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# What type of assets are crypto token?
Crypto assets are [securities](../concepts/security.md) contracts for [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) investments.
# What type of assets are crypto tokens?
Crypto assets are [securities](../concepts/security.md) contracts for [speculative](../concepts/speculation.md) investments. This definition excludes [stablecoins](../concepts/stablecoin.md) which are a form of debt product or [deposit](../concepts/deposit.md) product.
See the [assets](../concepts/assets.md) comparison chart for an overview of how crypto asset compare to traditional investments and currencies.
Crypto assets are [not currencies](is-bitcoin-currency.md) because they cannot fulfil the definition of [money](../concepts/money.md).
Crypto assets are [not currency](is-bitcoin-currency.md) because they cannot fulfil the definition of [money](../concepts/money.md).
Crypto assets are not [financial assets](../concepts/financial-asset.md) because they have no claims on [income cashflows](income-cashflows.md), underlying [currency](currency.md) or [commodity](commodity.md), or risk transfer between counterparties.
Crypto assets are not [commodities](../concepts/commodity.md) because they have no intrinsic value needed to fulfil any productive economic activity or human need. Any hypothetical definition of their [use value](../concepts/use-value.md) depends on circular logic and is thus absurd.
Crypto assets are not [commodities](../concepts/commodity.md) because they have no [intrinsic value](../concepts/use-value.md) needed to fulfil any productive economic activity or human need. Any hypothetical definition of their [use value](../concepts/use-value.md) as a commodity depends on circular logic and is thus absurd.
Crypto assets may also be a form of [art](../concepts/art.md) under the fuzzy definition of "artistic intent".
See the [assets](../concepts/assets.md) comparison chart for an overview of how crypto asset compare to traditional investments and currencies.
## Comparables
While crypto assets are securities contracts, they are a pathological form of a zero-income security because they have no underlying asset or cashflows. Thus crypto assets have no direct correspondence in traditional markets, but have several pathological equivalences of traditional assets with absurd premises or terms.
Crypto assets have no direct correspondence in traditional markets, but have several pathological equivalences of traditional assets with absurd premises or terms.
* Tulip [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md)
* Zero-coupon perpetual [bond](bond.md)
* Unspendable [currency](currency.md)
* [Equity](security.md) with no cash flows or dividends
* [Commodity](commodity.md) with no [use value](../concepts/use-value.md)
* Exchange traded [pyramid-scheme](pyramid-scheme.md)
* [Equity](security.md) with no cashflows or dividends
* Exchange traded [pyramid scheme](pyramid-scheme.md)
* [Derivative](derivative.md) contract with no underlying
* [Libertarian](ideologies/libertarianism.md) performance [art](art.md)
* Self-organizing [Ponzi scheme](ponzi-scheme.md)
* Tulip [bubble](../concepts/bubble.md)
* [Indulgences](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indulgence)
## References

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@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ Art generally has no [income-cashflows](income-cashflows.md) in and of itself.
Art has no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) under the economic definition of the term.
Art's [intrinsic value](use-value.md) is a debated in philosophy. There is no generally agreed definition of what constitutes art.
Art's [intrinsic value](use-value.md) is a debated in philosophy. Some models suggest that art's value is derived from a human desire for beauty or a physiological compulsion to conceptualize abstract representations of the minds others human beings. There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes art.
Art's value is often tied to its provenance and [sign value](sign-value.md).
Art's [market value](market-value.md) is often tied to its provenance, [sign value](sign-value.md) and [narrative](narrative-economics.md). The precise nature of this a relationship is an open problem in the philosophy of art.
Art may be [artificial scarce](artificial-scarcity.md) if created as part of a collection.

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# Commercial Paper
Short term debt issued between companies.
See [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md).
## References
1. Venkataramakrishnan, Siddharth, and Joe Rennison. 2021. ‘Tether’s Commercial Paper Disclosure Places It among Global Giants’. Financial Times, 10 June 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/342966af-98dc-4b48-b997-38c00804270a.
1. Faux, Zeke. n.d. ‘Crypto Mystery: Where’s the $69 Billion Backing the Stablecoin Tether?’ Bloomberg. Accessed 22 March 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-07/crypto-mystery-where-s-the-69-billion-backing-the-stablecoin-tether.
1. Peebles, Gustav. 2020. ‘Banking on Digital Money: Swedish Cashlessness and the Fraying Currency Tether’. Cultural Anthropology 36 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.1.01.
1. Bennet, Tomlin. n.d. ‘Tether and Bitfinex Introduction’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://bennettftomlin.com/2021/08/08/tether-and-bitfinex-introduction/.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. Castor, Amy. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Tether: A Complete Timeline of Events’. https://amycastor.com/2019/01/17/the-curious-case-of-tether-a-complete-timeline-of-events/.
1. Griffin, John M, and Amin Shams. 2020. ‘Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?’ The Journal of Finance 75 (4): 1913–64.

