diff --git a/claims/authoritarianism.md b/claims/authoritarianism.md index 0205c6c..31d5480 100644 --- a/claims/authoritarianism.md +++ b/claims/authoritarianism.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Bitcoin is a means to counter authoritarian regimes -## References +## References * Bogost, Ian. 2017. ‘Cryptocurrency Might Be a Path to Authoritarianism’. The Atlantic 30. * Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204. * Krugman, Paul. 2022. ‘The Strange Alliance of Crypto and MAGA Believers’. The New York Times, 11 January 2022, sec. Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/10/opinion/crypto-cryptocurrency-money-conspiracy.html. diff --git a/claims/blockchain-tech.md b/claims/blockchain-tech.md index 7668140..9d81c28 100644 --- a/claims/blockchain-tech.md +++ b/claims/blockchain-tech.md @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ The technical purpose of blockchains is to create [censorship resistent](../conc ## References 1. Schneier, Bruce. 2019. ‘There’s No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology’. Wired Magazine. https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-good-reason-to-trust-blockchain-technology/. +1. Jeffries, Adrianne. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Meaningless’. The Verge 7: 2018. 1. Rosenthal, David. n.d. ‘Stanford Lecture on Cryptocurrency’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://blog.dshr.org/2022/02/ee380-talk.html. 1. Stinchcombe, Kai. 2017. ‘Ten Years In, Nobody Has Come Up With a Use for Blockchain’. Hackernoon. 22 December 2017. https://hackernoon.com/ten-years-in-nobody-has-come-up-with-a-use-case-for-blockchain-ee98c180100. 1. ———. 2018. ‘Blockchain Is Not Only Crappy Technology but a Bad Vision for the Future’. Medium (blog). 9 April 2018. https://medium.com/@kaistinchcombe/decentralized-and-trustless-crypto-paradise-is-actually-a-medieval-hellhole-c1ca122efdec. @@ -20,11 +21,4 @@ The technical purpose of blockchains is to create [censorship resistent](../conc 1. White, Molly. 2022a. ‘Blockchain-Based Systems Are Not What They Say They Are’. Molly White (blog). 9 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/blockchains-are-not-what-they-say/. 1. ———. 2022b. ‘It’s Not Still the Early Days’. Molly White. 14 January 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/its-not-still-the-early-days/. 1. Pollock, Rufus. 2016. ‘Reflections on the Blockchain · Rufus Pollock Online’. 2 July 2016. https://rufuspollock.com/2016/07/02/reflections-on-the-blockchain/. -1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220107084533/https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf. - -## References -* [@orlowski_blockchain_2018] -* [@rauchs_2nd_2019] -* [@bindseil_encrypted_2022] -* [@olson_problem_2022] -* [@diehl_case_nodate] \ No newline at end of file +1. Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://web.archive.org/web/20220107084533/https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/claims/is-gambling.md b/claims/is-gambling.md index ce83763..f7a4f2c 100644 --- a/claims/is-gambling.md +++ b/claims/is-gambling.md @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Purchasing crypto assets is a form of gambling. Crypto assets have no [income](. Crypto assets are not gambling if one participates in a [cartel](../concepts/cartel.md) which does [pump and dump schemes](../concepts/pump-and-dump.md) or other forms of [market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md) which uses [asymmetric information](../concepts/asymmetric-information.md) to defraud other market participants. Pump and dump schemes result in a net wealth transfer from the larger [market](../concepts/market.md) to a small set of insiders. ## References +1. Sharma, Ruchira. 2022. ‘“Crypto Ruined My Life”: The Mental Health Crisis Hitting Bitcoin Investors’. Vice (blog). 16 February 2022. https://www.vice.com/en/article/akvn8z/crypto-bad-for-mental-health. 1. Barrett, Claer. 2021. ‘Why Young Investors Bet the Farm on Cryptocurrencies’. Financial Times, 28 May 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/162839aa-0437-478b-a4d4-4a8d7ab71458. 1. Powell, Jamie. 2019. ‘Crypto-Shills’. Financial Times. https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/11/29/1543469404000/Crypto-shills/. 1. Dhawan, Anirudh, and Tālis J Putniņš. 2020. ‘A New Wolf in Town? Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets’. Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets (August 10, 2020). diff --git a/concepts/art.md b/concepts/art.md index 0c96a1f..a63e4d1 100644 --- a/concepts/art.md +++ b/concepts/art.md @@ -15,4 +15,6 @@ Art's value is often tied to its provenance and [sign value](sign-value.md). Art may be [artificial scarce](artificial-scarcity.md) if created as part of a collection. -The art market has a great amount of [asymmetric-information](asymmetric-information.md) and [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md). \ No newline at end of file +The art market has a great amount of [asymmetric-information](asymmetric-information.md) and [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md). + +## References \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/bitcoin.md b/concepts/bitcoin.md index 6295681..873f028 100644 --- a/concepts/bitcoin.md +++ b/concepts/bitcoin.md @@ -31,4 +31,12 @@ Bitcoin is a [security](security.md). Bitcoin is allegedly a [sound money](sound-money.md) in the [Austrian economics](ideologies/austrian-economics.md) school of thought. -Bitcoin is based on [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md) known as Proof of Work [mining](mining.md). \ No newline at end of file +Bitcoin is based on [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md) known as Proof of Work [mining](mining.md). + +## References +* Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048. +* Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204. +* Krugman, Paul. 2021. ‘Technobabble, Libertarian Derp and Bitcoin’. The New York Times 21. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/opinion/cryptocurrency-bitcoin.html. +* Bellinger, Matthew. 2018. ‘The Rhetoric of Bitcoin: Money, Politics, and the Construction of Blockchain Communities’. ResearchWorks Archive. PhD Thesis. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/43342. +* Bindseil, Ulrich, Patrick Papsdorf, and Jürgen Schaaf. 2022. ‘The Encrypted Threat: Bitcoin’s Social Cost and Regulatory Responses’. 7 January 2022. https://www.suerf.org/docx/f_88b3febc5798a734026c82c1012408f5_38771_suerf.pdf. +* Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/. diff --git a/concepts/bubble.md b/concepts/bubble.md index 26d2ffe..b83db22 100644 --- a/concepts/bubble.md +++ b/concepts/bubble.md @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) an 1. Corradi, Fiammetta, and Philipp Höfner. 2018. ‘The Disenchantment of Bitcoin: Unveiling the Myth of a Digital Currency’. International Review of Sociology 28 (1): 193–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2018.1430067. 1. Cembalest, Michael. 2022. ‘The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains’. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-wm-aem/global/pb/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/the-maltese-falcoin.pdf. 1. Shri T Rabi Sankar. n.d. ‘Cryptocurrencies – An Assessment’. Reserve Bank of India. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1196. -* Baur, Dirk G., and Thomas Dimpfl. 2021. ‘The Volatility of Bitcoin and Its Role as a Medium of Exchange and a Store of Value’. Empirical Economics 61 (5): 2663–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-020-01990-5. * Chancellor, Edward. 1999. ‘Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation’. * Demmler, Michael, and Amilcar Orlian Fernández Domínguez. 2021. ‘Bitcoin and the South Sea Company: A Comparative Analysis’. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica 13 (1): 197–224. * Kolchinski, Alex. 2022. ‘Crypto Is an Unproductive Bubble’. Alex Kolchinski (blog). 18 March 2022. https://alexkolchinski.com/2022/03/18/crypto-is-an-unproductive-bubble/. diff --git a/concepts/deflationary.md b/concepts/deflationary.md index d2f5993..12939d3 100644 --- a/concepts/deflationary.md +++ b/concepts/deflationary.md @@ -5,4 +5,8 @@ A deflationary spiral is a situation in [market](market.md) where decreases in t [Bitcoin](bitcoin.md) is an example of a deflationary asset due to its total fixed supply and increasing loss of funds due to lost [wallet](wallet.md) or loss of funds associated with [illicit-financing](illicit-financing.md). -See also [inflationary asset](inflationary.md). \ No newline at end of file +See also [inflationary asset](inflationary.md). + +## References +1. Hanley, Brian P. 2018. ‘The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin’. ArXiv:1312.2048 [Cs, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.2048. +1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2021. ‘Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility’. ArXiv:2106.14204 [Physics, q-Fin], July. http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14204. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/derivative.md b/concepts/derivative.md index c6c80c3..e2a3981 100644 --- a/concepts/derivative.md +++ b/concepts/derivative.md @@ -4,10 +4,9 @@ A derivative is a type of financial contract whose value is dependent on an unde Underlying assets for derivatives are most often stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, and market indexes. The value of the contract itself depend on changes in the prices of the underlying asset. ## Examples - * Futures * Forwards * Swaps * Options * Interest Rate Swaps -* Credit Default Swaps \ No newline at end of file +* [Credit Default Swaps](cds.md) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/dollar.md b/concepts/dollar.md index 2ea509f..e22e838 100644 --- a/concepts/dollar.md +++ b/concepts/dollar.md @@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ The dollar is a [currency](currency.md). The dollar is issued by a [central bank](central-banks.md). +The dollar is a [public good](public-goods-problem.md). + The dollar is [inflationary](inflationary.md). The dollar has no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md). diff --git a/concepts/ethereum.md b/concepts/ethereum.md index fc49f5e..3ed04f2 100644 --- a/concepts/ethereum.md +++ b/concepts/ethereum.md @@ -29,4 +29,17 @@ Ethereum has a negative [expected return](expected-return.md). Ethereum is a [security](security.md). -Ethereum is based on the [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md) known as Proof of Work [mining](mining.md). \ No newline at end of file +Ethereum is based on the [consensus algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md) known as Proof of Work [mining](mining.md). + +## References +1. Ante, Lennart. 2020. ‘Smart Contracts on the Blockchain – A Bibliometric Analysis and Review’. SSRN Electronic Journal, no. 10: 1–48. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576393. +1. ———. 2021a. ‘Non-Fungible Token (NFT) Markets on the Ethereum Blockchain: Temporal Development, Cointegration and Interrelations’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904683. +1. ———. 2021b. ‘Smart Contracts on the Blockchain – A Bibliometric Analysis and Review’. Telematics and Informatics 57: 101519. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2020.101519. +1. Bartoletti, Massimo, Salvatore Carta, Tiziana Cimoli, and Roberto Saia. 2020. ‘Dissecting Ponzi Schemes on Ethereum: Identification, Analysis, and Impact’. Future Generation Computer Systems 102: 259–77. +1. Brekke, Clara Jaya. 2019. ‘Disassembling the Trust Machine, Three Cuts on the Political Matter of Blockchain T’. PhD Thesis. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/13174/http://etheses.dur.ac.uk. +1. Brody, Ann, and Stéphane Couture. 2021. ‘Ideologies and Imaginaries in Blockchain Communities: The Case of Ethereum’. Canadian Journal of Communication 46 (3). https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2021v46n3a3701. +1. Casale-Brunet, S., P. Ribeca, P. Doyle, and M. Mattavelli. 2021. ‘Networks of Ethereum Non-Fungible Tokens: A Graph-Based Analysis of the ERC-721 Ecosystem’. ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:2110.12545. http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.12545. +1. Hartel, Pieter, Ivan Homoliak, and Daniël Reijsbergen. 2019. ‘An Empirical Study Into the Success of Listed Smart Contracts in Ethereum’. IEEE Access 7: 177539–55. +1. Jason Kolber, Adam. 2018. ‘Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility’. Stanford Technology Law Review 21 (2): 198–234. https://law.stanford.edu/publications/not-so-smart-blockchain-contracts-and-artificial-responsibility/. +1. McDonald, Kyle. 2021. ‘Ethereum Emissions: A Bottom-up Estimate’. http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.01238. +1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/gold-standard.md b/concepts/gold-standard.md index 9300238..b2f7bca 100644 --- a/concepts/gold-standard.md +++ b/concepts/gold-standard.md @@ -15,5 +15,8 @@ Very few mainstream economists believe the gold standard to be a good way to run ## Essays -1. [@bernanke_essays_2004] -2. [@krishna_when_2017] \ No newline at end of file +1. Green, Russell A. "Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold? Should the US Consider Returning to the Gold Standard?." Issue Brief 02.23. 16 (2016). +1. Allon, Fiona. 2018. ‘Money after Blockchain: Gold, Decentralised Politics and the New Libertarianism’. Australian Feminist Studies 33 (96): 223–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2018.1517245. +1. Bernanke, Ben S. 2004. Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press. +1. Selmi, Refk, Jamal Bouoiyour, and Mark E. Wohar. 2022. ‘“Digital Gold” and Geopolitics’. Research in International Business and Finance 59: 101512. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101512. +1. Wang, Gangjin, Yanping Tang, Chi Xie, and Shou Chen. 2019. ‘Is Bitcoin a Safe Haven or a Hedging Asset? Evidence from China’. Journal of Management Science and Engineering 4 (3): 173–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/gold.md b/concepts/gold.md index a560259..0c52dd0 100644 --- a/concepts/gold.md +++ b/concepts/gold.