability and Resilience With Is: A Call for Action. https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2021/is_future_work/is_future_work/17/.
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* Schneider, Nathan. 2021. ‘Broad-Based Stakeholder Ownership in Journalism: Co-Ops, ESOPs, Blockchains’. Media Industries Journal 7 (2). https://doi.org/10.3998/mij.15031809.0007.203.
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* Sun, Xiaotong. 2021. ‘Centralized Governance in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): A Case Study of MakerDAO’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971791.
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* Tse, Nathan. 2020. ‘Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Corporate Form’. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 51 (2): 313. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v51i2.6573.
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* Vergne, JP. 2020. ‘Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform’. Organization Theory 1 (4): 263178772097705. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720977052.
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* Wissel, Tim. 2021. ‘Fairness and Freedom for Artists: Towards a Robot Economy for the Music Industry’. https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid:72a5c834-177b-4b3c-a6f8-8e69e65cfdf4.
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* Wright, Steven A. 2021. ‘Measuring DAO Autonomy: Lessons From Other Autonomous Systems’. IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society 2 (1): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/tts.2021.3054974.
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1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
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1. Bayern, Shawn. 2021. Autonomous Organizations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108878203.
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1. Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
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1. Chen, Liang, Tony W. Tong, Shaoqin Tang, and Nianchen Han. 2022. ‘Governance and Design of Digital Platforms: A Review and Future Research Directions on a Meta-Organization’. Journal of Management 48 (1): 147–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211045023.
|
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1. Crepaldi, M. 2020. ‘The Authority of Distributed Consensus Systems Trust, Governance, and Normative Perspectives on Blockchains and Distributed Ledgers’. PhD Thesis. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9432/.
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1. El Faqir, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2020. ‘An Overview of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations on the Blockchain’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, August. https://doi.org/10.1145/3412569.3412579.
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1. Faqir-Rhazoui, Youssef, Javier Arroyo, and Samer Hassan. 2021. ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Platforms for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations in the Ethereum Blockchain’. Journal of Internet Services and Applications 12 (1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13174-021-00139-6.
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1. Frey, Seth, P. M. Krafft, and Brian C. Keegan. 2019. ‘“This Place Does What It Was Built for”: Designing Digital Institutions for Participatory Change’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1145/3359134.
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1. Hassan, Samer, and Primavera De Filippi. 2021. ‘Decentralized Autonomous Organization’. Internet Policy Review 10 (2): 1–10. https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.2.1556.
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1. Hsieh, Ying Ying, Jean Philippe Vergne, Philip Anderson, Karim Lakhani, and Markus Reitzig. 2018. ‘Bitcoin and the Rise of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations’. Journal of Organization Design 7 (1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s41469-018-0038-1.
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1. Lovett, Matthew, and Lee Thomas. 2021. ‘A Fork in the Road: Perspectives on Sustainability and Decentralised Governance in Digital Institutions’. First Monday 26 (11). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v26i11.12357.
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1. Lumineau, Fabrice, Wenqian Wang, and Oliver Schilke. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance-A New Way of Organizing Collaborations?’ Organization Science 32 (2): 500–521. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2020.1379.
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1. Lustig, Caitlin. 2019. ‘Intersecting Imaginaries: Visions of Decentralized Autonomous Systems’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW). https://doi.org/10.1145/3359312.
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1. Morrison, Robbie, Natasha C. H. L. Mazey, and Stephen C. Wingreen. 2020. ‘The DAO Controversy: The Case for a New Species of Corporate Governance?’ Frontiers in Blockchain 3 (May). https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.00025.
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1. Murray, Alex, Jen Rhymer, and David G. Sirmon. 2021. ‘Humans and Technology: Forms of Conjoined Agency in Organizations’. Academy of Management Review 46 (3): 552–71. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2019.0186.
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1. Poblet, Marta, Darcy W. E. Allen, Oleksii Konashevych, Aaron M. Lane, and Carlos Andres Diaz Valdivia. 2020. ‘From Athens to the Blockchain: Oracles for Digital Democracy’. Frontiers in Blockchain 3: 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbloc.2020.575662.
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1. Rikken, Olivier, Marijn Janssen, and Zenlin Kwee. n.d. ‘The Ins and Outs of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (Daos)’. Available at SSRN 3989559. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3989559.