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# Network Effect
A network effect is a property of a technical or financial system in which the utility of the system is proportional to the number of participants using it.
A [currency's](currency.md) efficacy as [money](money.md) is in-part generated by its network effect giving rise to its widespread acceptance. It's efficacy as money is also linked to its price stability.
A payment network arises out of network effects of collection of interconnected [banks](bank.md) which operate in conjunction a [central bank](central-banks.md) to do clearing and issue a [currency](currency.md). This is an example of a centralized hub-and-spoke model which forms the basis of all modern financial systems.
See also [decentralization](decentralization.md) and [recentralization](recentralization.md).
## References

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# Predatory Inclusion
Predatory inclusion refers to a process whereby members of a marginalized group are provided with access to a good, service, or opportunity from which they have historically been excluded but under suboptimal or risky conditions that jeopardize the benefits of access.
Predatory inclusion refers to a process whereby members of a marginalized group are provided with access to a good, service, or opportunity from which they have historically been excluded but under suboptimal or risky conditions that jeopardize the benefits of access.
## References
1. ‘Guidance on Cryptoassets’. 2019. Financial Conduct Authority. https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/consultation/cp19-03.pdf#page=11.
1. Hacker, Philipp, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos, and Stefan Eich. 2019. Regulating Blockchain: : Techno-Social and Legal Challenges. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842187.001.0001.
1. Aitken, Rob. 2017. ‘“All Data Is Credit Data”: Constituting the Unbanked’. Competition and Change 21 (4): 274–300. https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529417712830.
1. Crandall, Jillian. 2019. ‘Cryptoeconomic Geographies and Contestation in Puerto Rico’. Thesis. PhD Thesis. http://jilliancrandall.net/cryptoeconomic-geographies-and-contestation-in-pr/.
1. Greeley, Brendan. 2019. ‘Facebook’s Libra Will Not Help the Unbanked’. Financial Times 18.
1. Kapsis, Ilias. 2021. ‘Should We Trade Market Stability for More Financial Inclusion? The Case of Crypto-Assets Regulation in EU’. FinTech, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Regulation and Crime Prevention, 85–104. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020998-9.
1. Sen, Atreyee, Johan Lindquist, and Marie Kolling. 2020. Who’s Cashing in? Contemporary Perspectives on New Monies and Global Cashlessness. Vol. 19. Berghahn Books.
1. Vasudevan, Ramaa. 2020. ‘Libra and Facebook’s Money Illusion’. Challenge 63 (1): 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2019.1684662.
1. Azgad-Tromer, Shlomit. 2018. ‘Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation’. Am. UL Rev. 68: 69.
1. Barrett, Claer. 2021. ‘Why Young Investors Bet the Farm on Cryptocurrencies’. Financial Times, 28 May 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/162839aa-0437-478b-a4d4-4a8d7ab71458.
1. Cristina Cuervo, Anastasiia Morozova. 2020. ‘Regulation of Crypto Assets’. International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2020/01/09/Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-48810.
1. Eich, Stefan. 2019. ‘Old Utopias, New Tax Havens: The Politics of Bitcoin in Historical Perspective’. Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, 85–98.
1. Eichengreen, Barry. 2021. ‘Financial Regulation in the Age of the Platform Economy’. Journal of Banking Regulation, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00187-9.
1. Feinstein, Brian D, and Kevin Werbach. 2020. ‘The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets’. http://ssrn.com/paper=3649475.
1. Ivaniuk, Viktoria. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrency Exchange Regulation – An International Review’. Magda Dziembowska, Robert Dziembowski, Apelacja w Postępowaniu, 67.
1. Kapsis, Ilias. 2021. ‘Should We Trade Market Stability for More Financial Inclusion? The Case of Crypto-Assets Regulation in EU’. FinTech, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Regulation and Crime Prevention, 85–104. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003020998-9.
1. Maddox, Alexia, and Luke J Heemsbergen. 2021. ‘Digging in Crypto-Communities’ Future-Making: From Dark to Doge’. M/C Journal 24 (2 SE-). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2755.