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ # Gold Gold is a precious metal sometimes used as investment and historically as coinage for [currency](currency.md). +See also [gold standard](gold-standard.md). + ## Properties Gold has [use value](use-value.md) in jewellery and electronics. diff --git a/concepts/greater-fool-theory.md b/concepts/greater-fool-theory.md index 7d3c59d..115b3f1 100644 --- a/concepts/greater-fool-theory.md +++ b/concepts/greater-fool-theory.md @@ -1,4 +1,14 @@ # Greater Fool Theory The greater fool theory is a thesis in economics that market participants can sometimes profit from the purchase (i.e. [speculation](speculation.md)) of overvalued assets ,  assets whose [market-value](market-value.md) drastically exceeding their [fundamental-value](fundamental-value.md) ,  if those assets can later be resold at an even higher price to another market participant who makes the same assumption and so on ad infinitum. -The greater fool theory presumes an infinite chain of fools in order for all participants to profit or "make it" or profit from the [bubble](bubble.md). \ No newline at end of file +The greater fool theory presumes an infinite chain of fools in order for all participants to profit or "make it" or profit from the [bubble](bubble.md). + +## References + +* Mackay, Charles. 2012. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Simon and Schuster. +* Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press. +* Blanchard, Olivier J, and Mark W Watson. 1982. ‘Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets’. NBER Working Paper, no. w0945. +* Caferra, Rocco, Gabriele Tedeschi, and Andrea Morone. 2021. ‘Bitcoin: Bubble That Bursts or Gold That Glitters?’ Economics Letters 205: 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942. +* Chancellor, Edward. 1999. ‘Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation’. +* Demmler, Michael, and Amilcar Orlian Fernández Domínguez. 2021. ‘Bitcoin and the South Sea Company: A Comparative Analysis’. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica 13 (1): 197–224. +* Smales, L. A. 2022. ‘Investor Attention in Cryptocurrency Markets’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101972. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101972. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/high-control-group.md b/concepts/high-control-group.md index 4dc806e..73d593b 100644 --- a/concepts/high-control-group.md +++ b/concepts/high-control-group.md @@ -1,4 +1,10 @@ # High Control Group A social group or movement in which the members are strongly influenced by the suggestions of a group leader or group as a whole and in which dissent or reflection on the ideology are discouraged. Often incorporates a narrative about an ingroup and outgroup. -This type of group will often adopt a disfigurement of language and [thought terminating cliches](thought-terminating-cliches.md) in order to communicate within the ingroup. \ No newline at end of file +This type of group will often adopt a disfigurement of language and [thought terminating cliches](thought-terminating-cliches.md) in order to communicate within the ingroup. + +## References +1. Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press. +1. Lowe, Scott. "Cultish: The Language of Fanaticism, by Amanda Montell." (2022): 151-152. +1. Hoffer, Eric. "The True Believer (New York." Harper's (1952): 28. +1. Festinger, Leon, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schachter. When prophecy fails: A social and psychological study of a modern group that predicted the destruction of the world. Lulu Press, Inc, 2017. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/memecoin.md b/concepts/memecoin.md index 05b0824..f25c00d 100644 --- a/concepts/memecoin.md +++ b/concepts/memecoin.md @@ -1,4 +1,13 @@ # Memecoin A meme coin is a [cryptoasset](cryptoasset.md) which has no pretense of [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) or [utility](use-value.md) but instead is a [greater fool](greater-fool-theory.md) investment based trend-following of an image or symbol in popular culture. -See [dogecoin](dogecoin.md). \ No newline at end of file +See [dogecoin](dogecoin.md). + +## References +1. Warzel, Charlie. 2021. ‘The Absurdity Is the Point’. Substack newsletter. Galaxy Brain (blog). 11 May 2021. https://warzel.substack.com/p/the-absurdity-is-the-point. +1. Gerard, David. n.d. ‘Confused About Dogecoin? Here’s How It (Doesn’t) Work.’ Foreign Policy (blog). Accessed 3 March 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/11/dogecoin-how-does-it-work-elon-musk-cryptocurrency/. +1. Maddox, Alexia, and Luke J Heemsbergen. 