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1. Schirrmacher, Nina-Birte, Johannes Rude Jensen, and Michel Avital. 2021. ‘Token-Centric Work Practices in Fluid Organizations: The Cases of Yearn and MakerDAO’. In The 42nd International Conference on Information Systems: ICIS 2021: Building Sustainability and Resilience With Is: A Call for Action. https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2021/is_future_work/is_future_work/17/.
|
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1. Schneider, Nathan. 2021. ‘Broad-Based Stakeholder Ownership in Journalism: Co-Ops, ESOPs, Blockchains’. Media Industries Journal 7 (2). https://doi.org/10.3998/mij.15031809.0007.203.
|
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1. Sun, Xiaotong. 2021. ‘Centralized Governance in Decentralized Finance (DeFi): A Case Study of MakerDAO’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3971791.
|
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1. Tse, Nathan. 2020. ‘Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Corporate Form’. Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 51 (2): 313. https://doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v51i2.6573.
|
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1. Vergne, JP. 2020. ‘Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform’. Organization Theory 1 (4): 263178772097705. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631787720977052.
|
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1. Wissel, Tim. 2021. ‘Fairness and Freedom for Artists: Towards a Robot Economy for the Music Industry’. https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid:72a5c834-177b-4b3c-a6f8-8e69e65cfdf4.
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1. Wright, Steven A. 2021. ‘Measuring DAO Autonomy: Lessons From Other Autonomous Systems’. IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society 2 (1): 43–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/tts.2021.3054974.
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ See also [yield farming](yield-farming.md), [AMM](amm.md), [DEX](dex.md) and [sh
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## References
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1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
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1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
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1. Anker-Sørensen, Linn, and Dirk A Zetzsche. 2021. ‘From Centralized to Decentralized Finance: The Issue Of’. Available at SSRN 3978815. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978815.
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1. Aramonte, Sirio, Wenqian Huang, and Andreas Schrimpf. 2021. ‘DeFi Risks and the Decentralisation Illusion’, 16.
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1. Barbereau, Tom, Reilly Smethurst, Orestis Papageorgiou, Alexander Rieger, and Gilbert Fridgen. 2022. ‘DeFi, Not So Decentralized: The Measured Distribution of Voting Rights’. In Proceedings of the 55th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/80074.
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# Free Rider Problem
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The use of [public goods](public-goods-problem.md) by parties who do not contribute to their creation or upkeep.
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The use of [public goods](public-goods-problem.md) by parties who do not contribute to their creation or upkeep while still extracting value from the service or good.
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See also [public goods problem](public-goods-problem.md).
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@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ The strong form of this ideology coincides with the so-called Friedman Doctrine
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the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, possibly by any means.
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## References
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* Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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* Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417.
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* Akerlof, George A. "The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." In Uncertainty in economics, pp. 235-251. Academic Press, 1978.
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* Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström. "The theory of contracts." In Advances in economic theory: Fifth world congress, vol. 1. 1987.
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* Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. "Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns." Journal of financial economics 105, no. 3 (2012): 457-472.
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* Jarrow, Robert A. "Market manipulation, bubbles, corners, and short squeezes." Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, no. 3 (1992): 311-336.
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* Friedman, Milton. "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." In Corporate ethics and corporate governance, pp. 173-178. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007.
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1. Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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1. Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417.
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1. Akerlof, George A. "The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." In Uncertainty in economics, pp. 235-251. Academic Press, 1978.
|
||||
1. Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström. "The theory of contracts." In Advances in economic theory: Fifth world congress, vol. 1. 1987.
|
||||
1. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. "Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns." Journal of financial economics 105, no. 3 (2012): 457-472.
|
||||
1. Jarrow, Robert A. "Market manipulation, bubbles, corners, and short squeezes." Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, no. 3 (1992): 311-336.
|
||||
1. Friedman, Milton. "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." In Corporate ethics and corporate governance, pp. 173-178. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1 +1,4 @@
|
|||
# Illicit Financing
|
||||
Illicit financial flows are illegal movements of money from one country to another that are illegally earned, transferred, or associated with criminal activity.
|
||||
|
||||
See also [money laundering](money-laundering.md), [counter-terrorism financing](ctf.md), and [sanctions enforcement](sanctions-enforcement.md).
|
||||
|
|
@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ A crypto mixer is a [smart contract](smart-contracts.md) service that performs [
|
|||
Crypto mixers are a form of [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
* Buttigieg, Christopher P., Christos Efthymiopoulos, Abigail Attard, and Samantha Cuyle. 2019. ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulation of Crypto Assets in Europe’s Smallest Member State’. Law and Financial Markets Review 13 (4): 211–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2019.1663996.
|
||||
* Computerphile. 2018. Stolen Bitcoin Tracing - Computerphile - YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlLN0QERWBs&ab_channel=Computerphile.
|
||||
* Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January.
|
||||
* Fletcher, Emily, Charles Larkin, and Shaen Corbet. 2021. ‘Countering Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Case for Bitcoin Regulation’. Research in International Business and Finance 56 (January): 101387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101387.
