[notes/7][m]: various additional notes related to reading especially re axie and other stuff.

concepts/free-rider-problem.md

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 # Free Rider Problem
+
 The use of [public goods](public-goods-problem.md) by parties who do not contribute to their creation or upkeep while still extracting value from the service or good.
 
 See also [public goods problem](public-goods-problem.md).
 
 ## References
+
 1. Oakland, William H. "Theory of public goods." In Handbook of public economics, vol. 2, pp. 485-535. Elsevier, 1987.

concepts/public-goods-problem.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 # Public Goods Problem
+
 A problem in economics where a collective good or service must be sustained by [mutualization](mutualization.md) of funds across different parties with different incentives while maintaining access.
 
 * National defence is a public good.
@@ -8,5 +9,6 @@ A problem in economics where a collective good or service must be sustained by [
 See also [free rider problem](free-rider-problem.md).
 
 ## References
+
 1. Oakland, William H. "Theory of public goods." In Handbook of public economics, vol. 2, pp. 485-535. Elsevier, 1987.
 1. Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The theory of local public goods." In The economics of public services, pp. 274-333. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1977.

concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 # Regulatory Arbitrage
+
 The use of one region or jurisdictions laws to create financial products which abuse or break another jurisdictions laws using legal loopholes, [regulatory capture](regulatory-capture.md), or outright scofflaw and criminal behaviour.
 
 Tax avoidance is a form of [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md).

notes/axie-infinity.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Axie Infinity
+
+
+https://twitter.com/liron/status/1455370653801095168
+
+https://twitter.com/liron/status/1540035327665967105
+
+> Last year, @a16z partners @cdixon and @AriannaSimpson invested in a Web3 "play-to-earn" game called Axie Infinity.
+>
+> I put together some clips exploring their thought process.
+
+# Tags
+
+- [[notes/a16z-investments]]

notes/bitcoin-as-anti-authoritarian.md

@@ -41,13 +41,15 @@ We will conclude that **Bitcoin and crypto generally is not an liberatory force
         *  LGBT movement
         *  Gandhi's non-cooperation movement
         *  Anti Vietnam-war protests
-  *  Examples of using crypto as a form of, or to facilitate, disobedience: Edward Snowden and Sci-Hub.
+  * Examples of using crypto as a form of, or to facilitate, disobedience: Edward Snowden and Sci-Hub.[^1]
       * Snowden speaks on the infosec conference circuit and likely receives all his speaker fees via bitcoin which he converts into Russian rubles.
       * Sci-Hub pirates every scientific paper from Elvesier, Wiley, and other academic publishers and hosts a PirateBay style mirror site in which researchers can bypass paywalls and download paper.
           *  Server is run by one woman in Russia who takes crypto donations. She is seen as a folk hero giving knowledge to the world and advancing science.
           *  Is a violation of copyright laws, although the jurisdictional boundaries of this are somewhat gray considering Russia doesn’t respect US law.
           *  Many feel that although this is an intellectual property crime, the predatory business models of Elvesier are somehow worse than this crime. And that Sci-Hub is a net benefit for humanity under a certain utilitarian calculus.
 
+[^1]: More examples in e.g. here https://twitter.com/LynAldenContact/status/1529084598268968962 though note connection with crypto-advocate Alex Gladstein.
+
 ## Analysis
 
 #### 2 preliminary principles to be noted:

notes/brustein-2022-billion-dollar-crypto.md

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# A Billion Dollar Crypto Gaming Startup Promised Riches and Delivered Disaster
+
+Re [axie-infinity](axie-infinity.md)
+

notes/claims-inbox.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+## Andrew Yang: web3 an extraordinary opportunity to improve the human condition
+
+> In a livestreamed [discussion](https://yieldguild.substack.com/p/yield-guild-games-twitter-spaces "Yield Guild Games Twitter Spaces: The Importance of Web3 Decentralized and Autonomous Organizations") about play-to-earn gaming and crypto on March 2 [2022], former Democratic presidential contender Andrew Yang called web3 “an extraordinary opportunity to improve the human condition” and “the biggest weapon against poverty that we have.”
+
+From [brustein-2022-billion-dollar-crypto](brustein-2022-billion-dollar-crypto.md)