2021. ‘Digging in Crypto-Communities’ Future-Making: From Dark to Doge’. M/C Journal 24 (2 SE-). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2755. +1. Becker, Moritz. 2019. ‘Blockchain and the Promise (s) of Decentralisation : A Sociological Investigation of the Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Blockchain’. In Proceedings of the STS Conference Graz 2019, 6–30. https://doi.org/10.3217/978-3-85125-668-0-02. +1. Groos, Jan. 2021. ‘Crypto Politics: Notes on Sociotechnical Imaginaries of Governance in Blockchain Based Technologies’. In Data Loam, 1:148–70. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110697841-009. + 1. Lustig, Caitlin. 2019. ‘Intersecting Imaginaries: Visions of Decentralized Autonomous Systems’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 3 (CSCW). https://doi.org/10.1145/3359312. +1. West, Sarah Myers. 2018. ‘Cryptographic Imaginaries and the Networked Public’. Internet Policy Review 7 (2): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.14763/2018.2.792. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/moral-hazard.md b/concepts/moral-hazard.md index dafd0e6..65004ca 100644 --- a/concepts/moral-hazard.md +++ b/concepts/moral-hazard.md @@ -3,5 +3,7 @@ A situation in [market](market.md) behaviour in which participants are encourage Often cited as a factor leading to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. +See [credit default swaps](cds.md). + ## References * Momtaz, Paul P. 2020. ‘Entrepreneurial Finance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Token Offerings’. Journal of Business Venturing, 106001. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/nft.md b/concepts/nft.md index f8896f0..c4743ca 100644 --- a/concepts/nft.md +++ b/concepts/nft.md @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ In computer science terms, the NFT definition of "ownership" refers to the proce ## Duplication NFTs have been critizied as having no way of guaranteeing uniqueness of the datum or hyperlink. Since multiple NFTs can be created that reference the same artwork there is n canonical guarantee of uniqueness that an NFT purchased is "authentic" and it remains unclear what "authentic" would mean regarding hyperlinks which are infinitely reproducible. -Two smart contracts which reference the same piece of data or art are effectively identical to each other. +Two NFT smart contracts which reference the same piece of data or art are effectively identical to each other. ## Plagiarism Given the duplication problem above, many artists have critized NFT sales that involve plagarized versions of art whereby a [pseudonymous](pseudonymous.md) party will "steal" or reference the work of another when deploying the [smart contract](smart-contracts.md) allowing the third party to potentially profit off the work of another with no attribution or royalties paid to the original artist. @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ The NFT definition of "ownership" has been critized as having no single source o NFTs have been critized for the fact that the hyperlinks to the data in the [smart contract](smart-contracts.md) do not point to blockchain-hosted data but instead to content served on the open internet on private servers. These servers are themselves are operated by third parties which may cease to exist or serve the content that the NFT points at. When the content goes down the hyperlink is said to *link rot* and the underlying data is no longer accesible by the alleged "owner" of the NFT and now the NFT effectively refers to nothing. ## Tinkerbell Effect -NFTs have been critizied as only having value derived from the [tinkerbell effect](tinkerbell-effect.md) attached to the supposition that much of the NFT culture resembles either a [pyramid scheme](pyramid-scheme.md) or [high-control group](high-control-group.md) which is coercive in maintaining a shared delusion amongst members of an in group who have a financial incentive to create a market [bubble](bubble.md). +NFTs have been critizied as only having value derived from the [tinkerbell effect](tinkerbell-effect.md) attached to the supposition that much of the NFT culture resembles either a [pyramid scheme](pyramid-scheme.md) or [high-control group](high-control-group.md) which is coercive in maintaining a shared delusion amongst members of an ingroup who have a financial incentive to create a market [bubble](bubble.md). ## Market Manipulation NFTs have been critized as having excessive amounts of [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md), and in particular large demonstrated cases of [wash trading](wash-trading.md) which are now expected and normalized in the market. The presence of these phenomenon makes it difficult to ascertain what (if any) of the [price formation](price-formation.md) is organic versus the work of a coordinated [cartel](cartel.md) attempting to create [asymmetric information](asymmetric-information.md) . diff --git a/concepts/reserve-currency.md b/concepts/reserve-currency.md index 3f3f68a..f396f1f 100644 --- a/concepts/reserve-currency.md +++ b/concepts/reserve-currency.md @@ -5,4 +5,12 @@ 1. Spanish Silver Dollar 2. Dutch Guilder 3. British Pound -4. United States Dollar \ No newline at end of file +4. United States Dollar + +## References + +* Larue, Louis. 