|
||||
* Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/.
|
||||
* Scheck, Justin, and Shane Shifflett. 2018. ‘How Dirty Money Disappears into the Black Hole of Cryptocurrency’. Wall Street Journal 28.
|
||||
1. Buttigieg, Christopher P., Christos Efthymiopoulos, Abigail Attard, and Samantha Cuyle. 2019. ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulation of Crypto Assets in Europe’s Smallest Member State’. Law and Financial Markets Review 13 (4): 211–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2019.1663996.
|
||||
1. Computerphile. 2018. Stolen Bitcoin Tracing - Computerphile - YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlLN0QERWBs&ab_channel=Computerphile.
|
||||
1. Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January.
|
||||
1. Fletcher, Emily, Charles Larkin, and Shaen Corbet. 2021. ‘Countering Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Case for Bitcoin Regulation’. Research in International Business and Finance 56 (January): 101387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101387.
|
||||
1. Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/.
|
||||
* Scheck, Justin, and Shane Shifflett. 2018. ‘How Dirty Money Disappears into the Black Hole of Cryptocurrency’. Wall Street Journal 28.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,2 +1,34 @@
|
|||
# Money Services Business
|
||||
In financial regulation *money services business* includes any person doing business in one or more of the following capacities:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Currency dealer or exchange [making](market-maker.md).
|
||||
1. Check cashier.
|
||||
1. Issuer of checks, money orders or stored value.
|
||||
|
||||
Crypto exchanges are regulated as money services business in the United States, not as [brokers](broker.md). Money service business regulation is far less restrictive than the regulation applied to market makers or brokers, is very state-by-state based in terms of enforcement, and often only involves compliance with high-level FinCEN guidelines on [AML](aml.md) and [KYC](kyc.md) checks on transmission of stored value.
|
||||
|
||||
## References
|
||||
1. ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets’. 2019. Financial Conduct Authority. https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf#page=11.
|
||||
1. Amenta, Carlo, E Riva Sanseverino, and Carlo Stagnaro. 2021. ‘Regulating Blockchain for Sustainability? The Critical Relationship between Digital Innovation, Regulation, and Electricity Governance’. Energy Research & Social Science 76: 102060. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102060.
|
||||
1. Arjaliès, Diane-Laure. 2020. ‘“At the Very Beginning, There’S This Dream.” the Role of Utopia in the Workings of Local and Cryptocurrencies’. In Handbook of Alternative Finance. February. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333755384_AT_THE_VERY_BEGINNING_THERE'S_THIS_DREAM_THE_ROLE_OF_UTOPIA_IN_THE_WORKINGS_OF_LOCAL_AND_CRYPTOCURRENCIES.
|
||||
1. Azgad-Tromer, Shlomit. 2018. ‘Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation’. Am. UL Rev. 68: 69.
|
||||
1. Barrett, Claer. 2021. ‘Why Young Investors Bet the Farm on Cryptocurrencies’. Financial Times, 28 May 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/162839aa-0437-478b-a4d4-4a8d7ab71458.
|
||||
1. Burilov, Vlad. 2019. ‘Regulation of Crypto Tokens and Initial Coin Offerings in the EU: De Lege Lata and de Lege Ferenda’. European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 6 (2): 146–86. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00602003.
|
||||
1. Cristina Cuervo, Anastasiia Morozova. 2020. ‘Regulation of Crypto Assets’. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2020/01/09/Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-48810.
|
||||
1. Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126.
|
||||
1. Doody, Sean. 2020. ‘Reactionary Technopolitics: A Critical Sociohistorical Review’. Fast Capitalism 17 (1): 143–64. https://doi.org/10.32855/fcapital.202001.009.
|
||||
1. Eich, Stefan. 2019. ‘Old Utopias, New Tax Havens: The Politics of Bitcoin in Historical Perspective’. Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, 85–98.
|
||||
1. Eichengreen, Barry. 2021. ‘Financial Regulation in the Age of the Platform Economy’. Journal of Banking Regulation, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00187-9.
|
||||
1. Feinstein, Brian D, and Kevin Werbach. 2020. ‘The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3649475.
|
||||
1. Ferreira, Agata. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Stablecoins—Balancing Risks and Rewards?’ Journal of International Economic Law 24 (4): 755–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgab036.
|
||||
1. Guadamuz, Andres, and Chris Marsden. 2015. ‘Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory Responses to Cryptocurrencies’. First Monday 20 (12). https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v20i12.6198.
|
||||
1. Hacker, Philipp, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos, and Stefan Eich. 2019. Regulating Blockchain: : Techno-Social and Legal Challenges. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842187.001.0001.
