Contextual citations for all episode notes
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@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ Bitcoin has no historical track record of being a store of value and lacks the m
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Even if bitcoin could function as a new gold standard. The [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md) and the notion of [sound-money](../concepts/sound-money.md) are undesirable foundations for a [currency](../concepts/currency.md) and were subject to extreme shocks and deflationary spirals, and as such were abandoned in the mid 20th century in favour of the [central-banks](../concepts/central-banks.md) and fiat monetary system.
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## References
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1. Cembalest, M. (2022). The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains (p. 31).
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1. Allon, F. (2018). Money after Blockchain: Gold, Decentralised Politics and the New Libertarianism. Australian Feminist Studies, 33(96), 223–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2018.1517245
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1. Bernanke, B. S. (2004). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press.
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1. Caferra, R., Tedeschi, G., & Morone, A. (2021). Bitcoin: Bubble that bursts or Gold that glitters? Economics Letters, 205, 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942
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1. Doctorow, C. (2022, February 3). Pluralistic: 03 Feb 2022 – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow. https://pluralistic.net/2022/02/03/liquidation-preference/
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1. Selmi, R., Bouoiyour, J., & Wohar, M. E. (2022). “Digital Gold” and geopolitics. Research in International Business and Finance, 59, 101512. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101512
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1. Cembalest, M. (2022). The Maltese Falcoin: On Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains (p. 31).
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1. Wang, G., Tang, Y., Xie, C., & Chen, S. (2019). Is bitcoin a safe haven or a hedging asset? Evidence from China. Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 4(3), 173–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001
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@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ Uniswap is iterating to favor "professional players":
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> However, with this additional layer of complexity, “lazy” LPs are going to earn much less in trading fees than professional players who can constantly keep optimizing their strategy.
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## References
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1. Allen, Hilary J. 2022. ‘DeFi: Shadow Banking 2.0?’ William & Mary Law Review, Forthcoming.
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1. Walch, Angela. 2019. ‘Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems’. C. Brummer (Ed.), Crypto Assets: Legal and Monetary Perspectives, 1–36. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326244.
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1. Anker-Sørensen, Linn, and Dirk A Zetzsche. 2021. ‘From Centralized to Decentralized Finance: The Issue Of’. Available at SSRN 3978815. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978815.
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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# Decentralized Exchange
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A form of [market making](market-maker.md) done via a [smart-contracts](smart-contracts.md). In this setup the [order-book](order-book.md) is based on peer-to-peer transactions instead of through a central party like a [crypto-exchange](crypto-exchange.md). This contrasts with [AMM](AMM.md) (automated market makers) who don't have an [order book](order-book.md) and instead use [liquidity pools](liquidity-pool.md).
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A form of [market making](market-maker.md) done via a [smart-contracts](smart-contracts.md). In this setup the [order-book](order-book.md) is based on peer-to-peer transactions instead of through a central party like a [crypto exchange](crypto-exchange.md). This contrasts with [AMM](AMM.md) (automated market makers) who don't have an [order book](order-book.md) and instead use [liquidity pools](liquidity-pool.md).
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Decentralized exchanges lack the ability to withdraw currencies like [dollar](dollar.md) and Euros because they have no access to the [banking](bank.md) system to issue payments.
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# Market Manipulation
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Manipulation of [price-formation](price-formation.md) and the natural operation of a [market](market.md). Can be performed by both [market makers](market-maker.md) and [cartels](cartel.md).
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Manipulation of [price formation](price-formation.md) and the natural operation of a [market](market.md). Can be performed by both [market makers](market-maker.md) and [cartels](cartel.md).
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## Front Running
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Using inside information about future orders to preempt market movements and extract from other market participants.
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@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ See [asymmetric-information](asymmetric-information.md).
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See [wash-trading](wash-trading.md).
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## Pump and Dumps
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See [pump-and-dump](pump-and-dump.md).
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See [pump and dump](pump-and-dump.md).
