From 136b831e58b09749a8365a8661370b321696bbc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: sdiehl Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 13:39:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Expand references --- concepts/bubble.md | 5 +++-- concepts/gambling.md | 6 +++++- concepts/howey-test.md | 1 + concepts/ico.md | 24 +++++++-------------- concepts/illicit-financing.md | 14 ++++++++++++- concepts/kyc.md | 9 +++++++- concepts/leverage.md | 7 ++++++- concepts/market-maker.md | 13 +++++++++++- concepts/network-effect.md | 5 ++++- concepts/order-book.md | 5 ++++- concepts/paper-wealth.md | 5 ++++- concepts/price-formation.md | 1 + concepts/regulation.md | 7 ++++++- concepts/regulatory-capture.md | 5 ++++- concepts/security.md | 9 +++++--- concepts/sign-value.md | 6 +++++- concepts/stock.md | 7 ++++++- concepts/terminal-value.md | 6 +++++- concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md | 2 +- concepts/whataboutism.md | 8 +++++++ guide/index.md | 1 + meta/citations-todo.md | 28 ++++++++++++------------- meta/concepts-todo.md | 9 +++++++- 23 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) create mode 100644 concepts/whataboutism.md diff --git a/concepts/bubble.md b/concepts/bubble.md index cb6170d..4f7d030 100644 --- a/concepts/bubble.md +++ b/concepts/bubble.md @@ -3,9 +3,8 @@ An economic bubble is a phenomenon in [markets](market.md) created by herd menta Attempting to time the market on bubbles is a [zero-sum game](zero-sum-game.md) and has a negative [expected return](expected-return.md). -See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md). +Historical bubbles: -## Examples * South Sea Bubble * Beanie Baby Bubble * London Rail Bubble @@ -14,6 +13,8 @@ See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) an * Japanese Real Estate Bubble * [Crypto asset](cryptoasset.md) Bubble +See ["madness of crowds"](madness-crowds.md), [market mania](market-mania.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md). + ## References 1. Mackay, Charles. 2012. Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds. Simon and Schuster. diff --git a/concepts/gambling.md b/concepts/gambling.md index a8b053e..07ab068 100644 --- a/concepts/gambling.md +++ b/concepts/gambling.md @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ # Gambling An economic activity in which one party pays for the privilege of risking money on a probabilistic activity with negative [expected-return](expected-return.md). Often gambling games are [negative-sum](zero-sum-game.md). -Trading [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md) is often compared to gambling. \ No newline at end of file +Trading [crypto assets](cryptoasset.md) is often compared to gambling. + +## Examples +1. Packel, Edward W. Mathematics of Games and Gambling. Vol. 28. MAA, 2006. +1. Read, Colin. "Risk, Uncertainty, Fear, and Gambling." In The Fear Factor, pp. 112-117. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/howey-test.md b/concepts/howey-test.md index 4c99043..003e6fe 100644 --- a/concepts/howey-test.md +++ b/concepts/howey-test.md @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ A legal test which defines whether an investment contract is designed as a [secu ## References 1. ‘SEC v. WJ Howey Co.’ 1946. US. Supreme Court. +1. Coffee Jr, John C., Hillary Sale, and M. Todd Henderson. "Securities regulation: Cases and materials." (2015). 1. Burilov, Vlad. 2019. ‘Regulation of Crypto Tokens and Initial Coin Offerings in the EU: De Lege Lata and de Lege Ferenda’. European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 6 (2): 146–86. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00602003. 1. Cornish, Chloe, and Richard Waters. 2018. ‘Silicon Valley Investors Line up to Back Telegram ICO’. Financial Times, January. https://www.ft.com/content/790d9506-0175-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. 1. Hacker, Philipp, and Chris Thomale. 2018. ‘Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law’. European Company and Financial Law Review 15 (4): 645–96. diff --git a/concepts/ico.md b/concepts/ico.md index 528cba4..53d95f3 100644 --- a/concepts/ico.md +++ b/concepts/ico.md @@ -6,25 +6,15 @@ Initial coin offerings are illegal in the United States. See also [security](security.md) and [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md). ## References +1. Cornish, Chloe, and Richard Waters. 