notes/conviction-voting.md

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+
+
+https://medium.com/giveth/conviction-voting-a-novel-continuous-decision-making-alternative-to-governance-aa746cfb9475
+
+Bold claims are made
+
+> But how do we, as a collective, decide how those resources should be allocated? **Conviction Voting offers a novel decision making process that funds proposals based on the aggregated preference of community members, _expressed continuously_.** In other words, voters are always asserting their preference for which proposals they would like to see approved, rather than casting votes in a single time-boxed session. A member can change their preference at any time, but the longer they keep their preference for the same proposal, the “stronger” their conviction gets. This added conviction gives long standing community members with consistent preferences more influence than short term participants merely trying to influence a vote. **Conviction Voting sidesteps** [**sybil attacks**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sybil_attack)**, provides collusion resistance, and mitigates many of the attack vectors of time-boxed voting mechanisms.**
+
+Background white paper:
+
+https://github.com/BlockScience/conviction/blob/master/social-sensorfusion.pdf

notes/crypto-is-like-the-early-internet.md

@@ -1,7 +1,28 @@
+# Crypto is like the Early Internet
 
+Core thesis is that *even if crypto has no use cases now it will have big ones in the future*. By its nature this is a very difficult claim to invalidate as it is so unspecific. One can allude to a variety technologies that were somehow unpromising at the start and claim that crypto is analogous.
+
+The key aspect is any evaluation must be a) specifics about the time frame in which compelling use cases and adoption would show up b) more detailed examination of past use case -- was it really the case that people dismissed them or did not believe in their promise (at least at this stage in the technological development).
+
+More interestingly what examples are there of technology that "failed", especially technology for which bold claims were made at the time? 
 
 ## Evidence people say this
 
-See this tweet from Kara Swisher https://twitter.com/karaswisher/status/1528533392266076160
+See this tweet from Kara Swisher https://twitter.com/karaswisher/status/1528533392266076160 in context of this thread https://twitter.com/agraham999/status/1528516401039675393
 
-in context of this thread https://twitter.com/agraham999/status/1528516401039675393
+> Last time I checked people had choice and this offered a range of investments. Also crypto is by no means over. It’s like early internet. Sorry if that bothers you but it is so
+
+And see responses like this one https://twitter.com/Fintech_Brennan/status/1528798432378372106:
+
+> "like the early internet"
+> 
+> NO I've been on the internet (the ARPAnet originally) since 1979. Every protocol developed for the internet (from TCP/IP onward) was developed in response to actual needs to address real use cases. Nobody pitched the internet as a way to make money.
+
+Mark Cuban (but this time about e.g. early networking)
+
+https://twitter.com/mcuban/status/1531473342930247680
+
+> My 1st company did LAN/WAN custom software and integrations. Back then we argued about Token Ring, ARCNet, Ethernet and others, and the OpSystems from Novell, Banyan, Microsoft and others. You prob don't know any of this. The same will happen with Blockchain.
+
+
+## Past technologies and what

notes/regulatory-arbitrage-having-cake-eating-it.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Regulatory Arbitrage and then Appealing to traditional authorities
+
+The key point here is that these in theory decentralized non-state dependent efforts ultimately come back to depending on classic (centralized) state institutions (or equivalents therefore) for key functions of enforcement and dispute settlement. This issues relates to [[concepts/incomplete-contracts]].
+
+# Notes
+
+## 2022-06-24 example of indexed.finance
+
+https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-05-19/crypto-platform-hack-rocks-blockchain-community
+
+> In their complaint, lawyers for Kellar and Day argued that two particular steps of the attack violated statutes against market manipulation and computer hacking. One was swapping almost all the UNI tokens out of the DEFI5 pool, the otherwise irrational trade that distorted the pricing such that Medjedovic could buy tokens out from under Indexed users, who were forced by the algorithm to sell. “The only purpose of that trade was to mislead token holders to part with tokens on terms they never would have agreed to,” says Stephen Aylward, a lawyer representing Kellar and Day. “We say that’s a form of market manipulation.” The same argument applied to Medjedovic’s interaction with the CC10 pool.
+
+You could only set up an index fund on blockchain using smart contracts with no regulation ... and yet one one then appeals to traditional courts and law when someone exploits that.
+
+A point made by DeFi purists:
+
+> DeFi purists would prefer to keep governments away from their platforms. Chris Blec, who runs the watchdog site [DeFi Watch](https://defiwatch.net/ "DeFi Watch"), tweeted that the attack on Indexed was “an embarrassment for DeFi” and criticized the team for turning to a centralized institution like the courts for help. Kellar says he doesn’t see an alternative—it’s not like DeFi has its own justice system. And anyway, he believes DeFi should operate within the existing legal framework. “I think it should be decentralized in terms of governance and the management of projects,” he says. “But you need a central authority to enforce basic rules.”