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## Order Tampering
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Altering of [order-book](order-book.md) to privilege the market maker or a [cartel](cartel.md) of insiders.
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Discretionary restriction of the sale of assets for [currency](currency.md).
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1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
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1. Dhawan, Anirudh, and Talis J. Putnins. 2020. ‘A New Wolf in Town? Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3670714.
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1. Hamrick, JT, Farhang Rouhi, Arghya Mukherjee, Amir Feder, Neil Gandal, Tyler Moore, and Marie Vasek. 2018a. ‘An Examination of the Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Ecosystem’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3303365.
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1. *———. 2018b. ‘The Economics of Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Schemes’.
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1. ———. 2018b. ‘The Economics of Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Schemes’.
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1. Kamps, Josh, and Bennett Kleinberg. 2018. ‘To the Moon: Defining and Detecting Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dumps’. Crime Science 7 (1): 18.
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1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
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1. Li, Tao, Donghwa Shin, and Baolian Wang. 2019. ‘Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dump Schemes’. Available at SSRN 3267041.
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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
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# Intercitations TODO
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Concepts
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- [ ] [web3](../concepts/web3.md)
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- [ ] [cryptoasset](../concepts/cryptoasset.md)
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- [ ] [nft](../concepts/nft.md)
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- [ ] [money](../concepts/money.md)
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- [ ] [private-money](../concepts/private-money.md)
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- [ ] [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md)
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- [ ] [post-state-technocracy](../notes/post-state-technocracy.md)
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- [ ] [security](../concepts/security.md)
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- [ ] [crypto-exchange](../concepts/crypto-exchange.md)
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Claims
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- [ ] [is-bitcoin-currency](../claims/is-bitcoin-currency.md)
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- [ ] [blockchain-tech](../claims/blockchain-tech.md)
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- [ ] [weird-culture](../claims/weird-culture.md)
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- [ ] [well-defined](../claims/well-defined.md)
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@ -158,12 +158,27 @@ Rufus and Stephen end their conversation with an analysis of the market fundamen
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* [regulatory-arbitrage](../concepts/regulatory-arbitrage.md)
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* [speculation](../concepts/speculation.md)
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* [stock](../concepts/stock.md)
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* [stablecoin](../concepts/stablecoin.md)
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* [valuation-model](../claims/valuation-model.md)
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* [wash-trading](../concepts/wash-trading.md)
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* [zero-sum-game](../concepts/zero-sum-game.md)
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## References
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1. [@akerlof_market_1978]
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2. [@krugman_technobabble_2021]
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3. [@krugman_transaction_2018]
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4. [@griffin_is_2020]
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1. Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
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1. Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417.
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1. Akerlof, George A. "The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism." In Uncertainty in economics, pp. 235-251. Academic Press, 1978.
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1. Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström. "The theory of contracts." In Advances in economic theory: Fifth world congress, vol. 1. 1987.
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1. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. "Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns." Journal of financial economics 105, no. 3 (2012): 457-472.
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1. Jarrow, Robert A. "Market manipulation, bubbles, corners, and short squeezes." Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, no. 3 (1992): 311-336.
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1. Friedman, Milton. "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." In Corporate ethics and corporate governance, pp. 173-178. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007.
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1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
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1. Dhawan, Anirudh, and Talis J. Putnins. 2020. ‘A New Wolf in Town? Pump-and-Dump Manipulation in Cryptocurrency Markets’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3670714.
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1. Hamrick, JT, Farhang Rouhi, Arghya Mukherjee, Amir Feder, Neil Gandal, Tyler Moore, and Marie Vasek. 2018a. ‘An Examination of the Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Ecosystem’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3303365.
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1. ———. 2018b. ‘The Economics of Cryptocurrency Pump and Dump Schemes’.
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1. Kamps, Josh, and Bennett Kleinberg. 2018. ‘To the Moon: Defining and Detecting Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dumps’. Crime Science 7 (1): 18.
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1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons.