|
||||
1. Herian, Robert. 2020. ‘Blockchain, GDPR, and Fantasies of Data Sovereignty’. Law, Innovation and Technology 12 (1): 156–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727094.
|
||||
1. Ivaniuk, Viktoria. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrency Exchange Regulation – An International Review’. Magda Dziembowska, Robert Dziembowski, Apelacja w Postępowaniu, 67.
|
||||
1. Kapsis, Ilias. 2021. ‘Should We Trade Market Stability for More Financial Inclusion? The Case of Crypto-Assets Regulation in EU’. FinTech, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Regulation and Crime Prevention, 85–104. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020998-9.
|
||||
1. Nabilou, Hossein, and André Prüm. 2019. ‘Ignorance, Debt, and Cryptocurrencies: The Old and the New in the Law and Economics of Concurrent Currencies’. Journal of Financial Regulation 5 (1): 29–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjz002.
|
||||
1. Rae, Shaela W, and Lorraine Mastersmith. 2019. ‘Crypto Asset Trading in Canada: Entering a New Era of Regulation’. Banking & Finance Law Review 35 (1): 153–85.
|
||||
1. Schneiders, Alexandra, and David Shipworth. 2021. ‘Community Energy Groups: Can They Shield Consumers from the Risks of Using Blockchain for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading?’ Energies 14 (12). https://doi.org/10.3390/en14123569.
|
||||
1. Tozze, Arianna, Josh Kamps, Eray Arda Akartuna, Toby Davies, Florian Hetzel, and Shane D. Johnson. 2021. ‘Cryptocurrencies and Future Crime’. Crime Science 11 (1): 4. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-021-00163-8.
|
||||
1. Xie, Rain. 2019. ‘Why China Had to Ban Cryptocurrency but the U.S. Did Not: A Comparative Analysis of Regulations on Crypto-Markets between the U.S. and China’. Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 18 (2): 457–89. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1684&context=law_globalstudies.
|
||||
1. Yeung, Karen. 2019. ‘Regulation by Blockchain: The Emerging Battle for Supremacy between the Code of Law and Code as Law’. Modern Law Review 82 (2): 207–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12399.
|
||||
|
|
@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ Money is any item or verifiable record that is accepted as payment for goods and
|
|||
Money is a social technology whose efficacy is based on both its universal acceptance in an economic region and the money's coherence to three properties:
|
||||
|
||||
The United States [dollar](dollar.md) and the Euro are examples of money.
|
||||
|
||||
See also [private money](private-money.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Qualities
|
||||
|
||||
The qualifies of a currency representing money are defined by coherent to three properties:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
|
|||
# Paper Wealth
|
||||
Paper wealth is [value](value.md) that is stored on behalf of a customer or counterparty which has not been converted into [currency](currency.md) yet. It's denominated value has yet to be realized and is subject to [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md), [platform risk](platform-risk.md) and [price risk](price-risk.md)
|
||||
|
||||
[Crypto assets](cryptoasset.md) held in [crypto exchanges](crypto-exchange.md) are an example of paper wealth.
|
||||
[Crypto assets](cryptoasset.md) held in [crypto exchanges](crypto-exchange.md) are an example of paper wealth.
|
||||
|
||||
See also [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md) and [bank run](bank-run.md).
|
||||
|
|
@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ First pass
|
|||
Second Pass
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] [private-money](../concepts/private-money.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [amm](../concepts/amm.md)
|
||||
- [x] [amm](../concepts/amm.md)
|
||||
- [x] [artificial-scarcity](../concepts/artificial-scarcity.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [assets](../concepts/assets.md)
|
||||
- [x] [assets](../concepts/assets.md)
|
||||
- [x] [bretton-woods](../concepts/bretton-woods.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [broker](../concepts/broker.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [cd](../concepts/cd.md)
|
||||
|
|
@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ Second Pass
|
|||
- [x] [deposit-insurance](../concepts/deposit-insurance.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [dex](../concepts/dex.md)
|
||||
- [x] [exit-scam](../concepts/exit-scam.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [free-rider-problem](../concepts/free-rider-problem.md)
|
||||
- [x] [free-rider-problem](../concepts/free-rider-problem.md)
|
||||
- [x] [bank](../concepts/bank.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [illicit-financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md)
|
||||
- [x] [illicit-financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md)
|
||||
- [x] [mixer](../concepts/mixer.md)
|
||||
- [x] [mining](../concepts/mining.md)
|
||||
- [ ] [money-services-business](../concepts/money-services-business.md)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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Reference in New Issue