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# Private Money
A [currency](currency.md) issued by a private party instead of a nation state or [central-banks](central-banks.md). Private money has a [distribution-problem](distribution-problem.md).
A [currency](currency.md) issued by a private party instead of a nation state or a [central bank](central-banks.md). Private money has a [distribution problem](distribution-problem.md).
Many forms of private money are a type of *scrip* or a provisional certificate or promissory note of funds subscribed a company entitling the holder to a redemption upon demand possibly subject to restrictions.
@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ Company scrip was a form of private money issued by corporations up until the ea
Company scrip gave wildly asymmetric power to corporations and was deemed to be a predatory practice, and was banned in the United States and Europe in the mid 1900s.
See [artificial demand](artificial-demand.md).
## Town Money
Private money still lives in on parts of the United States and Europe in a limited form known as town money, whereby a local city or town will issue its own private notes which can be spent within a limited geographic region to encourage captive spending within a local region and to encourage tourism. These notes encourage circulation of money within the town and goods and services may be discounted when using the private money as a means of encourage to promote local businesses and increase tourist spending with the town. Town money is generally issued on small scales and is overseen by a local town government.
@ -27,6 +29,8 @@ Casino tokens are a form of scrip used by customers to play [gambling](gambling.
Under United States law if a customer purchases casino chips, they have the right to sell them back to the casino for the marked value. The casino is restricted from allowing customers to use chips to pay for goods or services, however they can be given or sold to other customers in peer to peer transactions.
See [artificial demand](artificial-demand.md).
## References
* Eich, Stefan. 2018. ‘The Currency of Politics’. The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes.
* Hockett, Robert C. 2019. ‘Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking’.

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# Sign Value
Sign value denotes and describes the value accorded to an object because of the prestige or social status that it imparts upon the possessor, rather than the [use value](use-value.md) and [income cashflows](income-cashflows.md) derived from the function or use of the asset.
Sign value denotes and describes the intangible value accorded to an object because of the prestige or social status that it imparts upon the possessor, rather than the [use value](use-value.md) and [income cashflows](income-cashflows.md) derived from the function or use of the asset.
See [art](art.md), [narrative economics](narrative-economics.md), [endowment effect](endowment-effect.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md).