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1. Li, Tao, Donghwa Shin, and Baolian Wang. 2019. ‘Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dump Schemes’. Available at SSRN 3267041.
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1. Xu, Jiahua, and Benjamin Livshits. 2019. ‘The Anatomy of a Cryptocurrency Pump-and-Dump Scheme’. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 1609–25.
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1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
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1. Castor, Amy. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Tether: A Complete Timeline of Events’. https://amycastor.com/2019/01/17/the-curious-case-of-tether-a-complete-timeline-of-events/.
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1. Griffin, John M, and Amin Shams. 2020. ‘Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?’ The Journal of Finance 75 (4): 1913–64.
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@ -131,10 +131,6 @@ Bitcoin is Better
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* Aside from its impacts on Bitcoin’s potential as a gold substitute, the issue of trust has serious ramifications for how we govern our societies.
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## Concepts Covered
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* [gold-standard](../concepts/gold-standard.md)
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@ -156,10 +152,19 @@ Bitcoin is Better
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* [zero-sum-game](../concepts/zero-sum-game.md)
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## References
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1. [@taleb_bitcoin_2021-1]
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2. [@arnosti_bitcoin_2022]
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3. [@golumbia_bitcoin_2015]
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4. [@caferra_bitcoin_2021]
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5. [@qin_bitcoins_2020]
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6. [@bernanke_essays_2004]
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1. Bemanke, Ben, and Harold James. 1991. ‘The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison’. In Financial Markets and Financial Crises, 33–68. University of Chicago Press. https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/financial-markets-and-financial-crises/gold-standard-deflation-and-financial-crisis-great-depression-international-comparison.
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1. Bernanke, B. S. (2004). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton University Press.
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1. Eich, Stefan. 2018. ‘The Currency of Politics’. The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes.
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1. Green, Russell A. "Gold Standard or Fool’s Gold? Should the US Consider Returning to the Gold Standard?." Issue Brief 02.23. 16 (2016).
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1. Ammous, Saifedean. 2018. The Bitcoin Standard: The Decentralized Alternative to Central Banking. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.
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1. Sanz Bas, David. 2020. ‘Hayek and the Cryptocurrency Revolution’. Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought 7 (1): 15–28. https://doi.org/10.5209/ijhe.69403.
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1. Friedrich, Carl J. "The Road to Serfdom." (1945): 575-579.
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1. Selmi, R., Bouoiyour, J., & Wohar, M. E. (2022). “Digital Gold” and geopolitics. Research in International Business and Finance, 59, 101512. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101512
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1. Krugman, Paul. "The hangover theory." Slate. December 3 (1998).
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1. Krugman, Paul (7 April 2010). "The Conscience of a Liberal: Martin And The Austrians". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 September 2011.
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1. Allon, F. (2018). Money after Blockchain: Gold, Decentralised Politics and the New Libertarianism. Australian Feminist Studies, 33(96), 223–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2018.1517245
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1. Caferra, R., Tedeschi, G., & Morone, A. (2021). Bitcoin: Bubble that bursts or Gold that glitters? Economics Letters, 205, 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942
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1. Wang, G., Tang, Y., Xie, C., & Chen, S. (2019). Is bitcoin a safe haven or a hedging asset? Evidence from China. Journal of Management Science and Engineering, 4(3), 173–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmse.2019.09.001
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1. Caferra, Rocco, Gabriele Tedeschi, and Andrea Morone. 2021. ‘Bitcoin: Bubble That Bursts or Gold That Glitters?’ Economics Letters 205: 109942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109942.
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1. Wolf, Martin. 2019. ‘The Libertarian Fantasies of Cryptocurrencies’. Financial Times, February. https://www.ft.com/content/eeeacd7c-2e0e-11e9-ba00-0251022932c8.
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1. Fantacci, Luca. 2019. ‘Cryptocurrencies and the Denationalization of Money’. International Journal of Political Economy 48 (2): 105–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.2019.1624319.
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