2018. ‘Silicon Valley Investors Line up to Back Telegram ICO’. Financial Times, January. https://www.ft.com/content/790d9506-0175-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. +1. Kharif, Olga. 2018. ‘Half of ICOs Die Within Four Months After Token Sales Finalized’. Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/half-of-icos-die-within-four-months-after-token-sales-finalized. +1. Livni, Ephrat, and Andrew Ross Sorkin. 2021. ‘The Dramatic Crash of a Buzzy Cryptocurrency Raises Eyebrows’. The New York Times, 28 June 2021, sec. Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/business/dealbook/icp-cryptocurrency-crash.html. 1. Andrés, Pablo de, David Arroyo, Ricardo Correia, and Alvaro Rezola. 2022. ‘Challenges of the Market for Initial Coin Offerings’. International Review of Financial Analysis 79: 101966. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101966. 1. Burilov, Vlad. 2019. ‘Regulation of Crypto Tokens and Initial Coin Offerings in the EU: De Lege Lata and de Lege Ferenda’. European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 6 (2): 146–86. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00602003. -1. Cincinnati, Josh. 2017. ‘PonzICO: Let’s Just Cut to the Chase’. -1. Cornish, Chloe, and Richard Waters. 2018. ‘Silicon Valley Investors Line up to Back Telegram ICO’. Financial Times, January. https://www.ft.com/content/790d9506-0175-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. +1. Hofman, Darra, Quinn DuPont, Angela Walch, and Ivan Beschastnikh. 2021. ‘Blockchain Governance: De Facto (x)or Designed?’ In Building Decentralized Trust, 21–33. x. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54414-0_2. +1. Walch, Angela. 2019a. ‘In Code (Rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains’. +1. ———. 2019b. ‘Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains’. Regulating Blockchain. Techno-Social and Legal Challenges, Ed. by Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich, Oxford University Press, 2019. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3203198. 1. Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126. 1. Davis, Mark and DavisBruce. 2021. Crowdfunding and the Democratization of Finance. Policy Press. https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/crowdfunding-and-the-democratization-of-finance. 1. Kelly, Jemima. 2019. ‘The ICO Whose Team Members Are Literally Cartoon Characters’. Financial Times. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/57805b32-0bbe-34cb-940c-66cdd1aec5e2. -1. Kharif, Olga. 2018. ‘Half of ICOs Die Within Four Months After Token Sales Finalized’. Bloomberg.Com. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/half-of-icos-die-within-four-months-after-token-sales-finalized. -1. Livni, Ephrat, and Andrew Ross Sorkin. 2021. ‘The Dramatic Crash of a Buzzy Cryptocurrency Raises Eyebrows’. The New York Times, 28 June 2021, sec. Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/business/dealbook/icp-cryptocurrency-crash.html. -1. Low, Kelvin F K. 2021. ‘The Emperor’s New Art: Cryptomania, Art & Property’. Art & Property. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978241. -1. Maddox, Alexia, and Luke J Heemsbergen. 2021. ‘Digging in Crypto-Communities’ Future-Making: From Dark to Doge’. M/C Journal 24 (2 SE-). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2755. - - -* [@kharif_half_2018] -* [@zetzsche_ico_2017] -* [@kelly_ico_2019] -* [@debler_foreign_2018] -* [@cincinnati_ponzico_2017] -* [@howell_initial_2018] -* [@boreiko_serial_2020] -* [@benedetti_digital_2018] -* [@momtaz_entrepreneurial_2020] \ No newline at end of file +1. Maddox, Alexia, and Luke J Heemsbergen. 2021. ‘Digging in Crypto-Communities’ Future-Making: From Dark to Doge’. M/C Journal 24 (2 SE-). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2755. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/illicit-financing.md b/concepts/illicit-financing.md index 1401655..c77a56a 100644 --- a/concepts/illicit-financing.md +++ b/concepts/illicit-financing.md @@ -1,4 +1,16 @@ # Illicit Financing Illicit financial flows are illegal movements of money from one country to another that are illegally earned, transferred, or associated with criminal activity. -See also [money laundering](money-laundering.md), [counter-terrorism financing](ctf.md), and [sanctions enforcement](sanctions-enforcement.md). \ No newline at end of file +See also [money laundering](money-laundering.md), [counter-terrorism financing](ctf.md), and [sanctions enforcement](sanctions-enforcement.md). + +## References +1. Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January. +1. Orcutt, Mike. 2020. ‘This Is How North Korea Uses Cutting-Edge Crypto Money Laundering to Steal Millions’. MIT Technology Review. MIT Technology Review. http://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/05/916688/north-korean-hackers-cryptocurrency-money-laundering/. +1. Buttigieg, Christopher P., Christos Efthymiopoulos, Abigail Attard, and Samantha Cuyle. 2019. ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulation of Crypto Assets in Europe’s Smallest Member State’. Law and Financial Markets Review 13 (4): 211–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2019.1663996. +1. Fanusie, Yaya, and Tom Robinson. 2018. ‘Bitcoin Laundering: An Analysis of Illicit Flows into Digital Currency Services’. Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance Memorandum, January. +1. Feinstein, Brian D., and Kevin Werbach. 2020. ‘The Impact of Cryptocurrency Regulation on Trading Markets’. SSRN Electronic Journal 7 (1): 48–99. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3649475. +1. Ferreira, Agata. 2021. ‘The Curious Case of Stablecoins—Balancing Risks and Rewards?’ Journal of International Economic Law 24 (4): 755–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgab036. +1. Fletcher, Emily, Charles Larkin, and Shaen Corbet. 2021. ‘Countering Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Case for Bitcoin Regulation’. Research in International Business and Finance 56 (January): 101387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2021.101387. +1. Miscione, Gianluca, and Donncha Kavanagh. 2015. ‘Bitcoin and the Blockchain: A Coup d’Etat in Digital Heterotopia?’ SSRN Electronic Journal, no. 2006: 1–27. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624922. +1. Rae, Shaela W, and Lorraine Mastersmith. 2019. ‘Crypto Asset Trading in Canada: Entering a New Era of Regulation’. Banking & Finance Law Review 35 (1): 153–85. +1. Renwick, Robin, and Rob Gleasure. 2021. ‘Those Who Control the Code Control the Rules: How Different Perspectives of Privacy Are Being Written into the Code of Blockchain Systems’. Journal of Information Technology 36 (1): 16–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268396220944406. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/kyc.md b/concepts/kyc.md index fbed404..713fae1 100644 --- a/concepts/kyc.md +++ b/concepts/kyc.md @@ -8,4 +8,11 @@ KYC is used to assign an identity to a crypto [wallet](wallet.md) account and is See also [money-laundering](money-laundering.md), [aml](aml.md), [illicit-financing](illicit-financing.md) and [regulatory-arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md). ## References -1. Petro, Louis W., James P. Martin, Adam A. Wadecki, and Harry Cendrowski. The handbook of fraud deterrence. John Wiley & Sons, 2007. \ No newline at end of file +1. Petro, Louis W., James P. Martin, Adam A. Wadecki, and Harry Cendrowski. The handbook of fraud deterrence. John Wiley & Sons, 2007. +1. Rae, Shaela W, and Lorraine Mastersmith. 2019. ‘Crypto Asset Trading in Canada: Entering a New Era of Regulation’. Banking & Finance Law Review 35 (1): 153–85. +1. Papadopoulos, Georgios. 2015. ‘Currency and the Collective Representations of Authority, Nationality, and Value’. Journal of Cultural Economy 8 (4): 521–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2014.989884. +1. Renieris, Elizabeth M. n.d. ‘Why a Little-Known Blockchain-Based Identity Project in Ethiopia Should Concern Us All’. Centre for International Governance Innovation. Accessed 22 February 2022. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/why-a-little-known-blockchain-based-identity-project-in-ethiopia-should-concern-us-all/. +1. Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126. +1. Ivaniuk, Viktoria. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrency Exchange Regulation – An International Review’. Magda Dziembowska, Robert Dziembowski, Apelacja w Postępowaniu, 67. +1. Johnson, Kristin N. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: Regulating Cryptocurrency Exchanges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831439. +1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/. diff --git a/concepts/leverage.md b/concepts/leverage.md index 4a28d9a..2323666 100644 --- a/concepts/leverage.md +++ b/concepts/leverage.md @@ -1,2 +1,7 @@ # Leverage -Leverage refers to the use of debt to increase the size of a position in an investment. \ No newline at end of file +Leverage refers to the use of debt to increase the size of a position in an investment. + +## References +1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625. +1. Grinold, Richard C., and Ronald N. Kahn. Active portfolio management: Quantitative theory and applications. Probus, 1995. +1. Wilmott, Paul. Paul Wilmott introduces quantitative finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2007. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/market-maker.md b/concepts/market-maker.md index d6d0b59..60cf082 100644 --- a/concepts/market-maker.md +++ b/concepts/market-maker.md @@ -1,4 +1,15 @@ # Market Maker A entity of business with performs the business of creating a market, connecting buyers and sellers to exchange goods and services. The trading of financial assets is a regulated activity and involves [price-formation](price-formation.md) and making of an [order book](order-book.md). -See also [order book](order-book.md) and [crypto exchange](crypto-exchange.md). \ No newline at end of file +See also [order book](order-book.md) and [crypto exchange](crypto-exchange.md). + +## References +1. Harris, Larry. Trading and exchanges: Market microstructure for practitioners. OUP USA, 2003. +1. Doctorow, C. (2022, February 3). Pluralistic: 03 Feb 2022 – Pluralistic: Daily links from Cory Doctorow. https://pluralistic.net/2022/02/03/liquidation-preference/ +1. Ivaniuk, Viktoria. 2020. ‘Cryptocurrency Exchange Regulation – An International Review’. Magda Dziembowska, Robert Dziembowski, Apelacja w Postępowaniu, 67. +1. White, Molly. 2022. ‘Cryptocurrency Off-Ramps, and the Shift towards Centralization’. Molly White. 12 February 2022. https://blog.mollywhite.net/off-ramps/. +1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons. +1. Cumming, Douglas J., Sofia Johan, and Anshum Pant. 2019. ‘Regulation of the Crypto-Economy: Managing Risks, Challenges, and Regulatory Uncertainty’. Journal of Risk and Financial Management 12 (3): 126. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm12030126. +1. Johnson, Kristin N. 2021. ‘Decentralized Finance: Regulating Cryptocurrency Exchanges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3831439. +1. Mizrach, Bruce. 2021. ‘Stablecoins: Survivorship, Transactions Costs and Exchange Microstructure’. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3835219. +1. Roubini, Nouriel. 2019. ‘The Great Crypto Heist’. Project Syndicate 16. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cryptocurrency-exchanges-are-financial-scams-by-nouriel-roubini-2019-07. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/network-effect.md b/concepts/network-effect.md index a18882e..d1452fc 100644 --- a/concepts/network-effect.md +++ b/concepts/network-effect.md @@ -7,4 +7,7 @@ A payment network arises out of network effects of collection of interconnected See also [decentralization](decentralization.md) and [recentralization](recentralization.md). -## References \ No newline at end of file +## References +1. Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. "Systems competition and network effects." Journal of economic perspectives 8, no. 2 (1994): 93-115. +1. Metcalfe, Bob. "Metcalfe's law after 40 years of ethernet." Computer 46, no. 12 (2013): 26-31. +1. Newman, Mark EJ. "The mathematics of networks." The new palgrave encyclopedia of economics 2, no. 2008 (2008): 1-12. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/order-book.md b/concepts/order-book.md index 2479aed..21970dc 100644 --- a/concepts/order-book.md +++ b/concepts/order-book.md @@ -9,4 +9,7 @@ The other property of an order book making is the *tick size* which refers to th There are vast differences in design of different matching engines and ways of calculating the market maker spread to give rise to different dynamics of [price formation](price-formation.md) on a given exchange. Distortions of the order book and order matching can be used to do [market manipulation](market-manipulation.md). -## References \ No newline at end of file +## References +1. Harris, Larry. Trading and exchanges: Market microstructure for practitioners. OUP USA, 2003. +1. Cont, Rama, Arseniy Kukanov, and Sasha Stoikov. "The price impact of order book events." Journal of financial econometrics 12, no. 1 (2014): 47-88. +1. Mertens, Jean-François. "The limit-price mechanism." Journal of Mathematical Economics 39, no. 5-6 (2003): 433-528. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/paper-wealth.md b/concepts/paper-wealth.md index af2f244..a58c2ff 100644 --- a/concepts/paper-wealth.md +++ b/concepts/paper-wealth.md @@ -3,4 +3,7 @@ Paper wealth is [value](value.md) that is stored on behalf of a customer or coun [Crypto assets](cryptoasset.md) held in [crypto exchanges](crypto-exchange.md) are an example of paper wealth. -See also [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md) and [bank run](bank-run.md). \ No newline at end of file +See also [counterparty risk](counterparty-risk.md) and [bank run](bank-run.md). + +## References +1. Petro, Louis W., James P. Martin, Adam A. Wadecki, and Harry Cendrowski. The handbook of fraud deterrence. John Wiley & Sons, 2007. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/price-formation.md b/concepts/price-formation.md index 36ff0ab..d3052bd 100644 --- a/concepts/price-formation.md +++ b/concepts/price-formation.md @@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ Price formation is an information-gathering process which ensures that market pa ## References 1. Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012. +1. Harris, Larry. Trading and exchanges: Market microstructure for practitioners. OUP USA, 2003. 1. Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417. 1. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. "Size, value, and momentum in international stock returns." Journal of financial economics 105, no. 3 (2012): 457-472. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/regulation.md b/concepts/regulation.md index f61f0ea..0e3c077 100644 --- a/concepts/regulation.md +++ b/concepts/regulation.md @@ -4,4 +4,9 @@ * [Anti-money laundering law](../concepts/aml.md) * [Counter-terrorism financing](../concepts/ctf.md) * [Money services business](../concepts/money-services-business.md) -* [Market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md) \ No newline at end of file +* [Market manipulation](../concepts/market-manipulation.md) + +## References + +1. Dal Bó, Ernesto. "Regulatory capture: A review." Oxford review of economic policy 22, no. 2 (2006): 203-225. +1. Petro, Louis W., James P. Martin, Adam A. Wadecki, and Harry Cendrowski. The handbook of fraud deterrence. John Wiley & Sons, 2007. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/regulatory-capture.md b/concepts/regulatory-capture.md index dd49e9a..869607a 100644 --- a/concepts/regulatory-capture.md +++ b/concepts/regulatory-capture.md @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ # Regulatory Capture The movement of people working in regulatory bodies to take jobs in the industries they used to regulate. This may introduce conflicts of interest which are not in the public interest. -See also [regulatory-arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md). \ No newline at end of file +See also [regulatory arbitrage](regulatory-arbitrage.md). + +## References +1. Dal Bó, Ernesto. "Regulatory capture: A review." Oxford review of economic policy 22, no. 2 (2006): 203-225. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/security.md b/concepts/security.md index 369a25b..3ef8956 100644 --- a/concepts/security.md +++ b/concepts/security.md @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ A legal framework in which counterparties to a contract are given time-varying r ## Examples -* [stock](stock.md) -* [bond](bond.md) -* [derivative](derivative.md) \ No newline at end of file +* [Stock](stock.md) +* [Bond](bond.md) +* [Derivative](derivative.md) + +## References +1. Coffee Jr, John C., Hillary Sale, and M. Todd Henderson. "Securities regulation: Cases and materials." (2015). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/sign-value.md b/concepts/sign-value.md index d6931e6..7050391 100644 --- a/concepts/sign-value.md +++ b/concepts/sign-value.md @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ # Sign Value Sign value denotes and describes the intangible value accorded to an object because of the prestige or social status that it imparts upon the possessor, rather than the [use value](use-value.md) and [income cashflows](income-cashflows.md) derived from the function or use of the asset. -See [art](art.md), [narrative economics](narrative-economics.md), [endowment effect](endowment-effect.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md). \ No newline at end of file +See [art](art.md), [narrative economics](narrative-economics.md), [endowment effect](endowment-effect.md) and [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md). + +## References +1. Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Bread and Circuses Publishing, 2012. +1. Baudrillard, Jean. "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy." (2007). \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/stock.md b/concepts/stock.md index 4d4593d..5a69d52 100644 --- a/concepts/stock.md +++ b/concepts/stock.md @@ -11,4 +11,9 @@ Stocks return [income-cashflows](income-cashflows.md) generated by the enterpris 1. Dividend payments 2. Stock buybacks -3. Mergers and Acquisitions \ No newline at end of file +3. Mergers and Acquisitions + +## References +1. Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work." The journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417. +1. Janeway, William H. Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets, speculation and the state. Cambridge University Press, 2012. +1. Lefevre, Edwin. 2004. Reminiscences of a Stock Operator. Vol. 175. John Wiley & Sons. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/terminal-value.md b/concepts/terminal-value.md index ab1ee6e..5b65921 100644 --- a/concepts/terminal-value.md +++ b/concepts/terminal-value.md @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ # Terminal Value In quantitative finance, the terminal value of a [financial asset](financial-asset.md) is the [present value](present-value.md) of its [income](income-cashflows.md) at a future point in time (called the *horizon*) of all future cash flows can be estimated. -See also [present value](present-value.md). \ No newline at end of file +See also [present value](present-value.md). + +## References +1. Grinold, Richard C., and Ronald N. Kahn. Active portfolio management: Quantitative theory and applications. Probus, 1995. +1. Wilmott, Paul. Paul Wilmott introduces quantitative finance. John Wiley & Sons, 2007. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md b/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md index 45a3fde..3df2a12 100644 --- a/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md +++ b/concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ A acronym or saying that is used within a [high control group](high-control-grou * Anti-intellectualism * Tribalism -See also [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md), [high-control-group](high-control-group.md), [madness of crowds](madness-crowds.md) and [Tinkerbell effect](tinkerbell-effect.md). +See also [bandwagon bias](bandwagon-bias.md), [high-control-group](high-control-group.md), [madness of crowds](madness-crowds.md), [whataboutism](whataboutism.md) and [Tinkerbell effect](tinkerbell-effect.md). ## References 1. Bernstein, William J. 2021. The Delusions of Crowds: Why People Go Mad in Groups. Grove Press. diff --git a/concepts/whataboutism.md b/concepts/whataboutism.