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@ -6,23 +6,23 @@ Stablecoins may be [leverage](leverage.md) against their deposits where the tota
See also [DeFi](defi.md), [staking](staking.md) and [liquidity pool](liquidity-pool.md).
## References
* Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
* Gorton, Gary B., and Jeffery Zhang. 2021. ‘Taming Wildcat Stablecoins’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888752.
* Bennet, Tomlin. n.d. ‘Tether and Bitfinex Introduction’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://bennettftomlin.com/2021/08/08/tether-and-bitfinex-introduction/.
* Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
* Castor, Amy. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Tether: A Complete Timeline of Events’. https://amycastor.com/2019/01/17/the-curious-case-of-tether-a-complete-timeline-of-events/.
* Griffin, John M, and Amin Shams. 2020. ‘Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?’ The Journal of Finance 75 (4): 1913–64.
* Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
* Clements, Ryan. 2021. ‘Built to Fail: The Inherent Fragility of Algorithmic Stablecoins’. SSRN Electronic Journal 11: 131. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3952045.
* Ferreira, Agata. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Stablecoins—Balancing Risks and Rewards?’ Journal of International Economic Law 24 (4): 755–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgab036.
* Landwehr, Marvin, and Volker Wulf. 2020. ‘Toward Emancipatory Currencies: A Critique of Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency and Ideas for Alternatives’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, 236–46. https://doi.org/10.1145/3401335.3401365.
* Li, Ye, and Simon Mayer. 2021. ‘Money Creation in Decentralized Finance: A Dynamic Model of Stablecoin and Crypto Shadow Banking’. Fisher College of Business Working Paper, no. 2020–03: 030.
* Malloy, Matthew, and David Lowe. 2021. ‘Global Stablecoins: Monetary Policy Implementation Considerations from the U.S. Perspective’. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021 (020): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2021.020.
* Mizrach, Bruce. 2021. ‘Stablecoins: Survivorship, Transactions Costs and Exchange Microstructure’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3835219.
* Pupolizio, Ivan. 2021. ‘From Libra to Diem. The Pursuit of a Global Private Currency’. Global Jurist. https://doi.org/10.1515/gj-2021-0055.
* Reiser, Jan. 2020. ‘Libra : An Economic and Technical Analysis’. https://wwz.unibas.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/wwz/00_Professuren/Schaer_DLTFintech/Lehre/Reiser_2020.pdf.
* Salmony, Michael. 2019. ‘Money and the Fear of Missing out: How to Stay Sane in a World Shaken by Libra.’ Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 13 (4): 282–87. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hsp/jpss/2020/00000013/00000004/art00002.
* Tischer, Daniel. 2020. ‘Cutting the Network? Facebook’s Libra Currency as a Problem of Organisation’. Finance and Society 6 (1): 19–33. https://doi.org/10.2218/finsoc.v6i1.4406.
* Vasudevan, Ramaa. 2020. ‘Libra and Facebook’s Money Illusion’. Challenge 63 (1): 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2019.1684662.
* Zetzsche, Dirk A., Ross P. Buckley, and Douglas W. Arner. 2021. ‘Regulating Libra’. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 41 (1): 80–113. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa036.
* Peebles, Gustav. 2020. ‘Banking on Digital Money: Swedish Cashlessness and the Fraying Currency Tether’. Cultural Anthropology 36 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.1.01.
1. Steele, Graham. 2021. ‘The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank’. Technology and Government, Emerald Studies in Media and Communications, Forthcoming.
1. Gorton, Gary B., and Jeffery Zhang. 2021. ‘Taming Wildcat Stablecoins’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888752.
1. Bennet, Tomlin. n.d. ‘Tether and Bitfinex Introduction’. Accessed 2 March 2022. https://bennettftomlin.com/2021/08/08/tether-and-bitfinex-introduction/.
1. Krugman, Paul. 2018. ‘Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic’. The New York Times 21.
1. Castor, Amy. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Tether: A Complete Timeline of Events’. https://amycastor.com/2019/01/17/the-curious-case-of-tether-a-complete-timeline-of-events/.
1. Griffin, John M, and Amin Shams. 2020. ‘Is Bitcoin Really Untethered?’ The Journal of Finance 75 (4): 1913–64.
1. Brennecke, Martin, Benjamin Schellinger, Nils Urbach, and Tobias Guggenberger. 2022. ‘The De-Central Bank in Decentralized Finance: A Case Study of MakerDAO’. https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2022.737.
1. Clements, Ryan. 2021. ‘Built to Fail: The Inherent Fragility of Algorithmic Stablecoins’. SSRN Electronic Journal 11: 131. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3952045.
1. Ferreira, Agata. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Stablecoins—Balancing Risks and Rewards?’ Journal of International Economic Law 24 (4): 755–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgab036.
1. Landwehr, Marvin, and Volker Wulf. 2020. ‘Toward Emancipatory Currencies: A Critique of Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency and Ideas for Alternatives’. PervasiveHealth: Pervasive Computing Technologies for Healthcare, 236–46. https://doi.org/10.1145/3401335.3401365.
1. Li, Ye, and Simon Mayer. 2021. ‘Money Creation in Decentralized Finance: A Dynamic Model of Stablecoin and Crypto Shadow Banking’. Fisher College of Business Working Paper, no. 2020–03: 030.
1. Malloy, Matthew, and David Lowe. 2021. ‘Global Stablecoins: Monetary Policy Implementation Considerations from the U.S. Perspective’. Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021 (020): 1–14. https://doi.org/10.17016/feds.2021.020.
1. Mizrach, Bruce. 2021. ‘Stablecoins: Survivorship, Transactions Costs and Exchange Microstructure’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3835219.
1. Pupolizio, Ivan. 2021. ‘From Libra to Diem. The Pursuit of a Global Private Currency’. Global Jurist. https://doi.org/10.1515/gj-2021-0055.
1. Reiser, Jan. 2020. ‘Libra : An Economic and Technical Analysis’. https://wwz.unibas.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/wwz/00_Professuren/Schaer_DLTFintech/Lehre/Reiser_2020.pdf.
1. Salmony, Michael. 2019. ‘Money and the Fear of Missing out: How to Stay Sane in a World Shaken by Libra.’ Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 13 (4): 282–87. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hsp/jpss/2020/00000013/00000004/art00002.
1. Tischer, Daniel. 2020. ‘Cutting the Network? Facebook’s Libra Currency as a Problem of Organisation’. Finance and Society 6 (1): 19–33. https://doi.org/10.2218/finsoc.v6i1.4406.
1. Vasudevan, Ramaa. 2020. ‘Libra and Facebook’s Money Illusion’. Challenge 63 (1): 21–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.2019.1684662.
1. Zetzsche, Dirk A., Ross P. Buckley, and Douglas W. Arner. 2021. ‘Regulating Libra’. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 41 (1): 80–113. https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa036.
1. Peebles, Gustav. 2020. ‘Banking on Digital Money: Swedish Cashlessness and the Fraying Currency Tether’. Cultural Anthropology 36 (1): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca36.1.01.

