From 00add61d501439aafe05c5fa05de8f5929c95fe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: sdiehl Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2022 09:43:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Citations for public goods articles --- claims/is-authoritarianism.md | 2 +- concepts/bandwagon-bias.md | 3 ++- concepts/endowment-effect.md | 3 ++- concepts/free-rider-problem.md | 3 ++- concepts/mutualization.md | 4 +++- concepts/public-goods-problem.md | 14 ++++++++------ meta/citations-todo.md | 6 +++--- 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/claims/is-authoritarianism.md b/claims/is-authoritarianism.md index f826446..473fdfb 100644 --- a/claims/is-authoritarianism.md +++ b/claims/is-authoritarianism.md @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # Bitcoin is not a means to counter authoritarian regimes -Crypto assets are not a safe haven for one’s investments or a a shield against government tyranny. In his whitepaper *Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility*, Nassim Taleb writes of the "safe haven from tyranny" thesis: +Crypto assets are not a safe haven for one’s investments or a shield against government tyranny. In his whitepaper *Bitcoin, Currencies, and Fragility*, Nassim Taleb writes of the "safe haven from tyranny" thesis: > By its very nature, bitcoin is open for all to see. The belief in one’s ability to hide one’s assets from the government with a public blockchain easily triangularizable at endpoints, and not just read by the FBI but also by people in their living rooms, requires a certain lack of financial seasoning and statistical understanding — perhaps even a lack of minimal common sense. For instance a Wolfram Research specialist was able to statistically detect and triangularize "anonymous" ransom payments made by Colonial Pipeline on May 8 in 2021 — and it did not take long for the FBI to restore the funds. We can safely assume that government structures and computational power will remain stronger than those of distributed operators who, while distrusting one another, can fall prey to simple hoaxes > diff --git a/concepts/bandwagon-bias.md b/concepts/bandwagon-bias.md index 2a3d75b..2c7a7bf 100644 --- a/concepts/bandwagon-bias.md +++ b/concepts/bandwagon-bias.md @@ -3,4 +3,5 @@ The bandwagon bias refers to the tendency people have to adopt a certain trend-f See [madness of crowds](madness-crowds.md), [bubble](bubble.md) and [market mania](market-mania.md). -## References \ No newline at end of file +## References +1. Leibenstein, Harvey. "Bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effects in the theory of consumers' demand." The quarterly journal of economics 64, no. 2 (1950): 183-207. diff --git a/concepts/endowment-effect.md b/concepts/endowment-effect.md index 2f37896..acd67a4 100644 --- a/concepts/endowment-effect.md +++ b/concepts/endowment-effect.md @@ -2,4 +2,5 @@ The endowment effect is a result in behavioral economical that people are more likely to retain an object they own than acquire that same object when they do not own it. It is a cognitive distortion in which the perceived [value](value.md) of an [asset](assets.md) is biased by the act of owning it and ties into the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion. Instead of objectively valuing the [asset](asset.md), independent of their holdings, the individual will overvalue assets they currently hold. ## References -1. Plott, Charles R., and Kathryn Zeiler. "Exchange asymmetries incorrectly interpreted as evidence of endowment effect theory and prospect theory?." American Economic Review 97, no. 4 (2007): 1449-1466. \ No newline at end of file +1. Plott, Charles R., and Kathryn Zeiler. "Exchange asymmetries incorrectly interpreted as evidence of endowment effect theory and prospect theory?." American Economic Review 97, no. 4 (2007): 1449-1466. +1. Leibenstein, Harvey. "Bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effects in the theory of consumers' demand." The quarterly journal of economics 64, no. 2 (1950): 183-207. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/free-rider-problem.md b/concepts/free-rider-problem.md index 42c43bc..9c8f9a6 100644 --- a/concepts/free-rider-problem.md +++ b/concepts/free-rider-problem.md @@ -3,4 +3,5 @@ The use of [public goods](public-goods-problem.md) by parties who do not contrib See also [public goods problem](public-goods-problem.md). -## References \ No newline at end of file +## References +1. Oakland, William H. "Theory of public goods." In Handbook of public economics, vol. 2, pp. 485-535. Elsevier, 1987. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/mutualization.md b/concepts/mutualization.md index 8ca4744..732d84b 100644 --- a/concepts/mutualization.md +++ b/concepts/mutualization.md @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@ # Mutualization In finance, the *mutualization* of risk is the process of dividing up exposure to potential risk or financial losses among many or all shareholders in a financial structure. -See also [deposit insurance](deposit-insurance.md) and [bank run](bank-run.md). +See also [deposit insurance](deposit-insurance.md), [bank run](bank-run.md) and [public goods problem](public-goods-problem.md). ## References +1. Oakland, William H. "Theory of public goods." In Handbook of public economics, vol. 2, pp. 485-535. Elsevier, 1987. +1. Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The theory of local public goods." In The economics of public services, pp. 274-333. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1977. 1. Roche, Cullen O. 2011. ‘Understanding the Modern Monetary System’. http://ssrn.com/paper=1905625. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/concepts/public-goods-problem.md b/concepts/public-goods-problem.md index 19b748b..2378d92 100644 --- a/concepts/public-goods-problem.md +++ b/concepts/public-goods-problem.md @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ # Public Goods Problem -A problem in economics where a collective good or service must be sustained by [mutualization](mutualization.md) of funds across different parties with different incentives while maintaining universal access. +A problem in economics where a collective good or service must be sustained by [mutualization](mutualization.md) of funds across different parties with different incentives while maintaining access. -City parks are a public good. +* National defence is a public good. +* Open source software is a public good. +* City parks are a public good. -[Money](money.md) is a public good. +See also [free rider problem](free-rider-problem.md). -See also [free-rider-problem](free-rider-problem.md). - -## References \ No newline at end of file +## References +1. Oakland, William H. "Theory of public goods." In Handbook of public economics, vol. 2, pp. 485-535. Elsevier, 1987. +1. Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The theory of local public goods." In The economics of public services, pp. 274-333. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1977. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/meta/citations-todo.md b/meta/citations-todo.md index 75c77c0..54d35c7 100644 --- a/meta/citations-todo.md +++ b/meta/citations-todo.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ First pass - [ ] [artificial-demand](../concepts/artificial-demand.md) - [x] [artificial-scarcity](../concepts/artificial-scarcity.md) - [x] [austrian-economics](../concepts/austrian-economics.md) -- [ ] [bandwagon-bias](../concepts/bandwagon-bias.md) +- [x] [bandwagon-bias](../concepts/bandwagon-bias.md) - [x] [bank](../concepts/bank.md) - [x] [bank-run](../concepts/bank.md) - [x] [bearer-instrument](../concepts/bearer-instrument.md) @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ First pass Second pass -- [ ] [free-rider-problem](../concepts/free-rider-problem.md) +- [x] [free-rider-problem](../concepts/free-rider-problem.md) - [x] [gambling](../concepts/gambling.md) - [x] [ico](../concepts/ico.md) - [x] [illicit-financing](../concepts/illicit-financing.md) @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Second pass - [x] [market-maker](../concepts/market-maker.md) - [x] [meme-stock](../concepts/meme-stock.md) - [ ] [mutualization](../concepts/mutualization.md) -- [ ] [narrative-economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) +- [x] [narrative-economics](../concepts/narrative-economics.md) - [x] [network-effect](../concepts/network-effect.md) - [x] [order-book](../concepts/order-book.md) - [x] [paper-wealth](../concepts/paper-wealth.md)