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33d5794 --- /dev/null +++ b/concepts/whataboutism.md @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Whataboutism +In debate, a *whataboutism* is a fallacy of responding to an accusation or difficult question by making a counter-accusation or raising a different issue as a means of distracting from the issue at hand. This type of argument is very common in online discussions. + +See also [thought-terminating cliches](../concepts/thought-terminating-cliches.md) and [high control group](../concepts/high-control-group.md). + +## References +1. O’Connell, Eoin. "Whataboutery." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 34, no. 2 (2020): 243-254. +1. Battaly, Heather. "Varieties of epistemic vice." The ethics of belief (2014): 51-76. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/guide/index.md b/guide/index.md index 692e2b9..7744639 100644 --- a/guide/index.md +++ b/guide/index.md @@ -228,6 +228,7 @@ Understand the deeper theoretical concepts behind the technical and economic cla * [Value](../concepts/value.md) * [Use value](../concepts/use-value.md) * [Sign value](../concepts/sign-value.md) +* [Whataboutism](../concepts/whataboutism.md) * [Bubbles](../concepts/bubble.md) * ["Madness of crowds"](../concepts/madness-crowds.md) * [Decentralization](../concepts/decentralization.md) diff --git a/meta/citations-todo.md b/meta/citations-todo.md index 16fd837..8c40e89 100644 --- a/meta/citations-todo.md +++ b/meta/citations-todo.md @@ -33,26 +33,26 @@ First pass Second pass - [ ] [free-rider-problem](../concepts/free-rider-problem.md) -- [ ] [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) -- [ ] [ico](../concepts/ico.md) -- [ ] [illicit-financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md) -- [ ] [kyc](../concepts/kyc.md) -- [ ] [leverage](../concepts/leverage.md) +- [x] [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) +- [x] [ico](../concepts/ico.md) +- [x] [illicit-financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md) +- [x] [kyc](../concepts/kyc.md) +- [x] [leverage](../concepts/leverage.md) - [x] [market](../concepts/market.md) -- [ ] [market-maker](../concepts/market-maker.md) +- [x] [market-maker](../concepts/market-maker.md) - [x] [meme-stock](../concepts/meme-stock.md) - [ ] [mutualization](../concepts/mutualization.md) - [ ] [narrative-economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) -- [ ] [network-effect](../concepts/network-effect.md) -- [ ] [order-book](../concepts/order-book.md) -- [ ] [paper-wealth](../concepts/paper-wealth.md) +- [x] [network-effect](../concepts/network-effect.md) +- [x] [order-book](../concepts/order-book.md) +- [x] [paper-wealth](../concepts/paper-wealth.md) - [ ] [public-goods-problem](../concepts/public-goods-problem.md) - [ ] [real-estate](../concepts/real-estate.md) -- [ ] [regulation](../concepts/regulation.md) -- [ ] [regulatory-capture](../concepts/regulatory-capture.md) -- [ ] [security](../concepts/security.md) -- [ ] [sign-value](../concepts/sign-value.md) -- [ ] [stock](../concepts/stock.md) +- [x] [regulation](../concepts/regulation.md) +- [x] [regulatory-capture](../concepts/regulatory-capture.md) +- [x] [security](../concepts/security.md) +- [x] [sign-value](../concepts/sign-value.md) +- [x] [stock](../concepts/stock.md) - [x] [techno-obscurantism](../concepts/techno-obscurantism.md) - [ ] [terminal-value](../concepts/terminal-value.md) - [ ] [value](../concepts/value.md) diff --git a/meta/concepts-todo.md b/meta/concepts-todo.md index 6082e09..86f5bde 100644 --- a/meta/concepts-todo.md +++ b/meta/concepts-todo.md @@ -107,4 +107,11 @@ Fourth Pass - [x] [cross-bridges](../concepts/cross-bridges.md) - [x] [staking](../concepts/staking.md) - [x] [technopopulism](../concepts/technopopulism.md) -- [x] [yield-farming](../concepts/yield-farming.md) \ No newline at end of file +- [x] [yield-farming](../concepts/yield-farming.md) + +Fifth pass + +- [ ] [enclosure](../concepts/enclosure.md) +- [ ] [amm](../concepts/amm.md) +- [ ] [dex](../concepts/dex.md) +- [ ] [narrative-economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) \ No newline at end of file