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# Tinkerbell Effect
The Tinkerbell effect is an expression in psychology and finance to describe things that are thought to exist only because people believe in them. Effectively a shared collective delusion at a critical scale.
See also [high-control group](high-control-group.md), [NFT](nft.md), [bandwagon-bias](bandwagon-bias.md) and [endowment-effect](endowment-effect.md).
This differs from the [network effect](network-effect.md) generated by [financial assets](financial-asset.md) and [currencies](currency.md) whose efficacy is a collective legal fiction that arises out its use as a medium of exchange or investment vehicle.
See also [high-control group](high-control-group.md), [NFT](nft.md), [bandwagon-bias](bandwagon-bias.md) and [endowment-effect](endowment-effect.md).
## References
1. Diehl, Stephen. 2021. ‘The Tinkerbell Griftopia’. 19 November 2021. [https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/tinkerbell.html](https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/tinkerbell.html).

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An example of a [commodity](commodity.md) with use value is wheat, whose use is the ability to produce flour and bread which can provide sustenance and satisfy human hunger and need for sustenance. Alternatively the use value of petrol is the capacity to burn it to produce energy.
An example of a financial product with no use value is a [stock](stock.md). Instead its [market value](market.md) is derived from its [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) which originates from both the [legal framework](security.md) that gives rise to its existence and whose demand is generated from its exposure to [income-cashflows](income-cashflows.md).
An example of a [financial asset](financial-asset.md) with no use value is a [stock](stock.md). Instead its [market value](market.md) is derived from its [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) which originates from both the [legal framework](security.md) that gives rise to its existence and whose demand is generated from its exposure to [income-cashflows](income-cashflows.md).
The [dollar](dollar.md) has no use value and no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md), however it is a [monetary](money.md) instrument because of its efficacy as a [currency](currency.md).
[Cypto assets](cryptoasset.md) are a [speculative](speculation.md) investment that has both no use value, no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) and are also non-monetary. Instead their demand is generated from [narrative](../claims/narrative-economics.md) and the [greater fool theory](greater-fool-theory.md).
[Cypto assets](cryptoasset.md) are a [speculative](speculation.md) investment that has both no use value, no [fundamental value](fundamental-value.md) and are also non-monetary. Instead their demand curve is generated from [narrative](../claims/narrative-economics.md) and the [greater fool theory](greater-fool-theory.md).
A similar historical pathological example of a [ficticious commodity](ficticious-commodity.md), with both no use value and no [fundamental-value](fundamental-value.md), would be [indulgences](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indulgence) sold by the medieval church based on [artificial demand](artificial-demand.md) induced by [narrative](narrative-economics.md).
A historical pathological example of a [ficticious commodity](ficticious-commodity.md), with both no use value and no [fundamental-value](fundamental-value.md), would be [indulgences](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indulgence) sold by the medieval church based on [artificial demand](artificial-demand.md) induced by [narrative](narrative-economics.md).
See the [asset comparison table](assets.md) for a larger enumeration of asset classes and their properties.

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guide/index.md
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@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ Understand the deeper theoretical concepts behind the technical and economic cla
* [Bretton Woods system](../concepts/bretton-woods.md)
* [Wash trading](../concepts/wash-trading.md)
* [Liquidity pool](../concepts/liquidity-pool.md)
* [Artificial demand](../concepts/artificial-demand.md)
* [Financial asset](../concepts/financial-asset.md)
* [Assets](../concepts/assets.md)
* [Real estate](../concepts/real-estate.md)
* [Gold](../concepts/gold.md)
@ -182,6 +184,7 @@ Understand the deeper theoretical concepts behind the technical and economic cla
* [Cryptoasset](/concepts/cryptoasset.md)
* [Immutability](../concepts/immutability.md)
* [Crypto Wallet](../concepts/wallet.md)
* [Network effect](../concepts/network-effect.md)
* [Decentralized Finance (DeFi)](/concepts/defi.md)
* [Decentralization](/concepts/decentralization.md)
* [Initial Coin Offering (ICO)](/concepts/ico.md)
@ -224,4 +227,5 @@ Understand the deeper theoretical concepts behind the technical and economic cla
* [Bandwagon bias](../concepts/bandwagon-bias.md)
* [Tinkerbell effect](../concepts/tinkerbell-effect.md)
* [Endowment effect](../concepts/endowment-effect.md)
* [Predatory inclusion](../concepts/predatory-inclusion.md)
* [Predatory inclusion](../concepts/predatory-inclusion.md)
* [Enclosure](../concepts/enclosure.md)