2020. ‘“A Conceptual Framework for Classifying Currencies”.’ International Journal of Community Currency Research 24 (1): 45–60. +* Hockett, Robert C. 2019. ‘Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking’. +* Eich, Stefan. 2018. ‘The Currency of Politics’. The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes. +* Varoufakis, Yanis. 2021. ‘What Is Money, Really? And Why Bitcoin Is Not the Answer (Even If Blockchain Is Brilliant & Potentially Helpful in Democratising Money)’. Yanis Varoufakis (blog). 2 August 2021. https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2021/08/02/what-is-money/. +* Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/smart-contracts.md b/concepts/smart-contracts.md index 246a717..e4a7eb4 100644 --- a/concepts/smart-contracts.md +++ b/concepts/smart-contracts.md @@ -1,11 +1,24 @@ # Smart Contracts -A unit of programmable logic that is stored on a [blockchain](blockchain.md) and executed as part of a [consensus-algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md). +A unit of programmable logic that is stored on a [blockchain](blockchain.md) and executed as part of a [consensus-algorithm](consensus-algorithm.md). Despite the namesake smart contracts have little if anything to do legal contracts as defined in standard Common Law. Smart contracts are simply programs which mediate the exchange of [crypto asset](cryptoasset.md) on a [blockchain](blockchain.md) network as part of a programmed prescription and which [wallet](wallet.md) actions can execute specific actions. + +## Oracle Problem +Since blockchain networks are self-contained, unlike with a normal computer program, there is no way for a smart contract to "pull" or fetch data from the public internet. Instead data has to be "pushed" into so-called *oracle contracts* which act as information services that provide external "real-world" data to contracts. + +This fundamentally introduces a trust boundary issue as smart contracts then need to depend on a trusted thirty party data vendor and undermines the idealized form of [decentralization](decentralization.md) that allegedly underpins the design and purpose of [smart contracts](smart-contracts.md). ## Examples - +* [NFT](nft.md) * [DAO](dao.md) * [ICO](ico.md) * [AMM](amm.md) * [DEX](dex.md) * ERC20 -* [mixer](mixer.md) +* [Mixer](mixer.md) + +## References +* Mik, Eliza. 2017. ‘Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World Complexity’. Law, Innovation and Technology 9 (2): 269–300. https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2017.1378468. +* Ante, Lennart. 2020. ‘Smart Contracts on the Blockchain – A Bibliometric Analysis and Review’. SSRN Electronic Journal, no. 10: 1–48. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576393. +* Barbosa, Leonardo Peixoto. 2021. ‘Blockchain Smart Contracts: A Socio-Legal Approach’. European Business Law Review 32 (2). https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Business+Law+Review/32.2/EULR2021010. +* Caldarelli, Giulio. 2020. ‘Understanding the Blockchain Oracle Problem: A Call for Action’. Information (Switzerland) 11 (11): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.3390/info11110509. +* Jason Kolber, Adam. 2018. ‘Not-So-Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility’. Stanford Technology Law Review 21 (2): 198–234. https://law.stanford.edu/publications/not-so-smart-blockchain-contracts-and-artificial-responsibility/. +* Pinna, Andrea, Simona Ibba, Gavina Baralla, Roberto Tonelli, and Michele Marchesi. 2019. ‘A Massive Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts Empirical Study and Code Metrics’. IEEE Access 7: 78194–213. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md b/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md index 581a4f8..f69c283 100644 --- a/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md +++ b/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md @@ -1,2 +1,8 @@ # Thought Terminating Cliche -A acronym or saying that is used within a [high control group](high-control-group.md) to quell dissent or discourage rational inquiry. \ No newline at end of file +A acronym or saying that is used within a [high control group](high-control-group.md) to quell dissent or discourage rational inquiry. + +## References +1. Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press. +1. Lowe, Scott. "Cultish: The Language of Fanaticism, by Amanda Montell." (2022): 151-152. +1. Hoffer, Eric. "The True Believer (New York." Harper's (1952): 28. +1. Festinger, Leon, Henry Riecken, and Stanley Schachter. When prophecy fails: A social and psychological study of a modern group that predicted the destruction of the world. Lulu Press, Inc, 2017. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/site/pages/about.md b/site/pages/about.md index 4080036..6e08b07 100644 --- a/site/pages/about.md +++ b/site/pages/about.md @@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ We will be steel-manning the key claims made by proponents of web3 through consc **This risks polarization resulting in stasis and further degradation of our sensemaking capacities**: Without good sensemaking we risk polarization: bifurcation in two schools of thought that are incommensurate and culture-war-like; and consequently we risk stasis and sclerosis. This is is bad wherever you stand in the debate: it blocks either necessary support or adequate prevention. In general, polarization chills discourse further impeding our capacities to make sense of this topic, especially together. -**A lot of energy and attention are going into this area**: There is also a lot of energy and attention being channeled into this area across the spectrum from tech to change-makers. This is energy that could be used elsewhere—it has an opportunity cost. If web3 can’t deliver on its promise this would be a significant waste of energy. Furthermore, given some of the elevated claims, there is a risk that disappointments here would not only tarnish web3 but reduce the energy for other types of innovation or change-making. Whilst there are opportunity costs to any action, they are particularly important in the context of web3 precisely because so much energy and good-will are being channelled here. +**A lot of energy and attention are going into this area**: There is also a lot of energy and attention being channeled into this area across the spectrum from tech to change-makers. This is energy that could be used elsewhere—it has an [opportunity cost](../../claims/is-opportunity-cost.md). If web3 can’t deliver on its promise this would be a significant waste of energy. Furthermore, given some of the elevated claims, there is a risk that disappointments here would not only tarnish web3 but reduce the energy for other types of innovation or change-making. Whilst there are opportunity costs to any action, they are particularly important in the context of web3 precisely because so much energy and good-will are being channelled here. -**This is a runaway phenomenon presenting special risks and requiring special attention**: Finally, this is a "runaway phenomenon" with exponential growth in interest, use and investment. To take just one illustrative example, blockchain based assets are the fastest growing asset class we have ever seen in human history; The crypto market cap -- the value of all the cryptocurrency tokens in circulation -- is currently sitting at $2.6 trillion, according to CoinMarketCap data. This huge velocity of expansion means web3 has the potential to significantly impact the organization of society -- for good or ill. It also renders the risks of wasted resources and energy even greater, as our "spend" is increasing so rapidly. Furthermore, runaway phenomena present special risks because things can happen before we notice and have time to react (cf. AI, climate change, nuclear weapons). The need for discourse and understanding, in other words, is not one that can wait. +**This is a runaway phenomenon presenting special risks and requiring special attention**: Finally, this is a "runaway phenomenon" with exponential growth in interest, use and investment. To take just one illustrative example, blockchain based assets are the [fastest growing](../../concepts/bubble.md) asset class we have ever seen in human history; The crypto market cap -- the value of all the cryptocurrency tokens in circulation -- is currently sitting at $2.6 trillion, according to CoinMarketCap data. This huge velocity of expansion means web3 has the potential to significantly impact the organization of society -- for good or ill. It also renders the risks of wasted resources and energy even greater, as our "spend" is increasing so rapidly. Furthermore, runaway phenomena present special risks because things can happen before we notice and have time to react (cf. AI, climate change, nuclear weapons). The need for discourse and understanding, in other words, is not one that can wait. ### We need better sensemaking. How do we get there?