We don't need to start with the ETH smart contracts - those are too hard to use and not indicative of the REAL VALUE being unlocked here.  It's too tied up in the "tokens as money" theme, which makes people innately distrust these tools.

You want to separate tokens from money? Use Louis' token generator machine to create non-financialized 'voice tokens' and give them to your citizens to give you input on things in real time. Allocate a budget towards your community needs.

Individual implementations are too limited based on their context. CV v1 turned out to be not fit for purpose (needs a lot of funds and a competitive grant ecosystem to avoid just being a hole in the treasury). 

We need to start with examples - LampDAO, collectively controlling the brightness of the lights in the room.

Let people FEEL the clunky-ness of discrete voting on collective decision making (of certain sorts). Let them understand why dynamic input is important.  Let them understand why token voting is important (intensity of preference vs "1 person 1 vote")

What other problems have we seen with CV so far?

Voter apathy is a thing. Early DAO experiment results are in: people STILL don't like to vote!  Everybody likes to talk about governance, but it turns out nobody wants to actually do it. So, what do we do with that?  

Could consider reducing the cognitive overhead for a given individual by asking them to delegate their vote on any given topic to someone in their network who knows more about the topic than they do. Or, if they feel so inclined, they can vote themself!  

Delegated democracy!  Even better, fluid delegated democracy. Osmotic Governance.

What's interesting about liquid democracy is it preserves the **proportionality** of vote weight throughout the delegation process. A delegate who is trusted by 100 people in the community votes with the weight of 100, and the delegate at the table beside him who only votes for 5 has a proportionally smaller voice. 

The current system of representative democracy removes this proportionality from the representation process, where one delegate who may have massive support from a broad base gets one vote at council, the same weight as a heavily disliked and polarizing candidate elected on slim margins. It is in these chokepoints of representation that rule by the minority can become the norm, how our current governance systems became captured by special interests, and no longer speak for the majority of citizens.
