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Most of human institutional innovation for a few thousand years or more relate to this question. It's a hard, hard problem with a huge associated literature.] + +### For first time can decentrally fund global projects and reward individual actions towards that goal without top-down organized leadership + +> For the first time even we can decentrally fund important global projects and reward individual actions carried out to help that goal without top-down organized leadership +> +> * Like a charity of NGO but without the bureaucracy + > + ![[Pasted image 20220116085601.png]] + +### 🚩 This is a confusion of fundraising and allocation problems + +This seems a basic confusion (and an "intellectual sleight of hand" - no doubt accidental): it confuses allocation and fund-raising aspects: just because we can do allocation decentrally doesn't mean we can raise the funds decentrally! + +**How is the allocation model able to solve the fund-raising?** + +As we will say this problems is basically unsolved in what follows. + +Very similar to the issues with the [claims made by Gitcoin's Kevin Owicki](https://github.com/life-itself/web3/discussions/72) + +#TODO: move to notes and link. + +### The model he describes is as follows + + ![[Pasted image 20220116090043.png]] + +### Then we have an an application example that he walks us through + +![[Pasted image 20220116160233.png]] + +![[Pasted image 20220116160239.png]] + +![[Pasted image 20220116160252.png]] + +And finishes with: + +> In some future scenario, the beaches in Thailand may have been cleaned up in large part, so fewer donations are needed. As #THC tokens are sold, their value decreases according to the token bonding curve, and the donation network smoothly winds down to a smaller level of operation, commensurate with its needs. (Granted, this could go many different ways depending on your sell curve properties — thus the importance of bonding curve parameters!) + +### Let's walk this through: it's either ponzi like (some people don't get paid back) or it runs on donations + +* The only difference from classic donation is the weird possibility of speculative profit from the gradually rising payout value ... +* But given the zero sum aspect of in and out (ETH can't get created out of thin air) and the 50% allocation to the actual project this is only possible *either* with ponzi like mechanics where either people keep joining to pay out the early investors *or* the later "investors/donors" end up out of pocket (i.e. they just donate). + +### There is also no mention of how this is verified or governed + +### Either way it doesn't seem to solve the free rider problem and the funding of public goods + +> Though the example above is very basic, it shows some interesting properties. It encourages donations to successful causes, while also providing network liquidity for goal completion, and a potential investment opportunity for donors and project participants at the same time. A project able to bootstrap funding and token value along with project success and popularity, yet also remain light on infrastructure, with the ability to wind down gradually as a problem is resolved and the project requires less funding — that’s a powerful idea. + +* How does it *encourage* donations to successful causes? (Or, at least any more than the current system?) +* The point that money can pay out is nice though one could build that into most existing orgs relatively easily (just track who contributed). It does note seem a very powerful or important idea. + +### Claims seem large against the backing analysis + +The thing for me is how so many things are claimed with very little to back them up. + +> +> The true benefit of a model like this, however, would be opening up the ability to create these movements to absolutely anyone in the world, with permissionless, direct, incentivized global participation. + +Wait a moment this is only true for the entity setup but includes none of the governance and distribution of funds. + +### Summary + +![[Pasted image 20220116184626.png]] + +The critique (as often) is good: yes, traditional organizations are slow and inefficient. Also solving global collective actions are politically and socially very hard ... + +But ... we haven't been shown how token bonding curves really help at all. + + +## Asides + +### Market forces for fairness + +> Market forces prioritize good information, disincentivize bad actors + + +🚩 But information systems aren't markets or democracies ... and if they were, then simply building good informational voting systems would have been a solved problem years ago ... + +[Ed: what's surprising is you have (what I believe) is a really progressive person making very market-fundamentalist arguments. It's like the American Enterprise Institute approach to solving the climate crisis ...] + + +![[Pasted image 20220116183150.png]] + + +## TODO + +TODO: insert citation link \ No newline at end of file